Hollerud v. Malamis
1969 Mich. App. LEXIS 912, 174 N.W.2d 626, 20 Mich. App. 748 (1969)
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Rule of Law:
Consent to an intentional tort, such as assault and battery, is ineffective if the plaintiff's intoxication renders them incapable of expressing a rational will, and the defendant has knowledge of this condition. Furthermore, a child's right to sue for loss of support under the dramshop act is not defeated by the fact that their needs were met by another source.
Facts:
- On December 14, 1962, Edward Hollerud consumed 12 bottles of beer at Pinky's Bar.
- Hollerud then went to the Rainbow Bar, where he consumed four additional beers.
- While at the Rainbow Bar, Hollerud engaged in an Indian wrestling contest with the bartender.
- During the contest, Hollerud sustained injuries to the fingers on his left hand.
- Hollerud, a bricklayer by trade, claimed the injury permanently impaired his ability to work.
- Hollerud's daughter, Karen Hollerud, alleged that her father's injuries deprived her of his financial support.
- A few days before the wrestling incident, on December 10, 1962, Hollerud had been injured in an automobile accident.
Procedural Posture:
- Edward Hollerud and Karen Hollerud (plaintiffs) filed a complaint against the owners of Pinky's Bar and Rainbow Bar (defendants) in a Michigan trial court.
- The defendants filed motions for summary judgment, arguing the plaintiffs failed to state a valid cause of action.
- The trial judge granted the defendants' motions, dismissing all claims.
- The plaintiffs appealed the trial court's dismissal to the Michigan Court of Appeals (an intermediate appellate court).
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Issue:
Can an intoxicated person successfully sue for assault and battery despite appearing to consent to the act, if their intoxication was so severe that they could not rationally consent and the defendant knew of their condition?
Opinions:
Majority - Levin, J.
Yes, an intoxicated person can successfully sue for assault and battery even if they appeared to consent, provided certain conditions are met. While consent is ordinarily a complete defense to assault and battery, such consent is ineffective if the plaintiff was so intoxicated that they were incapable of expressing a rational will and the defendant knew of this incapacitated state. Hollerud alleged he was in a drunken condition, that the bartender knew it, and that he did not voluntarily enter the contest. These allegations create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he was capable of consenting, which must be decided by a trier of fact. The consent defense therefore fails at the summary judgment stage, and the assault and battery claim should proceed to trial. The court also held that Karen Hollerud's dramshop act claim was improperly dismissed, as a child's right to support is damaged regardless of whether another relative provides for her needs. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of Edward Hollerud's negligence claim against the bars, declining to create a new common-law cause of action for an intoxicated person against a vendor for their own injuries based on ordinary negligence.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the boundary of the consent defense in tort law, establishing that intoxication can vitiate consent when it is so severe that it prevents rational decision-making and this incapacity is known to the defendant. It prevents a defendant from knowingly engaging in risky behavior with an incapacitated person and then using their invalid 'consent' as a shield. The ruling also reinforces Michigan's position that the dramshop act is the exclusive statutory remedy against vendors and declines to expand common-law negligence liability to allow recovery for the intoxicated person themselves, distinguishing between liability for selling alcohol and liability for a separate, subsequent tort.
