Hoffman v. Jones
280 So.2d 431 (1973)
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Rule of Law:
A plaintiff's contributory negligence in a tort action is no longer a complete bar to recovery. Florida adopts the doctrine of "pure" comparative negligence, under which a plaintiff's recovery is reduced in proportion to their degree of fault.
Facts:
- William Harrison Jones, Jr., died as a result of a traffic accident.
- The other driver involved in the accident was Philip Francis Hoffman, Jr.
- At the time of the collision, Hoffman was an employee of Pav-a-Way Corporation, acting within the scope of his employment.
- The estate of Jones, represented by administratrix Hazel J. Jones, sued Hoffman and Pav-a-Way for wrongful death based on negligence.
- Evidence presented during the dispute suggested that the deceased, William Harrison Jones, Jr., was himself negligent and partially at fault for the accident.
Procedural Posture:
- Hazel J. Jones, as administratrix of the estate of William Harrison Jones, Jr., sued Philip Francis Hoffman, Jr., and Pav-a-Way Corporation in a Florida trial court for wrongful death.
- The trial court instructed the jury on the doctrine of contributory negligence.
- The jury returned a verdict for the defendants, Hoffman and Pav-a-Way Corporation.
- Jones (appellant) appealed the judgment to the Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District.
- The District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's judgment, holding that the rule of contributory negligence should be replaced with comparative negligence.
- The District Court of Appeal then certified the question to the Supreme Court of Florida as one of great public interest, and Hoffman and Pav-a-Way (petitioners) sought review.
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Issue:
Does Florida's judicially-created common law doctrine of contributory negligence, which acts as a complete bar to recovery for a plaintiff who is partially at fault, require judicial replacement with the doctrine of comparative negligence to apportion damages according to the respective fault of the parties?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Adkins
Yes. The judicially-created doctrine of contributory negligence is an unjust and inequitable rule that must be replaced by the doctrine of pure comparative negligence. The court has the authority to alter common law rules that it created, especially when social conditions and modern conceptions of justice demand change. The historical justification for contributory negligence—to protect nascent industries—is no longer valid. The rule is harsh because it denies any recovery to a plaintiff who is only slightly at fault, and juries often disregard it, leading to disrespect for the law. A system of pure comparative negligence, which apportions liability according to fault, is a more equitable and socially desirable method of loss distribution.
Dissenting - Justice Roberts
No. The judiciary is not empowered to replace the established doctrine of contributory negligence, as such a change is a legislative function that falls outside the Court's authority. The doctrine of contributory negligence was part of the English common law prior to 1776 and was adopted as the statutory law of Florida. Abrogating this long-standing rule by judicial decree violates the separation of powers doctrine. If such a fundamental change is to be made, it should be done by the legislature after public hearings and debate, not by judicial fiat.
Analysis:
This is a landmark decision in Florida tort law that abolished the harsh, all-or-nothing common law rule of contributory negligence. By judicially adopting the "pure" form of comparative negligence, the Florida Supreme Court positioned the state as a leader in tort reform, fundamentally altering the landscape of negligence litigation. The decision significantly increased the likelihood of recovery for injured plaintiffs and changed how lawyers evaluate cases, how insurance companies calculate risk, and how juries are instructed to apportion fault and damages.
