Hewitt et al. v. Helms
459 U.S. 460 (1983)
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Rule of Law:
A state creates a protected liberty interest for prisoners under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause when its statutes or regulations use explicitly mandatory language in connection with specific substantive predicates that limit the discretion of prison officials. However, the process due for placing an inmate in administrative segregation is minimal, requiring only an informal, non-adversary review that includes notice of the charges and an opportunity for the inmate to present their views.
Facts:
- On December 3, 1978, a violent riot erupted at the State Correctional Institution at Huntingdon, Pennsylvania, during which several guards were assaulted by inmates.
- Aaron Helms was an inmate at the institution during the riot.
- Several hours after the riot was quelled, prison authorities removed Helms from his cell for questioning by state police regarding his potential involvement.
- Immediately following the questioning, Helms was placed in restrictive confinement, known as administrative segregation.
- Prison officials and state police began an investigation into Helms's role in the riot.
- On December 11, 1978, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania filed criminal charges against Helms for assault and riot.
- On January 2, 1979, a Program Review Committee determined that Helms should remain in administrative segregation, citing him as a danger to staff and other inmates and noting the ongoing investigation and pending criminal charges.
Procedural Posture:
- Aaron Helms sued prison officials in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, alleging a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights.
- The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the prison officials.
- Helms, as appellant, appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
- The Court of Appeals reversed the district court's decision, holding that Pennsylvania's regulations created a liberty interest and remanding for further proceedings on the adequacy of the process Helms received.
- The prison officials, as petitioners, were granted a writ of certiorari by the U.S. Supreme Court.
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Issue:
Does a state's use of explicitly mandatory language and substantive predicates in its prison regulations create a protected liberty interest for an inmate to remain in the general population, and if so, does an informal, non-adversary review satisfy the procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause before confining the inmate to administrative segregation?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Rehnquist
Yes, Pennsylvania's regulations created a protected liberty interest, and yes, the informal procedures used satisfied the requirements of the Due Process Clause. While the Due Process Clause itself does not grant an inmate a liberty interest in avoiding administrative segregation, which is within the ordinary terms of confinement, a state may create such an interest through its laws. The repeated use of 'explicitly mandatory language' ('shall,' 'will,' 'must') combined with 'specific substantive predicates' (e.g., 'the need for control') in Pennsylvania's regulations limited official discretion and thus created a protected liberty interest. However, applying the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test, the process due is minimal. Given the prisoner's diminished private interest and the government's paramount interest in institutional security, due process requires only an informal, non-adversary review. This consists of notice of the charges and an opportunity to present his views to the decisionmaker. The review Helms received five days after his confinement, where he had the opportunity to have his version of events recorded, satisfied this standard.
Dissenting - Justice Stevens
Yes, a liberty interest exists, but no, the process afforded was not sufficient. A prisoner retains a residuum of constitutionally protected liberty that is not created by state law but is inherent. The transfer to administrative segregation, which is functionally equivalent to punitive isolation, constitutes a 'grievous loss' that implicates this inherent liberty interest, regardless of the language in state regulations. The process required by the majority is inadequate. Due process demands more than just a written statement; it requires an opportunity for the inmate to present his views in person to reviewing officials. Furthermore, due to the continuous nature of the deprivation, meaningful periodic reviews—not mere paper-shuffling—are necessary to protect against arbitrary, indefinite confinement. These reviews should include an oral statement from the prisoner and a written statement of reasons from the decisionmaker.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Justice Blackmun
Yes, a state-created liberty interest exists, but no, the procedures used did not comport with due process. The transfer to administrative segregation is within the normal range of custody authorized by a conviction, so no liberty interest arises directly from the Due Process Clause. However, like the majority, I find that Pennsylvania's statutes and regulations, with their mandatory language and substantive criteria, did create a protected liberty interest. I disagree with the majority's conclusion regarding the sufficiency of the procedures afforded to Helms and therefore join the section of Justice Stevens's dissent which argues that the process was constitutionally inadequate.
Analysis:
This case is significant for establishing the 'mandatory language and substantive predicates' test, which became the primary method for determining whether state regulations create a liberty interest for prisoners. This decision marked a shift away from analyzing the 'grievous loss' suffered by an inmate and toward a positivist approach focused solely on the text of state law. By setting a very low procedural standard for administrative segregation, the Court reinforced the principle of judicial deference to prison administrators in matters of internal security. This ruling made it more difficult for inmates to challenge their placement in restrictive housing on due process grounds unless they could point to specific, mandatory language in state law.
