Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nevada
542 U.S. 177 (2004)
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Rule of Law:
A state law requiring a suspect to disclose their name to law enforcement during a lawful investigatory stop based on reasonable suspicion does not violate the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable seizures, nor does it violate the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination unless there is a reasonable belief that providing the name will be incriminating.
Facts:
- The Humboldt County Sheriff's Department received a report of a man assaulting a woman in a red and silver GMC truck.
- Deputy Sheriff Lee Dove was dispatched to investigate and located the truck parked on the side of a road.
- A man, Larry Dudley Hiibel, was standing by the truck, and a woman was inside; Dove also observed skid marks behind the vehicle.
- Dove approached Hiibel, who appeared intoxicated, and explained he was investigating a reported fight.
- The officer asked Hiibel for identification 11 times.
- Hiibel repeatedly refused to provide his name or any identification, became agitated, and taunted the officer to arrest him.
- After warning Hiibel that he would be arrested if he continued to refuse, Dove placed him under arrest for obstructing an officer.
Procedural Posture:
- Larry Dudley Hiibel was charged in the Justice Court of Union Township, Nevada, with obstructing a public officer.
- The Justice Court, acting as the trial court, convicted Hiibel and fined him $250.
- Hiibel appealed to the Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada, which affirmed the conviction.
- Hiibel appealed to the Supreme Court of Nevada, the state's highest court, which affirmed the lower courts' decisions in a divided opinion, rejecting his Fourth Amendment challenge.
- The Nevada Supreme Court denied Hiibel's petition for rehearing on his Fifth Amendment claim.
- The United States Supreme Court granted Hiibel's petition for a writ of certiorari.
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Issue:
Does a state law requiring a suspect to disclose their name to a police officer during a lawful Terry stop violate the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures or the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Kennedy
No. A state law compelling a suspect to disclose their name during a valid Terry stop does not violate the Fourth or Fifth Amendments. Under the Fourth Amendment, the request for identity is a reasonable, commonsense inquiry that is minimally intrusive and directly related to the purpose of the stop, which includes officer safety and resolving ambiguity about the individual's identity. The reasonableness is determined by balancing the minimal intrusion on the individual's privacy against the legitimate government interests in crime prevention and officer safety. Regarding the Fifth Amendment, the privilege against self-incrimination protects against compelled testimonial communications that are incriminating. While stating one's name may be testimonial, it is not incriminating in this context because Hiibel failed to show any 'real and appreciable' fear that disclosing his name would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute him for a separate crime; his refusal was based on the belief that it was none of the officer's business.
Dissenting - Justice Stevens
Yes. Compelling a suspect in a criminal investigation to identify themselves violates the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination. The right to remain silent applies with full force during a Terry stop. A person's name is both testimonial, as it is a communicative response to police interrogation, and inherently incriminating. A name provides the police with a 'link in the chain of evidence' by giving them access to extensive law enforcement databases and personal information, which is precisely the kind of disclosure the Fifth Amendment is designed to prevent. The majority wrongly concludes that a name is incriminating only in 'unusual circumstances,' ignoring that the very reason police demand it is for its investigative value.
Dissenting - Justice Breyer
Yes. Longstanding Fourth Amendment precedent, established in Justice White's concurrence in Terry v. Ohio and reinforced by the Court's subsequent statements in cases like Berkemer v. McCarty, holds that a person detained in a Terry stop is not obliged to answer an officer's questions. This 'strong dicta' has been the settled understanding of the law for over two decades, and there is no compelling reason to abandon it. The majority's decision erodes a clear rule and creates administrative difficulties for police officers, who must now determine on-the-fly whether a demand for a name might be impermissibly incriminating in a particular case. The prior rule, allowing police to ask but not compelling an answer, has not been shown to significantly interfere with law enforcement.
Analysis:
This decision validates state 'stop and identify' statutes and clarifies the scope of rights during a Terry stop. It establishes that the right to remain silent during an investigative detention is not absolute and does not protect against a compelled disclosure of one's name, absent a specific claim of potential incrimination. The ruling strengthens the power of law enforcement by giving them a tool to ascertain the identity of suspicious individuals, thereby shifting the balance between police authority and individual privacy. Future litigation may focus on what constitutes a 'reasonable belief' that disclosing one's name would be incriminating, creating a new area for judicial interpretation.
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