Hill v. United States
368 U.S. 424 (1962)
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Rule of Law:
A sentencing court's failure to follow the formal requirement of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(a) by not asking a defendant if they wish to make a statement is not, by itself, an error that can be raised in a collateral attack under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
Facts:
- In 1954, a jury found Hill guilty of transporting a kidnapped person and a stolen automobile in interstate commerce.
- At his sentencing hearing, Hill was represented by court-appointed counsel.
- The District Judge, after noting familiarity with Hill's character and history, imposed consecutive prison sentences of twenty and three years.
- The District Judge did not ask Hill whether he wished to make a statement in his own behalf before imposing the sentence.
Procedural Posture:
- In 1954, Hill was convicted by a jury in a Federal District Court.
- Hill did not file a direct appeal of his conviction or sentence.
- In 1959, Hill filed a motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the sentencing District Court, arguing a violation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(a).
- The District Court denied the motion.
- Hill, as appellant, appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals, which affirmed the District Court's denial.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the Rule 32(a) claim could be raised in this type of proceeding.
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Issue:
Does a federal district court's failure to explicitly ask a defendant, represented by counsel, if he has a statement to make before sentencing, as required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(a), constitute an error that can be remedied through a collateral attack on the sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Stewart
No, a sentencing court's failure to provide a defendant with an opportunity to make a statement is not an error that can be raised in a collateral attack. The remedy provided by 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is commensurate with a writ of habeas corpus, which is reserved for errors that are constitutional, jurisdictional, or constitute a fundamental defect resulting in a complete miscarriage of justice. The failure to comply with the formal requirements of Rule 32(a) is not an error of that character or magnitude. The Court distinguished this from cases where a defendant was affirmatively denied an opportunity to speak or where the judge was misinformed. Furthermore, the sentence was not 'illegal' under Rule 35, which applies to sentences that exceed the statutory maximum or are otherwise substantively invalid, not those imposed following a procedural error.
Dissenting - Justice Black
Yes, this error should be correctable. A sentence imposed in an illegal manner should be considered an 'illegal sentence' under a common-sense reading of Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The majority's interpretation of 'illegal sentence' as only pertaining to the terms of the punishment itself is an unsupported and begrudging contraction of the rule's plain language. The right of a defendant to speak before sentencing (allocution) is an ancient and important one, and its denial makes the resulting sentence illegal and subject to correction. Hill might have presented mitigating evidence regarding his prior convictions, and denying him this right was injurious.
Analysis:
This decision significantly narrows the grounds for collateral attacks on federal sentences under § 2255. It establishes a high bar, distinguishing between mere formal, procedural errors and fundamental defects that are jurisdictional or constitutional. By holding that a violation of Rule 32(a)'s right of allocution is not a fundamental defect, the Court directs such claims to be raised on direct appeal, thereby promoting finality in criminal judgments. The case also narrowly defines an 'illegal sentence' under Rule 35, limiting it to substantive defects in the sentence itself, not procedural errors during the sentencing hearing.
