Hicks v. United States
150 U.S. 442 (1893)
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Rule of Law:
To be criminally liable as an aider and abettor, a person must not only be present and say or do something that encourages the principal actor, but must also act with the specific intent to encourage or abet the commission of the crime.
Facts:
- On the night of February 12, 1892, John Hicks, Stand Rowe, and Andrew J. Colvard attended a dance in the Cherokee Nation.
- Hicks and Rowe, both Cherokee Indians, were armed with Winchester rifles and were actively eluding U.S. Marshals who had warrants for their arrest.
- As the dance ended on the morning of February 13, Colvard, a white man, persistently invited Rowe and Hicks to his home, offering Rowe a suit of clothes as an inducement.
- Hicks became suspicious of Colvard's persistence and openly declared that if Colvard continued trying to take Rowe away, he would shoot him.
- Later that morning, Hicks, Rowe, and Colvard were together on horseback in a road.
- From about 100 yards away, eyewitnesses saw Rowe twice raise his rifle and aim it at Colvard, and they heard Hicks laugh on both occasions.
- Witnesses then heard Hicks say to Colvard, "Take off your hat and die like a man."
- Immediately following Hicks's statement, Rowe raised his rifle a third time, fired, and fatally shot Colvard.
- After Colvard fell from his horse, Hicks and Rowe rode away together, though Hicks testified he separated from Rowe at the first opportunity out of fear.
Procedural Posture:
- John Hicks was jointly indicted with Stand Rowe for murder in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Arkansas, a federal trial court.
- Co-defendant Stand Rowe was killed by officers before he could be tried.
- Hicks was tried separately, and a jury returned a verdict of guilty.
- The trial court entered a judgment of conviction against Hicks.
- Hicks appealed the judgment to the Supreme Court of the United States.
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Issue:
Does a trial court's jury instruction on aiding and abetting murder constitute reversible error if it (1) fails to require the jury to find that the defendant acted with the specific intent to encourage the crime, and (2) permits a conviction based on mere presence with an unacted-upon intent to assist, in the absence of evidence of a prior conspiracy?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Shiras
Yes. A jury instruction on aiding and abetting is erroneous if it allows for a conviction without a finding that the defendant's words or acts were accompanied by a specific intent to encourage the crime's commission. The instruction was erroneous in two ways. First, it omitted the crucial element of intent, allowing the jury to find Hicks guilty if his words merely had the effect of encouraging Rowe, regardless of Hicks's actual purpose. The defendant's mens rea is essential. Second, the court improperly instructed that Hicks could be guilty if he was present with the purpose of aiding Rowe, even if he did not act because it was unnecessary. Such an instruction is only permissible where there is evidence of a pre-existing conspiracy to commit the crime, and no such evidence was presented in this case. Additionally, the judge erred by unfairly commenting on the defendant's testimony, suggesting other witnesses were 'telling the truth' and that Hicks's interest in the case would naturally cause him to lie, which undermined his statutory right to testify.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Brewer
No. The conviction should not be reversed because the defendant's trial objections were procedurally flawed and the judge's instructions were not substantively erroneous. The defendant made a general exception to an entire page of the jury charge without specifying the exact error, which violates the rule that objections must be specific enough to allow the trial judge an opportunity to make a correction. Substantively, the common understanding of words like 'abet' and 'advise' inherently includes the element of intent, so a separate instruction was not necessary to prevent the jury from being misled. Furthermore, the judge's comments on the defendant's credibility as an interested witness were proper, and criticizing the use of the article 'the' in the phrase 'the other witnesses who are telling the truth' is a 'refinement of criticism which offends common sense.'
Analysis:
This case is significant for clarifying the mens rea (criminal intent) required for accomplice liability under an aiding and abetting theory. It establishes the critical principle that a defendant's words or actions must be accompanied by a specific purpose to encourage or facilitate the commission of the offense. This decision prevents convictions based on ambiguous conduct or words that may have inadvertently emboldened a principal actor. The ruling also reinforces the doctrine that jury instructions must be tailored to the evidence actually presented at trial; an instruction on a conspiracy theory is improper if no evidence supports it. Finally, it serves as a caution to trial judges to avoid making comments that could prejudice the jury against a defendant's testimony and thus compromise the defendant's right to be a competent witness.
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