Hirabayashi v. United States
320 U.S. 81 (1943)
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Rule of Law:
During wartime, the government may impose restrictions on a specific racial group of citizens, such as a curfew, if such a measure is judged necessary by the military and Congress to protect against espionage and sabotage. A law that discriminates on the basis of race does not violate the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause when justified by the exigencies of war and a rational basis exists for the distinction.
Facts:
- Gordon Hirabayashi was a United States citizen of Japanese ancestry, born in Seattle, Washington in 1918.
- At the time of his arrest, Hirabayashi was a senior at the University of Washington.
- Following the attack on Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9066, authorizing military commanders to prescribe military areas and restrict the movement of persons within them.
- Subsequently, Lt. General J.L. DeWitt, military commander of the Western Defense Command, issued Public Proclamation No. 3.
- This proclamation established a curfew for all persons of Japanese ancestry in designated military areas, requiring them to remain in their residences between 8:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m.
- General DeWitt also issued Civilian Exclusion Orders requiring persons of Japanese ancestry to report to Civil Control Stations as a preliminary step to being removed from the area.
- On May 9, 1942, Hirabayashi deliberately violated the curfew order.
- Hirabayashi also failed to report to the Civil Control Station as required, believing that compliance would mean waiving his rights as a U.S. citizen.
Procedural Posture:
- The United States charged Gordon Hirabayashi in the U.S. District Court on two counts: violating a military curfew order and violating a military exclusion order.
- Hirabayashi's demurrer and plea in abatement, which challenged the constitutionality of the orders, were overruled by the trial court.
- A jury convicted Hirabayashi on both counts, and the court sentenced him to three months imprisonment on each count, to be served concurrently.
- Hirabayashi (appellant) appealed the conviction to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
- The Court of Appeals certified questions of law to the U.S. Supreme Court.
- The Supreme Court, invoking its statutory authority, ordered the entire case record to be sent up for a final decision, bypassing the Court of Appeals.
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Issue:
Does a military curfew order targeting only U.S. citizens of Japanese ancestry, authorized by an Executive Order and an Act of Congress during wartime, violate the Fifth Amendment?
Opinions:
Majority - Chief Justice Stone
No, the military curfew order does not violate the Fifth Amendment. The combined war powers of Congress and the Executive are broad and extend to every measure necessary to wage war successfully. The Court must give great deference to the judgment of the war-making branches of government that the danger of espionage and sabotage from some members of the Japanese American community was a real threat. While racial distinctions are 'odious,' they are not unconstitutional in a time of war when the government has a rational basis for believing that the ethnic affiliations of a group with an enemy nation pose a special danger to national security. The curfew was a necessary and appropriate protective measure in a time of grave and imminent public danger.
Concurring - Justice Douglas
No, the order was a permissible exercise of military power. Given the real threat of invasion and the military's belief that a 'fifth column' existed among citizens of Japanese ancestry, temporary treatment on a group basis was a practicable expedient. Courts cannot second-guess military requirements in a time of national peril, as speed and dispatch are of the essence. However, guilt is personal, and the issue of whether a loyal citizen could seek reclassification through a hearing is a separate, reserved question.
Concurring - Justice Murphy
No, but the order goes to the 'very brink of constitutional power.' Racial discrimination is inconsistent with American ideals and bears a 'melancholy resemblance' to the persecution of Jews in Europe. Such a restriction on the liberty of citizens based on ancestry would normally violate due process. However, given the critical military situation, the imminent peril of invasion, and the urgent need for action in the spring of 1942, the military made an allowable judgment. This deference is granted only because of the emergency and should not be seen as a general approval of such measures.
Concurring - Justice Rutledge
No, the order is permissible in this instance. While agreeing with the outcome, this concurrence is added to express a reservation about the scope of judicial review over military actions. It is not necessary in this case to decide that courts have no power to review any action a military officer deems necessary. There may be bounds beyond which an officer cannot go, but this case does not cross them.
Analysis:
This decision established a precedent of extreme judicial deference to the political branches and military authority during wartime, even at the cost of fundamental civil liberties. It validated the use of racial classifications for national security purposes by applying a highly deferential standard of review rather than heightened scrutiny. While the Court acknowledged that racial discrimination is 'odious,' its holding that the exigencies of war could make it constitutional created a dangerous exception to the principle of equal protection. The case, along with Korematsu v. United States, is now widely viewed as a significant failure of the Court to protect minority rights against wartime hysteria and racial prejudice.
