Hobbiebrunken v. G & S ENTERPRISES, INC.
470 N.W.2d 19, 1991 WL 78497 (1991)
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Rule of Law:
Under Iowa's amended dramshop statute, a liquor licensee is liable for injuries caused by an intoxicated patron only if the plaintiff proves the licensee had actual or constructive knowledge of the patron's intoxication. This standard does not impose a heightened, affirmative duty on the licensee to investigate a patron's condition.
Facts:
- On the evening of August 16, 1986, Douglas Hobbiebrunken consumed alcohol before leaving his home by boat.
- Around 10:00 p.m., he went to the Shady Beach Lounge, where he continued to drink.
- At approximately midnight, Hobbiebrunken gave four female college students a boat ride from the Shady Beach Lounge to the Waterfront Lounge.
- At the Waterfront, Hobbiebrunken ordered one round of drinks for the group.
- Evidence was unclear as to whether Hobbiebrunken consumed any additional alcohol at the Waterfront after the first round.
- Around 1:15 a.m., while driving the boat back towards Shady Beach, Hobbiebrunken crashed into an unlighted dock and was killed.
- A subsequent autopsy revealed that Hobbiebrunken had a blood alcohol level of .382.
Procedural Posture:
- Phyllis Hobbiebrunken, on behalf of herself and her minor children, filed a dramshop liability lawsuit in Iowa district court against the owners of the Shady Beach Lounge and the Waterfront Lounge.
- The plaintiff settled with the owner of the Shady Beach Lounge, who was then dismissed from the lawsuit.
- The case against G & S Enterprises, Inc., owner of the Waterfront, proceeded to a jury trial.
- The jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant, G & S Enterprises, Inc.
- The plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial, arguing errors in jury instructions and evidence admission.
- The district court denied the plaintiff's motion for a new trial.
- The plaintiff appealed the denial of the new trial motion to the Supreme Court of Iowa.
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Issue:
Does the 'knew or should have known' standard in Iowa's dramshop statute, Iowa Code § 123.92, impose a heightened affirmative duty on a liquor licensee to investigate a patron's condition to determine if they are intoxicated?
Opinions:
Majority - Andreasen, J.
No. The 'knew or should have known' standard in Iowa's dramshop statute does not create a heightened affirmative duty for a licensee to investigate a patron's condition. The 1986 amendment to Iowa Code § 123.92 abolished the previous strict liability standard and replaced it with a requirement that the plaintiff prove the licensee's knowledge of the patron's intoxication. The court reasoned that the phrase 'knew or should have known' simply provides two standards for proving knowledge: a subjective one ('knew') and an objective one ('should have known'). The objective standard is based on what a reasonably observant person would have known under similar circumstances. The court explicitly rejected the plaintiff's argument that this language imposes a duty analogous to that of a landowner to an invitee, stating that if the legislature had intended such a significant affirmative duty, it would have done so unambiguously. Therefore, the trial court's jury instruction defining the standard was adequate, and the plaintiff's proposed instruction imposing an affirmative duty to ascertain a patron's condition was correctly refused.
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarifies the scope of liability for liquor licensees in Iowa following the 1986 legislative shift away from strict liability. By interpreting 'knew or should have known' as a standard negligence-based knowledge requirement, the court prevented the creation of a quasi-strict liability regime through judicial interpretation. The ruling solidifies that the burden remains on the plaintiff to demonstrate that the patron's intoxication was apparent to a reasonable observer, rather than shifting the burden to the licensee to prove they took active steps to investigate every patron. This precedent makes it more difficult for plaintiffs to succeed in dramshop cases, as they must produce evidence of the patron's visible intoxication at the time of service.
