Hogan v. Gibson

Majority - Lucero, Circuit Judge

Yes, the failure to instruct the jury on first-degree manslaughter violated Hogan's constitutional due process rights under Beck v. Alabama because the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to warrant such an instruction. The Supreme Court's decision in Beck v. Alabama establishes that a death sentence cannot be imposed if the jury was not permitted to consider a lesser included non-capital offense when the evidence would have supported such a verdict, as this prevents an "all-or-nothing" choice that enhances the risk of unwarranted capital convictions. The Tenth Circuit has previously affirmed that Beck applies to Oklahoma, despite Oklahoma's three sentencing options, because a capital defendant is entitled to a lesser included instruction when warranted, regardless of sentencing discretion. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA) erred by assuming a self-defense instruction constituted a 'lesser included offense' or 'third option' under Beck. Self-defense, if successfully proven as 'perfect' self-defense, results in acquittal, not conviction of a lesser crime, thereby failing to address the fundamental dilemma underlying Beck. The OCCA also erred by focusing on the sufficiency of evidence for the greater offense (premeditated murder) rather than conducting the correct Beck inquiry into whether the evidence might allow a jury to acquit a defendant of the greater offense and convict him of the lesser. Given that the OCCA made no findings as to whether Hogan had presented sufficient evidence to warrant a first-degree manslaughter instruction, AEDPA deference does not apply, and the federal court reviews the district court's conclusion de novo. Applying the standard that a defendant is entitled to a lesser included instruction if the evidence would permit a jury rationally to find him guilty of the lesser offense and acquit him of the greater, Hogan's confession, which was central to the state's case, contained sufficient evidence to warrant a first-degree manslaughter instruction. Hogan's confession described Stanley's initial knife attack, his belief she was going for another weapon, his fear of false rape accusations, and his description of the killing as if 'somebody else' was doing it and he 'couldn't stop him.' This evidence could lead a rational jury to find 'adequate provocation' and 'heat of passion' (such as fear, terror, or anger) rendering him incapable of forming an intent to kill, consistent with Oklahoma's first-degree manslaughter statute. The district court erred in dismissing Hogan's confession as merely 'self-serving statements' and in concluding that multiple stab wounds by themselves 'clearly indicate' a 'design to effect death.' Under Oklahoma law, the quantity and quality of wounds cannot be viewed in isolation as irrefutable evidence of premeditation, and evidence of intent does not necessarily prohibit a court from issuing an instruction on manslaughter, as the totality of circumstances must be considered. Furthermore, the facts strikingly resembled those in Williams v. State, an Oklahoma case where similar circumstances warranted a first-degree manslaughter instruction. A Beck error can never be harmless. Therefore, Hogan's constitutional rights were violated, necessitating a new trial.