Hill v. Skinner
79 N.E.2d 787 (1947)
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Rule of Law:
The competency of a child witness under ten years of age lies within the sound discretion of the trial judge, who must determine if the child is capable of receiving just impressions of facts and relating them truthfully. Furthermore, under Ohio statute, a dog for which a damage recovery is awarded is declared a common nuisance by law, and the court must order it to be killed.
Facts:
- A four-year-old child, the petitioner, went into the yard of his neighbors, the owners of a dog named 'Chang'.
- The child was interacting with the dog, stating he was 'loving him' around the neck.
- The child suffered injuries to his head and mouth.
- The only direct evidence that Chang caused the injuries came from the testimony of the four-year-old child.
- Other potential causes for the injuries, such as barbed wire, glass, and a gashed steel barrel, were present in the area.
Procedural Posture:
- The four-year-old child (petitioner) filed a statutory action against the owners of the dog, Chang, in the Court of Common Pleas of Summit County (the trial court).
- A jury returned a verdict for the petitioner, awarding $500 in damages.
- The trial court entered a judgment on the verdict and also declared the dog a common nuisance, ordering the owners to either remove the dog from the vicinity or kill it.
- The dog's owners (appellants) appealed the final order, including the money judgment and the nuisance declaration, to the Court of Appeals (the intermediate appellate court).
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Issue:
Is a four-year-old child's testimony competent to support a judgment in a dog bite case when the trial judge determines the child understands the obligation to tell the truth and can recollect and communicate the events?
Opinions:
Majority - Doyle, P. J.
Yes. A four-year-old child's testimony is competent if the trial judge, exercising sound discretion, determines the child is capable of receiving just impressions of the facts and relating them truly. The essential test is the child's comprehension of the obligation to tell the truth combined with the intellectual capacity for observation, recollection, and communication. In this case, the trial judge examined the child and found him competent after the child demonstrated an understanding of his duty to tell the truth (stating that if he lied, 'God won’t love me') and an ability to recall and describe the events. The appellate court found no abuse of the trial judge's discretion. The court also held that under Ohio General Code § 5839, once a judgment is entered against a dog's owner for an injury, the statute is unambiguous and mandatory: the dog is deemed a common nuisance as a matter of law, and the court has no alternative but to order it killed.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the significant discretion afforded to trial judges in determining the competency of child witnesses, prioritizing a functional assessment of the child's understanding over a rigid age-based rule. It affirms that even a very young child can be the sole direct witness supporting a verdict if the court is satisfied with their capacity for truthfulness and recollection. The case also serves as a stark example of a mandatory statutory scheme, demonstrating that where a legislature's intent is clear and unambiguous, judicial discretion is eliminated; the finding of liability for the dog bite automatically triggered the non-discretionary statutory consequence of the dog being declared a nuisance and ordered destroyed.
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