Hillside Development Co. v. Fields
928 S.W.2d 886 (1996)
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Rule of Law:
An implied easement from pre-existing use is created when a common owner severs property, if the use was apparent, continuous, meant to be permanent, and is reasonably necessary for the full beneficial enjoyment of the dominant estate. Reasonable necessity does not require strict or absolute necessity; denial of access to a significant feature like a pre-existing garage can satisfy this requirement even if the property is not landlocked.
Facts:
- Initially, a single large property was owned by Carl Nelson, who in 1967 built a house with a garage on the north side.
- To access the garage from the public road on the south, Nelson constructed a long, curved asphalt driveway that wrapped around the house.
- After Nelson's death, Shriners Hospital inherited the entire property, including the house, driveway, and all surrounding land.
- In 1984, the hospital subdivided the property, selling a large, unimproved portion, which included a curved section of the driveway, to Hillside Development Company.
- The hospital retained the parcel with the house and created an express ingress-egress easement, but this easement did not cover the entire pre-existing driveway, leaving a 20-by-12-yard curved section on Hillside's new property.
- In 1987, the hospital sold the house and its lot to Roscoe Fields.
- At the time of purchase, Fields was aware from the title report that the curved portion of the driveway was on Hillside's land and not covered by the express easement.
- Fields continued to use the entire driveway to access his garage.
Procedural Posture:
- Plaintiff Hillside Development Company filed a lawsuit against Defendant Roscoe Fields in trial court for trespass and ejectment.
- Fields filed a counterclaim seeking a declaratory judgment that he possessed an implied easement.
- Both parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.
- The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Hillside, denying Fields' implied easement claim.
- Fields (Appellant) appealed the trial court's judgment to the court of appeals, with Hillside as the Respondent.
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Issue:
Does a homeowner have an implied easement over a portion of a neighbor's land for a driveway when the driveway was openly and continuously used before the properties were severed from a common owner, and the driveway provides the only practical access to a pre-existing garage, even though the homeowner knew the driveway was not included in his deed?
Opinions:
Majority - Stith, J.
Yes, an implied easement exists for the use of the driveway. All four elements for a visible easement are met: 1) There was unity of ownership under Nelson and the hospital, followed by severance when Hillside purchased part of the land. 2) The driveway was an open, obvious, and visible benefit constructed by the common owner for the house. 3) The driveway was used for 17 years before severance and its asphalt construction showed it was intended to be permanent. 4) The easement is reasonably necessary for the full beneficial use and enjoyment of Fields' property. The court distinguished the 'reasonable necessity' required for this type of easement from the 'strict necessity' required for an easement by necessity (i.e., being landlocked). Citing precedents like Di Pasco and Foxx, the court reasoned that because Fields would be unable to use his garage without the easement, and the garage is a significant and valuable part of the premises, access to it is reasonably necessary for the property's full enjoyment. Fields' knowledge that the driveway was not in his title does not defeat the claim, as an implied easement arises by definition when an express easement is absent.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the 'reasonable necessity' standard for implied easements from prior use in Missouri. It solidifies the principle that this standard is significantly less stringent than the 'strict necessity' required for easements by necessity. The case establishes that denying a landowner the use of a significant, pre-existing improvement like a garage can satisfy reasonable necessity, even if alternative access to the property exists. This holding protects the presumed intent of parties at the time of property severance, giving effect to the visible and long-standing conditions of the land over formal deficiencies in a deed.
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