Hernandez v. New York
500 U.S. 352 (1991)
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Rule of Law:
A prosecutor's peremptory challenge is not a per se violation of the Equal Protection Clause if the stated reason is race-neutral on its face, even if the reason has a disproportionate impact on a particular race. A trial court's finding on the ultimate issue of discriminatory intent is a finding of fact that is entitled to great deference and will be overturned on appeal only if it is clearly erroneous.
Facts:
- Dionisio Hernandez fired several shots on a Brooklyn street at Charlene Calloway and her mother, Ada Saline.
- Calloway was wounded, while Saline was unharmed; two bystanders in a nearby restaurant were hit by the shots intended for Saline.
- During jury selection for Hernandez's trial, the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to strike several prospective jurors.
- Two of the challenged jurors were bilingual, speaking both Spanish and English.
- The prosecutor stated his reason for striking them was his uncertainty that they would be able to listen to and follow the court's official English interpreter for the Spanish-speaking witnesses.
- The prosecutor observed that the jurors hesitated and looked away when asked if they could accept the interpreter's translation as final.
- The victims and all of the prosecution's civilian witnesses were Hispanic and were expected to testify in Spanish through an interpreter.
Procedural Posture:
- Dionisio Hernandez was tried for attempted murder and criminal possession of a weapon in the New York Supreme Court, Kings County (the trial court of first instance).
- During jury selection, defense counsel made a Batson objection, arguing the prosecutor was using peremptory challenges to exclude Latino jurors.
- The trial court accepted the prosecutor's explanation and denied the defendant's motion for a mistrial, and Hernandez was subsequently convicted.
- Hernandez (appellant) appealed his conviction to the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division (an intermediate appellate court), which affirmed the judgment.
- Hernandez (appellant) then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals (the state's highest court), which also affirmed the conviction.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the state courts' decisions.
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Issue:
Does a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to strike two bilingual Latino potential jurors, based on the stated concern that their Spanish-language proficiency might cause them to disregard the official English interpreter's translation of testimony, violate the Equal Protection Clause?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Kennedy
No. The prosecutor's reason for the peremptory strikes does not violate the Equal Protection Clause because the explanation was race-neutral and the trial court did not commit clear error in finding it was not a pretext for racial discrimination. A neutral explanation is one based on something other than the juror's race, and the inquiry at this stage is the facial validity of the reason. Here, the prosecutor's concern was not the jurors' ethnicity, but their specific responses and demeanor, which led him to doubt their ability to defer to the official translation. While this criterion may result in a disproportionate exclusion of Latino jurors, disparate impact alone does not prove discriminatory purpose. The ultimate question of discriminatory intent is a factual finding by the trial court, which hinges on credibility and is afforded great deference; it should not be overturned unless it is clearly erroneous.
Concurring - Justice O'Connor
No. The peremptory strikes did not violate the Equal Protection Clause because the defendant failed to meet his burden of proving purposeful discrimination. A violation requires discriminatory intent, not just disproportionate effect. No matter how closely correlated to race an explanation for a strike may be, it does not violate the Equal Protection Clause unless it is actually based on race. The trial court believed the prosecutor's nonracial justification, and that finding of fact was not clearly erroneous, which is the end of the inquiry.
Dissenting - Justice Stevens
Yes. The prosecutor's explanation, even if offered in good faith, was insufficient as a matter of law to rebut the defendant's prima facie case of discrimination. A justification that has a significant disproportionate impact is rarely a legitimate, race-neutral reason. The prosecutor's stated concern was insufficient for three reasons: (1) it would inevitably result in a disproportionate disqualification of Spanish-speaking jurors; (2) the concern could have been easily addressed by less drastic means, such as a jury instruction; and (3) if the concern was valid, it would have supported a challenge for cause, which the prosecutor did not make. The majority errs by focusing on the prosecutor's subjective state of mind instead of the objective sufficiency of the explanation.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the second step of the Batson analysis, establishing that a prosecutor's explanation need only be facially neutral, even if it is highly correlated with race and has a disparate impact. It significantly strengthens the third step's deference to the trial court by applying a 'clear error' standard to the judge's factual finding on discriminatory intent. This makes it more difficult for defendants to succeed on Batson challenges on appeal, as appellate courts will rarely overturn a trial judge's credibility determination regarding a prosecutor's proffered reason.
