Hill v. Stone
95 S. Ct. 1637, 421 U.S. 289, 1975 U.S. LEXIS 60 (1975)
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Rule of Law:
In an election of general interest, any classification restricting the right to vote on grounds other than residence, age, and citizenship must serve a compelling state interest to satisfy the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and a requirement to render property for taxation as a prerequisite for voting in a general obligation bond election fails this stringent test.
Facts:
- The Texas Constitution and implementing statutes dictated that in municipal elections concerning money expenditure or debt assumption, only residents who owned and had rendered taxable property were eligible to vote.
- In response to prior Supreme Court decisions, the Texas Attorney General implemented a 'dual-box election procedure' for local bond elections, where 'renderers' (those who rendered property) and 'non-renderers' voted separately, and bond issues required approval from both boxes and overall.
- On April 11, 1972, the city of Fort Worth used this dual-box system for a tax bond election seeking authorization for transportation system improvements and a city library.
- To vote in the 'renderers' box,' individuals only needed to sign an affidavit stating they had rendered some property for taxation, regardless of its value or whether taxes were actually paid.
- Approximately 29,000 voters participated in the Fort Worth bond election; 24,000 voted as renderers and 5,000 as non-renderers.
- The transportation bond proposal passed in both boxes and in the aggregate vote.
- The library bond proposal received a majority of total votes, but was defeated in the 'renderers' box,' leading to its non-authorization under the dual-box system.
- Appellees, residents of Fort Worth, including three who voted as non-renderers, were impacted by the library bond's defeat.
Procedural Posture:
- Appellees filed an action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, challenging the state and city laws limiting the franchise in city bond elections.
- A three-judge District Court was convened to hear the constitutional challenge.
- On March 25, 1974, the District Court ruled in favor of the appellees, declaring the relevant Texas constitutional and statutory provisions unconstitutional 'insofar as they condition the right to vote in bond elections on citizens' rendering property for taxation.'
- The District Court's judgment ordered the city to count the ballots of those who had voted in the nonrenderers’ box and enjoined any future restriction of the franchise based on property rendering.
- The Attorney General of Texas, the appellant, obtained a partial stay of the District Court's order from the U.S. Supreme Court, pending appeal.
- The Supreme Court subsequently noted probable jurisdiction, agreeing to hear the case on appeal.
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Issue:
Does a state law limiting the franchise in municipal general obligation bond elections to only those persons who have rendered property for taxation violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Marshall
Yes, a state law limiting the franchise in municipal general obligation bond elections to only those persons who have rendered property for taxation violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court reaffirmed that in elections of general interest, restrictions on the franchise (other than residence, age, and citizenship) must serve a compelling state interest. Its prior decisions in Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15, Cipriano v. City of Houma, and City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski established this 'strict scrutiny' standard for general interest elections. Phoenix explicitly held that a general obligation bond issue, even if paid entirely out of property taxes, is a matter of general interest because both property owners and non-property owners are substantially affected (e.g., through higher rents, increased prices for goods and services, or shared benefits from facilities). The Texas scheme creates a classification based on rendering property, which effectively disfranchises non-renderers. This classification is not based on wealth but is still subject to strict scrutiny because it restricts the fundamental right to vote. The state's justifications—protecting property owners and encouraging compliance with tax laws—do not meet the compelling state interest test. The 'rendering requirement' is easily circumvented by rendering property of negligible value, thus failing to truly protect property owners or significantly enforce tax laws. The Court affirmed the District Court's decision, declining to apply the ruling retroactively to avoid upsetting past bond elections, consistent with its prior cases.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Rehnquist, with whom The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Stewart join
No, a state law limiting the franchise in municipal general obligation bond elections to only those persons who have rendered property for taxation does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, because the rendering requirement imposes only a de minimis burden on the right to vote. Justice Rehnquist argued that the rendering requirement is minimal, as any item of property, even of nominal worth, qualifies a voter, and compliance is easy and widely available. He noted that state law requires all citizens to render property anyway, making non-compliance a choice or carelessness, not an insurmountable barrier. He contended that the Court's previous cases, such as Rosario v. Rockefeller, upheld voting requirements that imposed a minor burden or infringement, distinguishing them from total disenfranchisement. He suggested that the Texas requirement, much like New York's primary registration deadline in Rosario, was a matter of self-disenfranchisement for those who chose not to comply with an easily met legal obligation. He also suggested that the rendering qualification serves a legitimate state interest in preserving the integrity of the electoral process by linking the right to vote in bond elections with the legal obligation to contribute to the tax base that supports those bonds, mirroring the Rosario court's concern for party primary integrity. He questioned the factual basis of the majority's conclusion regarding the practical effect of the rendering requirement, suggesting a remand for a factual determination of whether it impermissibly disfranchises identifiable groups.
Analysis:
This case reinforces the Supreme Court's commitment to protecting the fundamental right to vote against classifications that do not serve a compelling state interest, even when the restrictions appear minor or indirect. It solidified the application of strict scrutiny to voting restrictions in 'general interest' elections, broadly defining such elections to include bond issues where costs may be indirectly borne by all residents. The ruling makes it exceedingly difficult for states to link voting eligibility in general elections to property ownership or tax payment, extending the reach of the Equal Protection Clause in suffrage cases.
