Hetfeld v. Bostwick
901 P.2d 986, 1995 Ore. App. LEXIS 1178, 136 Or. App. 305 (1995)
Rule of Law:
To establish a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must show that the defendant’s conduct was an 'extraordinary transgression of the bounds of socially tolerable conduct' and 'outrageous in the extreme,' a standard not typically met by common, albeit reprehensible, behaviors that occur in contentious divorce and visitation disputes.
Facts:
- Adele Bostwick is the former wife of Mr. Hetfeld, and Mr. Bostwick is her present husband.
- Defendants (Adele and Mr. Bostwick) allegedly acted with the purpose of causing Mr. Hetfeld emotional distress, anguish, and psychological injury by estranging him from his children.
- Defendants unlawfully withheld visitation from Mr. Hetfeld, making the children unavailable between March 1989 and March 1990.
- Defendants intentionally disparaged Mr. Hetfeld's character by encouraging the children to call him by his first name, assaulting him in the presence of the children, and using inappropriate language around them.
- Defendants encouraged the children to prematurely terminate visitations with Mr. Hetfeld and planned activities to conflict with his scheduled or proposed visitations.
- Defendants caused the children to be known by the surname Bostwick rather than Hetfeld in their school and community and encouraged them to identify Mr. Bostwick as their father.
- Adele Bostwick stalked and harassed a female friend of Mr. Hetfeld with the intention of intimidating her and preventing her from testifying on his behalf.
- Adele Bostwick solicited and fermented discord in Mr. Hetfeld's relationship with his second wife by recruiting her to file for modification of visitation.
- Adele Bostwick hired a lawyer for the children and made them privy to legal filings and proceedings relevant to her effort to terminate and limit Mr. Hetfeld's visitation with the children.
Procedural Posture:
- Mr. Hetfeld filed a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against his former wife, Adele Bostwick, and her present husband, Mr. Bostwick, in the trial court.
- The trial court dismissed Mr. Hetfeld's claim, ruling that the complaint failed to state ultimate facts sufficient to constitute a claim under ORCP 21.
- Mr. Hetfeld (appellant) appealed the trial court's dismissal to the Oregon Court of Appeals.
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Issue:
Does a complaint alleging a course of conduct aimed at estranging a parent from his children by his former spouse and her new husband, within the context of a hostile divorce and visitation dispute, state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress by constituting an 'extraordinary transgression of the bounds of socially tolerable conduct'?
Opinions:
Majority - Riggs, P. J.
No, the alleged course of conduct, while reprehensible, does not constitute an 'extraordinary transgression of the bounds of socially tolerable conduct' sufficient to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress in this context. The court reiterated that the tort requires conduct that is 'outrageous in the extreme,' beyond mere temporary annoyance or injured feelings. While acknowledging that defendants were uniquely capable of causing emotional harm due to their influence over the children, the court held that the relationship between former spouses does not create a special duty of care akin to a doctor-patient relationship. The majority found that many of the alleged behaviors, though contentious, are 'all too common' in hostile dissolution cases involving children. The court concluded that a course of conduct aimed at estranging children from a parent, even if intended to cause emotional harm, is not 'outrageous in the extreme' because such behaviors are prevalent in highly contentious divorce situations, suggesting that statutory remedies under ORS chapter 107 (relating to visitation, modification, and abuse prevention) are the more appropriate avenue for relief.
Dissenting - Leeson, J.
Yes, a jury should be permitted to determine whether defendants’ alleged conduct, in the context of a hostile divorce, exceeded the bounds of socially tolerable conduct, as the frequency of such behavior does not automatically negate its potential outrageousness. Justice Leeson disagreed with the majority's conclusion that the frequency of such conduct in divorce cases means it cannot be 'outrageous in the extreme,' arguing that whether conduct is socially intolerable is primarily a fact-specific inquiry for a jury. The dissent contended that the majority's reasoning effectively makes the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress inapplicable in marital dissolution contexts, creating a 'per se rule that all is fair when love turns to war.' It cited prior cases where the alleged frequency of harassment based on gender, race, or sexual orientation did not defeat IIED claims, asserting that the same principle should apply here.
Analysis:
This case significantly narrows the scope of intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) claims in Oregon, particularly within the context of family law disputes. By categorizing many reprehensible actions common in contentious divorces as 'not outrageous in the extreme,' the court sets a very high bar for plaintiffs seeking tort relief for emotional distress in such situations. This ruling suggests that litigants should primarily seek remedies within family courts through mechanisms like visitation orders or contempt proceedings rather than through separate tort actions. The decision highlights the tension between the fact-specific nature of determining 'outrageous conduct' and a court's willingness to declare certain types of behavior, as a matter of law, outside the bounds of IIED claims due to their prevalence.
