Yes, a lawyer's actions can be an 'extraordinary' reason, if they are bad enough. The lower court's rule that the lawyer had to be dishonest or act in bad faith was too strict. Fairness requires looking at each case individually. A simple mistake by a lawyer isn't enough to get an extension. But here, the lawyer's behavior—ignoring his client for years, missing a crucial deadline he was warned about, and not even knowing the basic facts of the case—was far more than a simple mistake. Because Holland himself tried so hard to keep his case moving, we are sending the case back to the lower courts to decide if the lawyer's terrible performance was extraordinary enough to excuse the late filing.

No. When you have a lawyer, their mistakes are your mistakes. The law already lists the specific reasons a deadline can be extended, and 'my lawyer messed up' isn't one of them. We've already said that a lawyer miscalculating a deadline isn't a good enough reason, and this case isn't different. If we start making exceptions for bad lawyering, everyone will claim their lawyer was bad, and the deadline will become meaningless.

Yes, but let's be clearer about why. It's not about how 'bad' the lawyer was; it's about whether the lawyer was even acting like the client's lawyer at all. Normal mistakes, even big ones, are the client's problem. But Holland is saying his lawyer completely abandoned him. When a lawyer basically quits on a client without telling them, the client can't be blamed for what the lawyer fails to do. If Holland can prove his lawyer truly abandoned him, that would be an extraordinary circumstance.

Yes, the one-year deadline can sometimes be extended if there are really special situations, because the rule is not super strict and doesn't say it can never be extended. What happened with Holland's lawyer seems worse than just regular mistakes and might be a special situation that allows for more time. The lower court's rule saying the lawyer has to do something really bad on purpose is too strict. Courts have to look at each case carefully to decide if more time should be allowed. The case is sent back to the lower court to look at it again.

Agrees that sometimes the deadline can be extended and that the lower court used the wrong rule. Explains more that just a lawyer being careless, even if really careless, isn't enough for more time because the prisoner has to deal with what their lawyer does. But if a lawyer does something so bad it's like they stopped being the prisoner's lawyer at all, that might be a special situation out of the prisoner's control. If what Holland says is true, it could be this kind of situation, especially if the state stopped him from getting a new lawyer or going to court on his own.

No, the one-year deadline can't be extended. The rule is very specific about when exceptions are allowed, which shows that it's not supposed to have extra exceptions. Even if extensions were sometimes allowed, Holland wouldn't get one because lawyers' mistakes, even really bad ones, still count as the prisoner's mistake. The majority doesn't explain clearly what counts as a special situation that allows an extension.

A petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling "only if he shows `(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way'and prevented timely filing. "

The Supreme Court has held that AEDPA's statute of limitations "is subject to equitable tolling in appropriate cases."

The one-year statute of limitations in AEDPA is not jurisdictional and is subject to equitable tolling.

The Supreme Court has "held that a garden variety claim of excusable neglect, such as a simple miscalculation that leads a lawyer to miss a filing deadline does not warrant equitable tolling."

The diligence required for equitable tolling purposes is reasonable diligence, not maximum feasible diligence

However, as the Supreme Court recently explained in Holland, equitable tolling can be applied in the "absence of an allegation and proof of bad faith, dishonesty, divided loyalty,[or] mental impairment."

Yes, an attorney's professional misconduct beyond simple negligence can constitute an 'extraordinary circumstance' warranting equitable tolling. First, the Court holds that AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations is not jurisdictional and is therefore subject to a rebuttable presumption in favor of equitable tolling. This presumption is not overcome by the statute's text or purpose. Second, the Eleventh Circuit's rigid rule requiring 'bad faith, dishonesty, divided loyalty, mental impairment or so forth' to justify tolling for attorney misconduct is rejected. Equity demands flexibility and a case-by-case analysis, and a per se rule is inappropriate. While 'garden variety' claims of attorney negligence like a simple miscalculation do not suffice, egregious conduct, such as an attorney's failure to communicate with a client for years and failure to file a petition despite repeated requests, may rise to the level of an extraordinary circumstance. Holland's own actions demonstrated reasonable diligence, and the case is remanded for the lower courts to determine if Collins's conduct constituted an extraordinary circumstance under this more flexible standard.

No, attorney misconduct, regardless of its severity, should not be a basis for equitable tolling under AEDPA. The statute's detailed scheme of specific exceptions and tolling provisions implies that Congress did not intend for courts to create additional ones. Under fundamental principles of agency law, an attorney's acts and omissions are attributable to the client, and therefore cannot be an 'extraordinary circumstance' external to the petitioner. This case is controlled by Lawrence v. Florida, which held that an attorney's miscalculation of the filing deadline does not warrant equitable tolling. Collins's failures, whether a misreading of the law or simple negligence, are legally indistinguishable. By rejecting a clear rule and vaguely gesturing toward 'canons of professional responsibility,' the majority provides no clear guidance and improperly expands judicial power to rewrite statutory deadlines.

Yes, but the standard requires clarification. While attorney negligence, even gross negligence, is not an extraordinary circumstance because it is attributable to the client, equitable tolling is appropriate where attorney misconduct is so severe that it is not constructively attributable to the petitioner. This occurs when an attorney has effectively abandoned the client, ceasing to act as the client's agent in any meaningful sense. Holland's allegations—that Collins completely failed to communicate for years and that Holland's own efforts to terminate the representation were thwarted—if true, would constitute such abandonment. This provides a basis for tolling that is distinct from mere negligence. The case should be remanded for the lower courts to consider whether Collins's conduct amounted to abandonment.

Yes, the AEDPA statute of limitations is subject to equitable tolling in appropriate cases because the statute is nonjurisdictional and does not contain unusually emphatic language that would rebut the presumption in favor of equitable tolling. The facts of Holland's case go beyond garden variety negligence and present extraordinary circumstances that may warrant equitable tolling. The Eleventh Circuit's rigid standard requiring bad faith, dishonesty, divided loyalty, or mental impairment is too narrow. Courts must exercise judgment and flexibility in determining whether equitable tolling is appropriate based on the specific circumstances of each case. The case is remanded for further proceedings to determine if Holland is entitled to equitable tolling.

Agrees that equitable tolling is available under AEDPA and that the Eleventh Circuit applied the wrong standard. Provides additional guidance, explaining that attorney negligence, even if gross, does not warrant equitable tolling because it is attributable to the client. However, attorney misconduct that amounts to effective abandonment of the client may constitute an extraordinary circumstance beyond the client's control. Holland's allegations, if true, could meet this standard, especially if the State prevented him from terminating counsel and proceeding pro se.

No, AEDPA's statute of limitations does not allow for equitable tolling. The statute's detailed and specific exceptions show that Congress did not intend for equitable tolling to apply. Even if equitable tolling were available, Holland would not qualify because attorney negligence, however egregious, is attributable to the client and does not constitute an extraordinary circumstance. The majority provides no clear guidance to lower courts on what circumstances warrant equitable tolling.

Holland v. Florida

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