Hesse v. McClintic
2008 WL 115118, 176 P.3d 759 (2008)
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Rule of Law:
A driver is under a duty to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances, which may include taking actions like pulling onto the shoulder. Whether a driver breached this duty, especially when confronted with a "sudden emergency," is generally a question of fact for the jury if there is sufficient evidence from which reasonable minds could differ.
Facts:
- On the morning of February 12, 2001, Colleen McClintic was driving at 65 miles per hour in the right lane of westbound I-70.
- McClintic saw several Rocky Mountain bighorn sheep ahead of her, with some standing in her lane of travel and some on the highway shoulder.
- McClintic slowed her car in her lane of travel to a speed of between ten and thirty miles per hour, seeing no vehicles behind her or in the adjacent left lane at that moment.
- Donald Hesse was driving in the left lane behind a semi-trailer truck, which partially obscured his vision of the right lane ahead.
- Another vehicle behind Hesse flashed its headlights, indicating a desire to pass, prompting Hesse to move into the right lane at 50 to 55 miles per hour.
- Upon changing lanes, Hesse saw McClintic's car ahead and was unable to stop his van before rear-ending her vehicle.
- McClintic's expert witness testified that she could have seen the sheep from seven hundred to nine hundred feet away, giving her about six to nine seconds to react.
- McClintic herself testified that, in retrospect, it would have been safer for her to pull off the road and that she was looking at the sheep, not focusing on traffic conditions, just before the accident.
Procedural Posture:
- Colleen McClintic sued Donald Hesse in the trial court for damages resulting from her injuries, claiming Hesse was negligent.
- Hesse asserted comparative negligence as an affirmative defense, arguing McClintic was negligent in slowing in the lane rather than pulling onto the right shoulder.
- At the close of evidence, McClintic moved for a directed verdict that Hesse was one hundred percent negligent, claiming no evidence of her comparative negligence, which the trial court denied.
- The jury awarded McClintic $170,000 but found Hesse to be seventy percent at fault and McClintic to be thirty percent at fault, reducing McClintic's award to $119,000.
- McClintic filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which the trial court denied.
- McClintic appealed the trial court’s denial of her directed verdict motion to the Colorado Court of Appeals (McClintic as appellant, Hesse as appellee).
- The court of appeals reversed, holding that the trial court erred because, as a matter of law, Hesse was solely negligent, determining that McClintic had no duty to pull onto the shoulder and acted reasonably under a "sudden emergency."
- The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the court of appeals’ ruling (Hesse as petitioner, McClintic as respondent).
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Issue:
Does a driver have a duty to pull onto the shoulder when confronted by animals on the road, and if so, is the question of whether a driver's actions in a "sudden emergency" were reasonable always a matter of law or generally a question for the jury when sufficient evidence of negligence exists?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice EID
No, a driver does not have an absolute duty to pull onto the shoulder when confronted by animals on the road; rather, a driver is under a duty to drive with reasonable care under the circumstances, which may be violated by not pulling over. The question of whether a driver's actions, even in a "sudden emergency," were reasonable is generally a question of fact for the jury if there is sufficient evidence that could support a finding of negligence. The Court reversed the court of appeals, holding that all drivers are bound by a duty to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances. This duty is flexible; while there is no general rule requiring a driver to always pull over when encountering animals, there are circumstances where not doing so could constitute a breach of the duty of care. The Court rejected the court of appeals' conclusion that McClintic had no duty to pull over as a matter of law. Furthermore, the "sudden emergency" doctrine does not lower the standard of care but is merely a factor for the jury to consider when determining if a driver acted reasonably. Questions of whether an emergency existed and whether the chosen course of conduct was reasonable are typically factual determinations for the jury, not matters of law for the court to decide on a directed verdict motion unless there is "no evidence" of negligence. The Court found sufficient evidence that McClintic might have acted unreasonably, including testimony that she had 6-9 seconds to react, her admission that pulling over would have been safer in retrospect, and her focus on the sheep rather than traffic. This evidence created a legitimate jury question regarding her comparative negligence.
Dissenting - Justice RICE
No, McClintic did not owe a specific duty to pull onto the shoulder when she slowed for bighorn sheep on the highway. This is because no statutory provision required it, and an analysis of fairness, risk, foreseeability, burden, and consequences indicates that imposing such a specific duty would be inappropriate. Justice Rice dissented, arguing that the majority's application of a broad duty of care was incorrect and that precedent requires tailoring the scope of the legal duty to the specific circumstances of the case. Citing Taco Bell, Inc. v. Lannon and Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc. v. Bradfield, the dissent argued for a narrower interpretation of duty, specifically whether there was a duty to pull to the shoulder when confronting animals. State statutes (e.g., § 42-4-1103(1) and (3)(b)) did not compel McClintic to pull over, as reducing speed was necessary for safety and no traffic was immediately behind her impeding movement. Applying the Taco Bell factors for duty—risk, foreseeability, burden, and consequences—the dissent concluded that McClintic's actions did not create an unreasonable risk, the resulting harm was not foreseeable, and the potential negative precedential effect of imposing such a specific duty (placing other reasonable drivers in legal jeopardy) weighed against it. Therefore, it would be unfair to impose a duty to pull to the side of the road on McClintic.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the application of the duty of reasonable care in negligence claims, particularly in the context of comparative negligence and the "sudden emergency" doctrine. It reinforces that the standard of care is flexible and fact-dependent, preventing courts from imposing rigid rules that ignore the nuances of real-world driving situations. The ruling limits the power of appellate courts to overturn jury findings on comparative negligence, underscoring the jury's role as the ultimate arbiter of facts and reasonableness, even in emergency scenarios. Future cases will likely see a stronger deference to jury verdicts on negligence questions unless there is a complete absence of evidence supporting the jury's determination.
