Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project
2010 U.S. LEXIS 5252, 561 U.S. 1, 177 L. Ed. 2d 355 (2010)
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Rule of Law:
The federal statute criminalizing the provision of "material support or resources" to designated foreign terrorist organizations does not violate the First Amendment's guarantees of free speech and association when applied to prohibit providing training, expert advice, and other services, even if intended to support only the organization's lawful activities. The government's compelling interest in national security and foreign relations justifies the prohibition, as any support lends legitimacy to the terrorist organization and frees up its resources for violent ends.
Facts:
- The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) is an organization seeking to establish an independent Kurdish state in southeastern Turkey.
- The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) is an organization that sought to create an independent Tamil state in Sri Lanka.
- The U.S. Secretary of State designated both the PKK and the LTTE as "foreign terrorist organizations" (FTOs) due to their engagement in terrorist activities.
- The Humanitarian Law Project (HLP), along with several U.S. citizens and organizations, wished to support the lawful, nonviolent activities of the PKK and LTTE.
- Specifically, HLP sought to provide training to PKK members on how to use international humanitarian law for peaceful dispute resolution and how to petition the United Nations for relief.
- Other plaintiffs sought to engage in political advocacy on behalf of Kurds in Turkey and Tamils in Sri Lanka, in coordination with the PKK and LTTE.
- The plaintiffs feared criminal prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, which prohibits knowingly providing "material support or resources" to designated FTOs.
Procedural Posture:
- Plaintiffs (Humanitarian Law Project et al.) filed a pre-enforcement suit against the U.S. Government in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, challenging the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B.
- The District Court granted a preliminary injunction for the plaintiffs, finding the terms "personnel" and "training" were likely unconstitutionally vague as applied.
- The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court's grant of the preliminary injunction.
- After Congress amended the statute to add "expert advice or assistance," plaintiffs filed a second suit, and the District Court again found the new term vague.
- While appeals were pending, Congress again amended the statute, defining several key terms. The Ninth Circuit remanded the cases for reconsideration in light of the amendments.
- On remand, the District Court consolidated the cases and again granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs, holding that the terms "training," "service," and "expert advice or assistance" remained unconstitutionally vague.
- The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part, finding that several terms remained vague because they covered plaintiffs' constitutionally protected advocacy.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to both the Government's petition and the plaintiffs' conditional cross-petition.
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Issue:
Does the federal statute prohibiting the knowing provision of "material support or resources" to a designated foreign terrorist organization, specifically in the forms of "training," "expert advice or assistance," "personnel," and "service," violate the First Amendment rights of free speech and association or the Fifth Amendment right to due process when applied to plaintiffs who seek to provide support for the lawful, nonviolent activities of such organizations?
Opinions:
Majority - Chief Justice Roberts
No. The federal statute prohibiting material support to designated foreign terrorist organizations, as applied to the plaintiffs' proposed activities, does not violate the First and Fifth Amendments. The statute is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to plaintiffs because their proposed conduct—training and advising the PKK—falls clearly within the statutory definitions of "training" and "expert advice or assistance." While the statute regulates speech based on content and is subject to a demanding standard, it is justified by the government's compelling interest in combating terrorism. Congress and the Executive Branch have reasonably concluded that any contribution to a foreign terrorist organization, even for peaceful purposes, is fungible and serves to legitimize the group, thereby facilitating its overall terrorist mission. The Court must grant significant deference to the political branches' predictive judgments in matters of national security and foreign policy. The statute does not violate the freedom of association because it bans the act of providing material support, not mere membership in or advocacy for a group.
Dissenting - Justice Breyer
Yes. The statute, as interpreted and applied by the majority, violates the First Amendment. The plaintiffs' proposed activities, such as teaching peaceful dispute resolution, constitute core political speech that receives the highest First Amendment protection. The government's justifications—that such support is "fungible" or that it "legitimizes" the terrorist group—are abstract, speculative, and lack specific evidentiary support. This reasoning has no logical stopping point and is inconsistent with precedents protecting association with groups that have both lawful and unlawful aims, such as the Communist Party cases. To avoid these grave constitutional doubts, the statute should be interpreted, under the canon of constitutional avoidance, to criminalize only support that the provider knows or intends will assist the organization’s unlawful terrorist activities.
Analysis:
This decision significantly strengthens the government's ability to prosecute individuals and groups for providing non-monetary, speech-based support to designated foreign terrorist organizations. By holding that even support intended for peaceful ends can be criminalized, the Court prioritized national security over First Amendment protections in this context. The ruling establishes a high degree of deference to the legislative and executive branches' judgments on how to combat terrorism, making it very difficult to challenge the "material support" statute on First Amendment grounds. The decision creates a significant chilling effect on the work of human rights organizations, lawyers, and academics who may need to interact with designated groups to promote peace or provide humanitarian aid.
