No. The police did not break the rules. The court said the Fourth Amendment protects a person's house and personal belongings, but this protection doesn't cover 'open fields.' Because the whiskey was found in a field, not the house, the police didn't need a warrant. Also, the court noted that Hester wasn't forced to give up the evidence; he and his friend chose to run and abandoned the jugs, so the police were free to examine what they left behind.

No, the law doesn't protect open fields. The special protection the law gives to people's 'persons, houses, papers, and effects' doesn't include big, open fields. This is because Hester and his friend left the whiskey bottles out in the open, so the police didn't break any laws by looking at them after they were abandoned. The law makes a big difference between the area right around your house and open fields farther away. Only the area close to your house gets the special protection. Objects left out in the open in fields are not protected by this law because the difference between fields and houses has been recognized for a very long time.

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?> <opinion type="majority"> <author id="b101-13"> Mr. Justice Holmes </author> delivered the opinion of the Court. The plaintiff in error, Hester, was convicted of concealing distilled spirits &amp;c. under Rev. Stats., § 3296. The case is brought here directly from the District Court on the single ground that by refusing to exclude the testimony of two witnesses and to direct a verdict for the defendant, the plaintiff in error, the Court violated his *58 rights under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States. The witnesses wh©se testimony is objected to were revenue officers. In consequence of information they went toward the house of Hester’s-father, where the plaintiff in error lived, and as they approached saw one Henderson drive near to the house. They concealed themselves from fifty to one hundred yards away and saw Hester come out and hand Henderson a quart bottle. An alarm was given. Hester went to a car standing near, took a gallon jug from it and he and Henderson ran. One of the officers pursued, and fired a pistol. Hester dropped his jug, which broke but kept about a quart of its contents. Henderson threw away his bottle also. The jug and bottle both contained what the officers, being experts, recognized as moonshine whiskey, that is whiskey illicitly distilled; said to be easily recognizable. The other officer entered the house, but being told there was no whiskey there left it, but found outside a jar that had been thrown out and broken and that also contained whiskey. While the officers were there other cars stopped at the house but were spoken to by Hester’s father and drove off. The officers had no warrant for search or arrest, and it is contended that this made their evidence inadmissible, it being assumed, on the strength of the pursuing officer’s saying that he supposed they were on Hester’s land, that such was the fact. It is obvious that even if there had been a trespass, the above testimony was not obtained by an illegal search or seizure. The defendant’s own acts, and those of his associates, disclosed the jug, the jar and the bottle — and there was no seizure in the sense of the law when the officers examined the contents of each after it had been abandoned. This evidence was not obtained by the entry into the house and it is immaterial to discuss that. The suggestion that the defendant was compelled to give evidence against himself *59 does not require an answer. The only shadow of a ground for bringing up the case is drawn from the hypothesis that the examination of the vessels took place upon Hester’s father’s land. As to that, it is enough to say that, apart from the justification, the special protection accorded by the Fourth Amendment to the people in their “ persons, houses, papers, and effects,” is not extended to the open fields. The distinction between the latter and the house is as old as the common law. 4 Bl. Comm. 223, 225, 226. Judgment affirmed. </opinion>

—special protection accorded by the Fourth Amendment to the people in their `persons, houses, papers, and effects,'is not extended to the open fields.

—held that the protection of the Fourth Amendment does not extend to open fields and the court said that "

The Supreme Court has distinguished the curtilage—the area immediately surrounding the home—from neighboring open fields, finding that the former, but not the latter, garners Fourth Amendment protection.

The defendant's own acts... disclosed the jug, the jar and the bottle—and there was no seizure in the sense of the law when the officers examined the contents of each after it had been abandoned

—speaking through Mr. Justice Holmes, refused to extend the Fourth Amendment to sights seen in `the open fields.

It has long been settled that objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be introduced in evidence.

For instance, under the "open fields" doctrine an officer may search for evidence on private land not within close proximity to a home on the property.

It observed that, although the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy inside his cabin, that expectation did not "extend [] to the visual observation of [the co-defendant's] automobile arriving on his premises after leaving a public highway, nor to movements of objects such as the drum of chloroform outside the cabin in the `open fields.'"

No. A warrantless search and seizure of evidence in an open field does not violate the Fourth Amendment. The court reasoned that the evidence was not obtained through an illegal search or seizure because the incriminating items were disclosed by the defendant's own actions of running and abandoning the property. Furthermore, there was no 'seizure' in the legal sense when the officers examined the contents of the containers after they had been abandoned. Critically, the court established that the Fourth Amendment's special protection for 'persons, houses, papers, and effects' does not apply to open fields, a distinction rooted in common law that separates the home from the surrounding open land.

No, the Fourth Amendment does not protect open fields. The special protection accorded by the Fourth Amendment to the people in their 'persons, houses, papers, and effects,' does not extend to open fields. This is because Hester's own acts, and those of his associates, disclosed the jug, the jar, and the bottle—and there was no seizure in the sense of the law when the officers examined the contents of each after it had been abandoned. The distinction between the curtilage, the area immediately surrounding the home, and neighboring open fields is significant, with only the former garnering Fourth Amendment protection. Apart from any justification, objects in plain view in open fields are not protected by the Fourth Amendment because the distinction between open fields and houses is as old as the common law.

Hester v. United States

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