Herron v. Anigbo
897 N.E.2d 444, 2008 Ind. LEXIS 1051, 2008 WL 5156272 (2008)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
An occurrence-based medical malpractice statute of limitations is constitutional on its face but may be unconstitutional as applied if a plaintiff, despite reasonable diligence, cannot discover the injury or that it may be attributable to malpractice within the two-year period. When the trigger date for discovery of potential malpractice falls within the two-year occurrence period, a plaintiff must exercise reasonable diligence to investigate and file a claim within the remaining time, or within a reasonable time thereafter if circumstances prevent filing within the original period.
Facts:
- On March 5, 2002, Victor Herron sustained a fall in his home, rendering him a quadriplegic.
- On March 6, 2002, Dr. Anthony Anigbo performed spinal surgery on Herron, which included the placement of a bone graft and a plate.
- Following his surgery, Herron remained in hospitals and care facilities, experiencing difficulty speaking, infection, and pulmonary difficulties requiring a ventilator for nine months.
- On June 18, 2003, Dr. Matthew Hepler examined Herron and noted several postoperative complications, some of which "may well require revision surgery," recommending further tests.
- In November 2003, Dr. Jacquelyn Carter informed Herron that his "condition has deteriorated since the accident, and that a likely cause of the deterioration was negligent follow-up care."
- On November 11, 2003, Herron underwent another spinal surgery, including the removal of hardware, a "revision anterior cervical fusion," and the application of a halo.
- As of January 22, 2004, Herron was unable to be transported by car and required the use of oxygen.
- On March 5, 2004, Dr. Hepler noted that Herron was "doing well without new complaint" and was able to speak, but was still in a halo.
Procedural Posture:
- Dr. Anthony Anigbo moved for summary judgment in the trial court, asserting that Victor Herron's complaint was barred by the two-year, occurrence-based statute of limitations.
- The trial court granted Dr. Anigbo's motion for summary judgment, finding that Herron knew, or should have known with reasonable diligence, of Dr. Anigbo’s malpractice by June 2003 and had a meaningful opportunity to file his claim.
- Victor Herron appealed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the Indiana Court of Appeals (Herron as appellant, Anigbo as appellee).
- The Indiana Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, holding that Herron did not discover his claim until November 2003 and did not have a meaningful opportunity to pursue his claim in the ensuing four months before the limitations period expired.
- The Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer concurrent with its opinion.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does an occurrence-based two-year medical malpractice statute of limitations bar a plaintiff's claim when the plaintiff, despite physical incapacitation and delayed notification of potential malpractice, fails to file suit within the remaining four-month statutory period after being informed of such potential, even if the extent of injuries was not fully known?
Opinions:
Majority - Boehm, Justice
Yes, the occurrence-based two-year medical malpractice statute of limitations bars Victor Herron's claim because, as a matter of law, he failed to pursue it with reasonable diligence within the required statutory period, even considering his physical condition and delayed notification. The Indiana Medical Malpractice Act's two-year statute of limitations runs from the date of the negligent act or omission. While this occurrence-based period is facially constitutional, it may violate the Indiana Constitution if applied to a plaintiff who, despite reasonable diligence, cannot reasonably be expected to learn of the injury or attribute it to malpractice within the two-year period. "Reasonable diligence" in an occurrence-based system requires a plaintiff who knows of both the injury/disease and the relevant treatment to inquire into the possibility of a claim within the remaining limitations period, even if there is no initial reason to suspect malpractice, and to institute a claim within that period or forego it. The "trigger date" is when a patient either knows of the malpractice and resulting injury or learns of facts that, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should lead to the discovery of malpractice and injury. If this trigger date is within the two-year period, the plaintiff must file before the statute expires, if possible with due diligence, or within a reasonable time after the trigger date if not. Herron's claim that he was unaware of the "extent of his injuries" is insufficient to avoid the bar, as the constitutional right to a remedy only requires that nothing prevent investigation into a potential claim, not full knowledge of the extent of injury. Despite Herron's severe physical incapacities, his argument focused on the time he was expressly informed of the possibility of malpractice (November 2003), not his inability to act due to his condition. Once informed in November 2003, four months remained in the two-year period (which began March 6, 2002). As a matter of law, the Court found four months was sufficient time to consult an attorney and file a claim, unless Herron provided evidence he was physically unable to do so. Since Herron only claimed ignorance of the extent of his injuries, and not physical impossibility of action, his claim is barred. Claims for post-March 6, 2002, "follow-up" and "monitoring" negligence were also barred because his physician-patient relationship with Dr. Anigbo ended by May 31, 2002, more than two years before the complaint was filed.
Dissenting - Dickson, Justice
No, the occurrence-based statute of limitations should not bar Victor Herron's claim, as the majority's new standard creates an unreasonable barrier to access courts and fosters suspicion, and there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding Herron's severe physical incapacitation. The majority's standard departs from prior jurisprudence, specifically Booth v. Wiley, which required facts that "should lead" or "would have led" to the discovery of malpractice, implying a reasonable probability of malpractice. The new standard, which triggers the period if the injury "may be" attributable to malpractice or if there is a "potential of malpractice" "even if there is no reason to suspect malpractice," is too low and fosters a climate of suspicion between patients and healthcare providers. The majority misapplies its own standard by overemphasizing Herron's interrogatory answer about the "extent of injuries" while overlooking "abundant additional facts" demonstrating his profound disability during the critical four-month period. Herron, a quadriplegic, was in a halo, on oxygen, unable to be transported by car, and had just undergone a second spinal surgery in November 2003. The totality of this evidence creates a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Herron's incapacity prevented him from filing his complaint during the final four months of the statutory period, thus potentially depriving him of his constitutional right to a remedy by due course of law.
Concurring - Shepard, Chief Justice
While the occurrence-based statute of limitations may be unconstitutional as applied in some cases, it should bar Victor Herron's claim because nothing in his specific facts prevented him from filing on time. The General Assembly’s decision to adopt an occurrence-based statute of limitations was previously upheld in Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., Inc. The Court later recognized in Martin v. Richey that the statute could be unconstitutional as applied if the nature of a patient’s affliction made discovery impossible within the statutory period. However, in Herron’s particular circumstances, there were no facts that genuinely prevented him from filing his claim within the statutory deadline.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies and potentially narrows the constitutional exception to Indiana's occurrence-based medical malpractice statute of limitations. The majority's emphasis on "potential for malpractice" rather than a higher standard of discovery, coupled with its determination that four months was, as a matter of law, sufficient time to act despite severe disability, places a substantial burden on plaintiffs. It suggests that patients must be proactive in investigating any adverse outcome from medical treatment, even if they lack explicit information of negligence. The dissenting opinion highlights the concern that this standard may foster distrust between patients and medical providers and potentially deny access to the courts for genuinely incapacitated individuals. Future cases will need to grapple with what constitutes an absolute barrier to filing a claim versus mere difficulty or inconvenience, and how lower courts should weigh a plaintiff's subjective understanding against the objective standard of reasonable diligence.
