Hilen v. Hays
673 S.W.2d 713, 1984 Ky. LEXIS 261 (1984)
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Rule of Law:
The common law doctrine of contributory negligence, which serves as a complete bar to a plaintiff's recovery, is abolished in favor of a system of pure comparative negligence, under which a plaintiff's recovery is reduced in proportion to their percentage of fault.
Facts:
- Margie Montgomery Hilen was a passenger in an automobile driven by Keith Hays.
- Hays negligently drove the automobile into the back of another vehicle, causing it to overturn.
- Hilen sustained severe injuries as a result of the accident.
- The cause of the accident was undisputedly Hays' negligent operation of the vehicle.
- A factual dispute existed as to whether Hilen was also negligent by riding with a person she knew or should have known was too intoxicated to drive safely.
Procedural Posture:
- Margie Montgomery Hilen sued Keith Hays in a Kentucky trial court seeking damages for negligence.
- At trial, the judge directed a verdict on Hays' negligence but instructed the jury that if Hilen was contributorily negligent, it would be a complete bar to any recovery.
- The trial court refused Hilen's request for an instruction on comparative negligence.
- The jury returned a verdict for the defendant, Hays, and the trial court entered judgment accordingly.
- Hilen, as appellant, appealed to the Kentucky Court of Appeals.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
- The Supreme Court of Kentucky granted Hilen's motion for discretionary review.
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Issue:
Does the court-made common law doctrine of contributory negligence, which completely bars a plaintiff's recovery if they are found to be at all negligent, require replacement by a system of pure comparative negligence that apportions damages based on the degree of fault of each party?
Opinions:
Majority - Leibson, J.
Yes. The doctrine of contributory negligence is an inequitable, court-made rule that is supplanted by the doctrine of pure comparative negligence. Contributory negligence as a complete bar to recovery is fundamentally unjust because it forces one party, the plaintiff, to bear the entire loss even when the defendant may be significantly more at fault. Because the rule was created by the judiciary and not the legislature, and because stare decisis does not require adherence to an 'ancient fallacy,' the court has the authority and responsibility to reform it. Legislative inaction on this issue reflects inertia, not an affirmative policy choice. The court adopts the 'pure' form of comparative negligence, which allows a plaintiff to recover damages reduced by their percentage of fault, regardless of how high that percentage is, because it is the fairest, simplest, and most equitable system.
Dissenting - Vance, J.
No. The decision to abolish the long-standing doctrine of contributory negligence and adopt comparative negligence is a matter of public policy that should be decided by the General Assembly, not the judiciary. The doctrine has been Kentucky law for nearly a century, and the legislature's repeated failure to pass comparative negligence bills constitutes an affirmative decision to retain the existing rule. By acting, the court intrudes upon the legislative province. Furthermore, the 'pure' form of comparative negligence adopted by the majority is flawed because it allows recovery for a plaintiff who may be almost entirely responsible for their own injury.
Concurring - Leibson, J.
Yes. The majority is correct to adopt pure comparative negligence, but the court should also provide guidance for trial courts on how to implement this significant change. To ensure a clear and simple transition, courts should look to the Uniform Comparative Fault Act as a comprehensive system for handling the collateral issues that will inevitably arise. This approach would allow Kentucky to benefit from the broad experience of other states and adopt the best solutions available for resolving complex fault allocation questions.
Analysis:
This landmark decision fundamentally altered tort law in Kentucky by judicially abolishing the harsh, all-or-nothing doctrine of contributory negligence. The court's adoption of pure comparative negligence aligned Kentucky with the overwhelming modern trend toward apportioning liability based on fault. By choosing the 'pure' form over more common 'modified' versions, the court established a particularly claimant-friendly standard that allows recovery even for plaintiffs found to be substantially at fault. This ruling significantly impacts personal injury litigation by removing a complete defense that previously barred many claims, thereby increasing the likelihood of recovery for injured plaintiffs who bear some responsibility for their own harm.
