Yes, this law is fair and constitutional. Driving can be dangerous, so states have a strong reason to make rules to keep their roads and citizens safe. The law treats driving in Massachusetts as an automatic agreement by out-of-state drivers to have a state official accept court papers on their behalf if they cause an accident. This is okay because the state has the power to ban out-of-state drivers completely, so it also has the power to set conditions for them to use its roads. The law is fair because it requires the court to mail a copy of the lawsuit to the out-of-state driver, ensuring they know they are being sued and have a chance to defend themselves.

Yes, the Massachusetts law is okay because it treats people from other states fairly when it comes to car accidents on its roads. The law makes sure the person being sued knows about the lawsuit and has enough time to respond. States can make rules for their roads and can ask people from other places to agree to these rules if they want to drive there. The law requires people from other states to answer for their actions where the accident happened and gives the person suing an easy way to do so. It doesn't treat people from other states worse than residents of Massachusetts. It's not possible or necessary for the law to treat everyone exactly the same. States have the power to regulate their highways for both residents and non-residents, and they can require non-residents to pick someone to receive lawsuit papers before they drive on the state's roads.

Yes, it is okay for Massachusetts to have a law that says if you're not from there but drive there and get into an accident, you have to deal with their courts in a specific way because it treats people from other states fairly when it comes to car accidents on its roads. The law makes sure the person being sued knows about the lawsuit and has enough time to respond. States can make rules for their roads and can ask people from other places to agree to these rules if they want to drive there. The law requires people from other states to answer for their actions where the accident happened and gives the person suing an easy way to do so. It doesn't treat people from other states worse than residents of Massachusetts. It's not possible or necessary for the law to treat everyone exactly the same. States have the power to regulate their highways for both residents and non-residents, and they can require non-residents to pick someone to receive lawsuit papers before they drive on the state's roads.

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<opinion type="majority">
<author id="b411-10">
 Mr. Justice Butler
 </author>

 delivered the opinion of the Court.
 

 This action was brought by defendant in error to recover damages for personal injuries. The declaration alleged that plaintiff in error negligently and wantonly drove a motor vehicle on a public highway in Massachusetts and that by reason thereof the vehicle struck and injured defendant in error. Plaintiff in error is a. resident of .Pennsylvania.- No personal service was made on him and no property belonging to him was. attached. The service of process was made in compliance with c.
 
 *354
 
 90, General Laws of Massachusetts, as amended by Stat. 1923, c. 431, § 2, the material parts of which follow:
 
<blockquote id="b412-5">
 “ The acceptance by a non-resident of the rights and privileges conferred by section three or four, as evidenced by his operating a motor vehicle thereunder, or the operation by a non-resident of a motor vehicle on a public way in the commonwealth other than under said sections, shall be deemed equivalent to an appointment by such non-resident of the registrar or his successor in office, to be his true and lawful attorney upon whom may be served all lawful processes in any action or proceeding against him, growing out of any accident or collision in which said non-resident may be involved while operating a motor vehicle on such a way, and said acceptance or operation shall be
 
 a
 
 signification of his agreement that any such process against him which is so served shall be of the same legal force and validity as if served on him personally. Service of such process shall be made by leaving
 
 a
 
 copy of the process with a fee of two dollars in the hands of the registrar, or in his office, and such service shall be sufficient service upon the said non-resident; provided, that notice of such service 'and a copy of the process are forthwith sent by registered mail by the plaintiff to the. defendant,' and the defendant’s return receipt and the plaintiff’s affidavit of compliance herewith are appended to the writ and entered with the declaration. The court in which the action is pending may order such continuances as may be necessary to afford the defendant reasonable opportunity to defend the action.”
 </blockquote>

 Plaintiff in error appeared specially for the purpose of contesting jurisdiction and filed an answer in abatement and moved to dismiss on the ground that, the service of process,, if sustained, would deprive him of his property without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court overruled the answer in abatement and denied the motion. The Supreme Judicial
 
 *355
 
 Court held the statute to be a valid exercise of the police power, and affirmed the order. 250 Mass. 22. At the trial the contention was renewed and again denied. Plaintiff in error excepted. The jury returned a verdict for defendant in error. The exceptions wSre overruled by the Supreme Judicial Court. 253 Mass. 478. Thereupon the Superior Court entered judgment. The writ of error was allowed by the chief justice of that court.
 

 The question is whether the Massachusetts enactment contravenes the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
 

 The process of a court of one State cannot run into another and summon a party there domiciled to respond to proceedings against him. Notice sent outside the State to a non-resident is unavailing to give jurisdiction in an action against him personally for money recovery.
 
 Pennoyer
 
 v.
 
 Neff,
 
 95 U. S. 714. There must be actual service within the State of notice upon him or upon some one authorized to accept service for him.
 
 Goldey
 
 v.
 
 Morning News,
 
 156 U. S. 518. A personal judgment rendered against a non-resident, who has neither been served with process nor appeared in the suit is without validity.
 
 McDonald
 
 v.
 
 Mabee,
 
 243 U. S. 90. The mere transaction of business in a State by non-resident natural persons does not imply consent to be bound by the process of its courts.
 
 Flexner
 
 v.
 
 Farson,
 
 248 U. S. 289. The power of a State to exclude foreign corporations, although not absolute but qualified, is the ground on which such an implication is supported as to them.
 
