Hillsborough County v. FLORIDA REST. ASS'N
1992 WL 164090, 603 So.2d 587 (1992)
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Rule of Law:
A local government ordinance requiring health warning signs in establishments serving alcohol is a valid exercise of its police power and is not preempted by state law (either expressly or impliedly) nor inconsistent with general law, particularly for charter counties with broad home rule authority.
Facts:
- Hillsborough County enacted Ordinance No. 91-11, titled the 'Hillsborough County Alcoholic Beverage Public Awareness Ordinance,' on February 2, 1991.
- The ordinance required all vendors of alcoholic beverages in Hillsborough County to conspicuously post a sign, not less than 8 1/2 X 11 inches, on their premises.
- The required sign content included a 'HEALTH WARNING' about alcohol causing birth defects, addiction, and intoxication, and advised reducing risks by not drinking during pregnancy, before driving or operating machinery, or mixing alcohol with other drugs.
- Failure to post the required sign could result in criminal prosecution.
- The Florida Restaurant Association, representing 37 members who operate public food establishments serving alcohol in Hillsborough County, challenged the ordinance.
Procedural Posture:
- The Florida Restaurant Association sued Hillsborough County in the trial court (court of first instance), seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the County's Ordinance No. 91-11.
- Both the Florida Restaurant Association and Hillsborough County moved for summary judgment.
- The trial court entered final summary judgment in favor of the Florida Restaurant Association, declaring the ordinance unconstitutional and permanently enjoining its enforcement.
- Hillsborough County (appellant) appealed the trial court's judgment to the District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
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Issue:
Does a county ordinance requiring health warning signs in establishments serving alcohol constitute an invalid exercise of local government power because it is expressly preempted, impliedly preempted, or inconsistent with Florida's general laws regulating alcoholic beverages or food service establishments?
Opinions:
Majority - Danahy, Acting Chief Judge
No, a county ordinance requiring health warning signs in establishments serving alcohol is not invalid because it is neither expressly nor impliedly preempted by state law, nor is it inconsistent with general law, and the Association has standing to challenge it. The court first affirmed that the Florida Restaurant Association had standing, applying the three-prong test from Florida Home Builders Ass'n v. Dep't of Labor & Employment Sec., as a substantial number of its Hillsborough County members were affected, the subject matter was within the Association's scope of interest, and the requested relief was appropriate for a trade association. Regarding express preemption, the court found none. Although Section 381.061(9), Florida Statutes, preempted 'regulation and inspection of food service establishments,' this general language did not expressly refer to signage requirements. Employing the doctrine of noscitur a sociis, the court interpreted the general phrase 'regulation and inspection' as limited by the accompanying specific terms (e.g., 'standards for training,' 'ranking,' 'testing of personnel'), which pertained to food safety, not alcohol consumption warnings. A broader interpretation would render the specific provisions redundant. The court also found no implied preemption. The state's regulatory scheme for alcohol (chapters 561 and 562) was not so pervasive as to completely occupy the field, especially given that state law explicitly reserves some regulatory spheres to local bodies (e.g., hours of operation, location, entertainment). The ordinance functions as an educational public health tool, aiming to influence, not prohibit, conduct, and does not conflict with the state's interest in the alcohol industry. The standard for implied preemption requires a pervasive legislative scheme completely occupying the field, and no such scheme was present to conflict with the county's ordinance. Finally, the ordinance was deemed not inconsistent with general law under Article VIII, section 1(g) of the Florida Constitution. Inconsistency requires legislative provisions that 'cannot coexist.' No state law was identified that would be incapable of coexisting with the health warning sign ordinance. The Responsible Vendor's Act, while addressing different sign requirements, did not create a conflict, and the court declined to speculate on potential future legislative conflicts. Thus, the ordinance was a valid exercise of Hillsborough County's broad home rule power of self-government, as it was not prohibited by general law.
Analysis:
This case provides significant clarification on the scope of 'home rule' powers for Florida charter counties, affirming their broad authority to enact public health ordinances even in areas where the state maintains a regulatory scheme. It establishes a high bar for proving express or implied preemption, emphasizing that express preemption requires specific statutory language and implied preemption demands a truly pervasive, conflict-prone state scheme. The decision underscores that local governments may implement educational public health measures unless directly contradictory to or explicitly prohibited by state law, thereby limiting preemption challenges to local initiatives.
