Herring v. New York
422 U.S. 853 (1975)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
A total denial of the opportunity for defense counsel to make a closing summation in a non-jury criminal trial denies the accused the basic right to the assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Facts:
- Allen Braxton alleged that the appellant approached him outside his home on the evening of September 15, 1971, and demanded money.
- Braxton claimed that when he refused the demand, the appellant swung a knife at him.
- A police officer later arrested the appellant and found a small knife in his pocket.
- The appellant denied Braxton's story, stating he was at his place of employment during the time of the alleged offense.
- The appellant's employer, Donald Taylor, testified that he recalled seeing the appellant at work around 5:30 p.m. on the day of the alleged incident.
- The appellant testified that Braxton was a former neighbor who had previously threatened to 'fix' him for refusing to provide money for wine and drugs.
Procedural Posture:
- The appellant was charged with attempted robbery and possession of a dangerous instrument in the Supreme Court of Richmond County, New York, which is a trial court.
- The appellant waived his right to a jury trial, proceeding with a bench trial.
- The trial judge found the appellant guilty of attempted robbery in the third degree.
- The appellant's conviction was affirmed without opinion by an intermediate state appellate court.
- The appellant was denied leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals, the state's highest court.
- The appellant appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which noted probable jurisdiction to hear the case.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a state law that grants a trial judge the discretion to deny defense counsel the opportunity to make a closing summation in a non-jury criminal trial violate the Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Stewart
Yes, the New York law violates the Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel. The right to counsel guarantees that the defense can participate fully and fairly in the adversary factfinding process, and closing argument is a basic element of that process. It is the last clear chance for the defense to persuade the trier of fact that there may be a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt by marshaling the evidence, arguing inferences, and highlighting weaknesses in the prosecution's case. This right is not diminished in a bench trial, as a judge is not infallible and can benefit from a summation that sharpens and clarifies the issues, especially in a trial with testimonial inconsistencies and interruptions. The only state interest served by denying summation is expediency, which is insufficient to justify infringing upon a right so fundamental to a fair trial.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Rehnquist
No, the New York law is not unconstitutional. The proper constitutional inquiry is not whether a right to summation is an element of the right to counsel, but whether its denial in a specific case resulted in a fundamentally unfair trial under the Due Process Clause. In this case, the trial was simple, conducted fairly by an experienced judge who was familiar with the evidence, and the denial of summation had a negligible practical effect on the outcome. The Court's creation of a prophylactic, per se rule is inappropriate for a matter like closing argument, which should be subject to the trial court's discretion. The majority's holding is also inconsistent, as it grants an absolute right to summation but then immediately concedes that judges retain broad discretion to limit its scope and duration, effectively returning the analysis to a case-by-case standard.
Analysis:
This decision establishes a bright-line, constitutional rule that a defense counsel must be given the opportunity to make a closing argument in every criminal trial, regardless of whether it is before a judge or a jury. By rejecting a case-by-case 'fundamental fairness' analysis, the Court elevates closing argument to an indispensable element of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. This precedent prevents states from statutorily granting trial judges the discretion to eliminate this critical stage of advocacy, reinforcing the principle that the right to counsel includes the right for that counsel to perform core adversarial functions.
Unlock the full brief for Herring v. New York