Hodel v. Irving
481 U.S. 704, 107 S. Ct. 2076 (1987)
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Rule of Law:
A government regulation that completely abolishes the essential rights of descent and devise for a particular class of property, even when pursuing a valid public purpose, constitutes a taking requiring just compensation under the Fifth Amendment.
Facts:
- In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the U.S. government allotted communal Indian reservation lands to individual tribe members, with the United States holding the land in trust.
- Over generations, the rules of intestate succession caused these individual allotments to become severely fractionated, with single parcels of land having dozens or even hundreds of co-owners.
- This fractionation made the land economically unproductive and created overwhelming administrative burdens for the Bureau of Indian Affairs.
- To address this, Congress passed the Indian Land Consolidation Act of 1983. Section 207 of the Act provided that any fractional interest representing 2% or less of a tract's total acreage and earning less than $100 in the prior year would escheat to the tribe upon the owner's death.
- This escheat provision prevented the owner from passing the interest on to their heirs through a will (devise) or through the laws of intestacy.
- Mary Irving, Patrick Pumpkin Seed, and Eileen Bissonette were heirs or devisees of several members of the Oglala Sioux Tribe who died shortly after the Act's passage.
- The decedents owned numerous small fractional interests that met the criteria for escheat under Section 207.
- Pursuant to the Act, the Department of the Interior determined that these interests escheated to the tribe, thereby preventing the appellees from inheriting property valued at several thousand dollars.
Procedural Posture:
- Mary Irving and others (appellees) filed a lawsuit against the Secretary of the Interior in the United States District Court for the District of South Dakota.
- The lawsuit claimed that Section 207 of the Indian Land Consolidation Act of 1983 resulted in a taking of their decedents' property without just compensation, violating the Fifth Amendment.
- The District Court found the statute constitutional and granted summary judgment in favor of the government.
- The appellees appealed the decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
- The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court, holding that the statute violated the Fifth Amendment by taking the decedents' right to control the disposition of their property at death.
- The government (as appellant) sought and was granted a writ of certiorari from the U.S. Supreme Court.
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Issue:
Does a federal statute that completely abolishes the right to devise or bequeath by intestacy certain small, undivided fractional interests in Indian lands, causing those interests to escheat to the tribe without compensation, constitute an unconstitutional taking of property under the Fifth Amendment?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice O'Connor
Yes. A federal statute that completely abolishes the rights of descent and devise for a certain class of property constitutes an unconstitutional taking. While the government has a valid public purpose in solving the problem of land fractionation, the character of this particular governmental regulation is extraordinary. The right to pass property to one's heirs is a fundamental and essential 'stick in the bundle of rights' that constitutes property ownership. The complete abrogation of both descent and devise for an entire class of property goes too far and is a taking of property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment. This is distinguishable from regulations that merely limit one right, such as the right to sell, because here the regulation extinguishes the core right to transmit property at death.
Concurring - Justice Brennan
Yes. This case is an unusual one due to the unique history and negotiations that gave rise to the property rights and expectations at issue. This context supports the conclusion that the statute effected a taking, and the Court's opinion should not be read to limit the holding in Andrus v. Allard.
Concurring - Justice Scalia
Yes. The statute at issue is functionally indistinguishable from the regulation upheld in Andrus v. Allard, which prohibited the sale of certain property. Because the Court finds a taking here, today's decision effectively limits the precedent of Andrus v. Allard to its specific facts.
Concurring - Justice Stevens
Yes. While I agree the statute is unconstitutional, the majority's takings analysis is flawed and resembles a First Amendment overbreadth doctrine. The proper ground for invalidating the statute is the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The statute is unconstitutional because it became effective immediately and failed to provide property owners with a reasonable grace period to arrange their affairs (e.g., by consolidating their interests) to avoid the escheat. This lack of notice and opportunity to comply constitutes a deprivation of property without due process of law.
Analysis:
This decision establishes that the right to transmit property at death through devise and descent is a fundamental, constitutionally protected property right that cannot be completely eliminated by the government without just compensation. The case places a significant limit on the government's regulatory power, even when it is acting to solve a serious public problem. The ruling reinforces the 'bundle of sticks' metaphor for property rights, suggesting that when a regulation destroys a core 'stick' like the right of inheritance, it is more likely to be deemed a taking. The multiple concurring opinions also highlight ongoing debates about the proper framework for analyzing regulatory takings and the relationship between the Takings and Due Process Clauses.
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