 Pennsylvania Fire Insurance Co.
 
 v.
 
 Gold Issue Mining Co.,
 
 243 U. S. 93, 96. But a State may not withhold from non-resident individuals the right of doing business therein. The privileges and immunities clause of the Constitution, § 2, Art. IV, safeguards to the citizens of one State the right “ to pass through, or to reside in any other state for purposes of trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise.”
 
 *356
 
 And it prohibits state legislation discriminating against citizens of other States,
 
 Corfield
 
 v.
 
 Coryell,
 
 4 Wash. C. C. 371, 381;
 
 Ward
 
 v.
 
 Maryland,
 
 12 Wall. 418, 430;
 
 Paul v. Virginia,
 
 8 Wall. 168, 180.
 

 Motor vehicles are dangerous machines; and, even when skillfully and cafefully operated, their use is attended by serious dangers to persons and property. In the public interest the State may make and enforce regulations reasonably calculated to promote care on the. part of all, residents and non-residents alike, who use its highways. The measure in question operates to require a non-resident to answer for his conduct in the State where arise causes of action alleged against him, as well as to provide for a claimant a convenient method by which he may sue to enforce his rights. Under the statute the implied consent is limited to proceedings growing out of accidents or collisions on a highway in which the non-resident may be involved. It is required that he shall actually receive and receipt for notice of the service and a copy of the process. And it contemplates such continuances as may be found necessary to give reasonable time and opportunity for defense. It makes no hostile discrimination against non-residents but tends to put - them on the sam'e footing as residents. Literal and precise equality in respect of this matter is not attainable; it is not required.
 
 Canadian Northern Ry. Co.
 
 v.
 
 Eggen,
 
 252 U. S. 553, 561-562. The State’s power to regulate the use of its highways extends to their usé by non-residents as well as by residents.
 
 Hendrick
 
 v.
 
 Maryland,
 
 235 U. S. 610, 622. And, in advance-of the operation of a motor vehicle on its highway by a non-resident, the State may require him to appoint one of its officials as his agent on whom process may be served in proceedings growing out of such use.
 
 Kane
 
 v.
 
 New Jersey,
 
 242 U. S. 160, 167. That case recognizes pówér of the State to exclude a non-resident until the formal appointment is made. And, having the power so to exclude, the State
 
 *357
 
 may declare that the use of the highway by the nonresident is the equivalent of the appointment of the registrar as agent on whom process may be served. Cf.
 
 Pennsylvania Fire Insurance Co.
 
 v.
 
 Gold Issue Mining Co., supra,
 
 96;
 
 Lafayette Ins. Co.
 
 v.
 
 French,
 
 18 How. 404, 407-408. The difference between the formal and implied appointment is not substantial so far as concerns the application of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
 


 Judgment affirmed.
 

</opinion>

No, the Massachusetts statute does not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A state has a vital interest in regulating the use of its highways for the safety of its citizens, and this power extends to non-residents. Because motor vehicles are dangerous instruments, a state may enact regulations to promote care and provide a convenient forum for its residents to seek redress for injuries caused by non-resident motorists. While a state generally cannot exercise jurisdiction over a non-resident who has not been personally served within its territory, it can require a non-resident to appoint an in-state agent for service of process as a condition of using its highways, as established in *Kane v. New Jersey*. The Court reasoned that the power to exclude non-resident motorists entirely includes the lesser power to declare that the act of using the highways itself constitutes an implied appointment of a state official as an agent. The statute satisfies due process because its provisions—requiring notice of service and a copy of the process to be sent via registered mail to the defendant—ensure the defendant receives actual notice and a reasonable opportunity to be heard.

Yes. The Massachusetts statute does not contravene the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it does not make hostile discrimination against non-residents and provides a reasonable method for claimants to enforce their rights. The statute requires actual receipt of notice and allows for necessary continuances to afford a reasonable opportunity to defend the action. The power of the State to regulate the use of its highways extends to non-residents, and the State may require non-residents to appoint an official as an agent for service of process. The difference between formal and implied appointment is not substantial concerning the application of the due process clause. The statute operates to require a non-resident to answer for his conduct in the State where causes of action arise against him, as well as to provide claimants a convenient method to sue to enforce their rights. It makes no hostile discrimination against non-residents but tends to put them on the same footing as residents. Literal and precise equality is not attainable or required. The State's power to regulate highway use extends to use by non-residents, and it may require them to appoint an agent for service of process in advance of operating a motor vehicle on its highways.

No. The Massachusetts statute does not contravene the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it does not make hostile discrimination against non-residents and provides a reasonable method for claimants to enforce their rights. The statute requires actual receipt of notice and allows for necessary continuances to afford a reasonable opportunity to defend the action. The power of the State to regulate the use of its highways extends to non-residents, and the State may require non-residents to appoint an official as an agent for service of process. The difference between formal and implied appointment is not substantial concerning the application of the due process clause. The statute operates to require a non-resident to answer for his conduct in the State where causes of action arise against him, as well as to provide claimants a convenient method to sue to enforce their rights. It makes no hostile discrimination against non-residents but tends to put them on the same footing as residents. Literal and precise equality is not attainable or required. The State's power to regulate highway use extends to use by non-residents, and it may require them to appoint an agent for service of process in advance of operating a motor vehicle on its highways.

Hess v. Pawloski

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