Hislop v. Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement & Power District
197 Ariz. 553, 5 P.2d 267, 5 P.3d 267 (2000)
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Rule of Law:
Arizona law does not permit recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress to a bystander who is merely a co-worker and close friend of the negligently injured person; rather, such claims are restricted to those with a familial or closely akin relationship due to policy considerations weighing against expanding liability to non-familial relationships.
Facts:
- Nanette Hislop, Michael McLaurin, and Larry Matthews were co-workers on a City of Phoenix sewer service crew.
- On August 22, 1995, Matthews was repairing a sewer main in an open trench.
- Hislop and McLaurin were standing at the edge of the trench, just inches away from Matthews.
- Matthews struck a high-voltage underground power line with a jackhammer, causing him to burst into flames as electricity coursed through his body.
- A fireball emitted by the electrocution shot four to six feet out of the trench, momentarily engulfing Hislop and McLaurin, although they were not burned.
- Hislop ran to radio for help, while McLaurin seized a fire extinguisher and put out the flames consuming Matthews.
- McLaurin then climbed into the trench and carried the unconscious Matthews to the surface.
- Matthews died three weeks after the incident.
- Hislop and McLaurin alleged they had both been close friends of Matthews.
Procedural Posture:
- Appellants Nanette Hislop and Michael McLaurin sued appellees (the allegedly negligent parties) in a trial court (Superior Court).
- Among other claims, appellants sought recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress for witnessing their co-worker Larry Matthews' electrocution.
- Appellees filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that a claim for bystander emotional distress is available only to a plaintiff who has witnessed an injury to a close family member.
- The trial court granted summary judgment to appellees, concluding that Arizona had never permitted anyone other than an actual family member to recover for bystander emotional distress and declining to extend recovery to encompass close friends.
- The parties stipulated to the dismissal of the remaining negligence and negligence per se claims.
- Appellants timely appealed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the Court of Appeals of Arizona.
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Issue:
Does Arizona law permit recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress to a bystander who is a co-worker and close friend, but not a family member, of a negligently injured person, or should the law be expanded to allow such recovery?
Opinions:
Majority - Sult, Judge
No, Arizona law does not permit recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress to a bystander who is a co-worker and close friend of a negligently injured person, and sound policy reasons favor denying such a claim. The court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment. The court reviewed Keck v. Jackson, which required a "close personal relationship, either by consanguinity or otherwise." The court interpreted the phrase "or otherwise" to mean a familial relationship or something closely akin thereto, referencing Leong v. Takasaki involving a step-grandmother in a unique family context, rather than a broad inclusion of friends. The majority found that if Keck had intended a significant expansion of bystander recovery, it would have been clearly announced, given that Keck itself involved a parent-child relationship. The majority rejected using foreseeability as the analytical framework for determining liability, deeming it unworkable and prone to being manipulated to achieve policy decisions. Instead, the court explicitly based its decision on policy considerations. While acknowledging Arizona's policy interest in fully compensating injured plaintiffs for valid emotional distress and recognizing the value of co-worker and friend relationships, the court found stronger policy reasons to limit recovery. These included the fear of unlimited liability, the difficulty of drawing principled limiting distinctions once recovery extends beyond the family unit, and the need to maintain a proportionate economic relationship between liability and culpability, echoing concerns raised by legal commentators like Prosser and Keeton. The court concluded that the policies favoring recovery for a co-worker and friend are insufficiently persuasive to justify placing an unreasonable economic burden on negligent defendants, and that such payment would be out of proportion to culpability inherent in merely negligent conduct. The court confined its holding to the specific facts, declining to define the outer limits of liability beyond the family unit, but explicitly stating that the relationship of "co-worker and friend" falls outside the range of circumstances warranting liability.
Concurring - Michael D. Ryan, Judge
Justice Ryan concurred with the majority opinion, but provided no separate reasoning.
Dissenting - Garbarino, Judge
Yes, a co-worker and friend of a negligently injured person should be able to recover for emotional distress suffered from witnessing the injury, and the determination of the closeness of the relationship should be left to the jury. Judge Garbarino argued that the Keck court's use of the phrase "or otherwise" in defining a "close personal relationship" indicated an intent not to strictly limit recovery to blood or familial relationships. The dissent contended that if Keck had intended such a strict limitation, it would have explicitly stated so. The dissent highlighted that the Keck court also stated, "The problem of limiting bystander recovery can be justly resolved by treating each case on its own individual facts." It advocated for allowing juries to determine the magnitude of the relationship, citing other states (New Jersey, Massachusetts, Ohio) that allow juries to assess the intimacy and familial nature of non-traditional relationships based on factors like duration, mutual dependence, and shared experience. The dissent criticized the majority's "bright-line" rule as arbitrary, arguing it would unfairly deny legitimate claims from individuals in deeply committed non-traditional relationships (e.g., fiancés, long-term unmarried cohabitants, same-sex partners) solely due to a lack of blood or marital ties, despite potentially strong emotional bonds. Judge Garbarino concluded that juries are uniquely qualified to make factual determinations about the closeness of relationships, and that such an approach would be more flexible and just than an arbitrary rule barring recovery based on formal status.
Analysis:
This case solidifies Arizona's conservative approach to bystander negligent infliction of emotional distress, expressly limiting recovery to familial or "closely akin" relationships and rejecting an expansion based on "co-worker and friend" status. The decision is significant for its explicit rejection of pure foreseeability as the sole determinant of liability and its candid reliance on policy concerns, particularly the fear of unlimited liability and the difficulty of drawing principled lines beyond the family unit. Future cases in Arizona seeking to expand NIED claims will face a high bar, requiring compelling policy justifications to overcome the court's concern for proportionality between culpability and economic burden, potentially leaving victims in deeply committed non-traditional relationships without recourse.
