Hilliard v. City & County of Denver
1991 WL 60945, 930 F.2d 1516 (1991)
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Rule of Law:
A government official performing a discretionary function is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 suit unless their conduct violates a statutory or constitutional right that was "clearly established" at the time of the incident. A right is not clearly established if there is no controlling precedent and other courts are divided on the issue.
Facts:
- The plaintiff was a passenger in a car driven by her male companion when it was involved in a minor traffic accident.
- Defendant police officers investigated the accident and arrested the plaintiff's companion for suspicion of driving under the influence of alcohol.
- The officers removed the driver from the scene and took him into custody.
- The officers determined that the plaintiff was too intoxicated to drive and ordered her not to do so.
- The officers impounded the vehicle in which the plaintiff had been a passenger.
- The officers then left the plaintiff alone in what was known to be a high-crime area.
- After being left by the officers, the plaintiff was robbed and sexually assaulted by an unknown third person.
Procedural Posture:
- The plaintiff filed suit against the defendant police officers in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state tort law.
- The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, asserting the defense of qualified immunity.
- The district court treated the defendants' motion as a motion for summary judgment.
- The district court dismissed the plaintiff's state law claims and her general § 1983 claims.
- The district court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment regarding the claim that they violated the plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment liberty interests, thus rejecting their qualified immunity defense on that issue.
- The defendant police officers (appellants) appealed the district court's denial of qualified immunity to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
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Issue:
Do police officers violate a clearly established Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest in personal security, thereby losing qualified immunity, when they arrest a driver and abandon his intoxicated passenger in a high-crime area where she is subsequently harmed by a third party?
Opinions:
Majority - Tacha, J.
No, the police officers did not violate a clearly established constitutional right because, at the time of their actions, the law was unsettled regarding whether the state has an affirmative constitutional duty to protect an individual from private violence when that person is not in state custody. The court's reasoning is that for a right to be 'clearly established' under the qualified immunity standard from Harlow v. Fitzgerald, its contours must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand their conduct violates that right. The plaintiff argued for a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest in personal security, citing Ingraham v. Wright, but the court distinguished that case and others because they involved individuals in some form of state custody or control (e.g., school children, prisoners, arrestees). The court reasoned that a constitutional right to personal security may depend on this element of state control. While acknowledging two circuit court cases (Wood v. Ostrander and White v. Rockford) that supported the plaintiff's position in non-custodial settings, the court held that two cases from other circuits do not make a right 'clearly established,' especially when contrasted with numerous cases finding no general state duty to protect citizens from private actors. The court's conclusion was reinforced by the Supreme Court's subsequent opinion in DeShaney, which explicitly noted the 'inconsistent approaches' among lower courts on this very issue, confirming that the law was not settled at the time of the incident.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the high threshold required to overcome a government official's qualified immunity defense. It clarifies that for a right to be "clearly established," there must be robust and consistent precedent from either the Supreme Court or a consensus of circuit courts; a mere split of authority, even with some cases favoring the plaintiff's position, is insufficient. The ruling solidifies the general principle articulated later in DeShaney that the Due Process Clause does not impose an affirmative obligation on the state to protect individuals from private violence unless the state has created the danger or has a special relationship with the individual, typically involving custody. The case serves as a key example of how courts distinguish between morally reprehensible conduct, which may give rise to a state tort claim, and conduct that violates a clearly established constitutional right sufficient to support a § 1983 action.
