Henry v. Wyeth Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 16109, 616 F.3d 134, 93 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 43,957 (2010)
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Rule of Law:
To establish a causal connection in a Title VII retaliation claim, a plaintiff is not required to prove that the individual decision-makers had personal knowledge of the protected activity; general corporate knowledge is sufficient, and causation may be inferred if an agent acts upon the encouragement of a superior who has the requisite knowledge.
Facts:
- Howard Henry, an African-American male, began working for Wyeth Pharmaceuticals' predecessor in 1992 and received several promotions, reaching the position of Production Engineer in 2000.
- Beginning in December 2001, Henry was passed over for several promotions, which were awarded to white or other non-African-American candidates.
- In September 2003, Henry's supervisor, Walter Wardrop, gave him a mid-year performance review with a lower rating ('three') and more criticism than he had previously received.
- In late 2003, as part of a corporate restructuring, Henry was reassigned to a Packaging Supervisor role, which he considered a demotion, and received another 'three' rating on his year-end review.
- In January 2004, Henry began complaining to a series of managers, including the facility's head of diversity, explicitly raising concerns that he was being subjected to racial discrimination.
- Following his complaints, Henry's new supervisor, Andrew Espejo, allegedly began to scrutinize his work more closely and 'develop a paper trail.'
- On September 24, 2004, Henry filed a formal charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).
- On June 24, 2005, shortly after Wyeth received a copy of Henry's 'right to sue' letter from the EEOC, his supervisors placed him on a 30-day Performance Improvement Plan (PIP).
Procedural Posture:
- Howard Henry filed suit against Wyeth Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and three individual supervisors in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, alleging racial discrimination and retaliation.
- The district court dismissed the claims against one individual defendant by stipulation.
- Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, which the district court granted in part, dismissing time-barred claims and claims for which Henry had conceded no racial motive, but denied in part, allowing other discrimination and retaliation claims to proceed.
- Prior to trial, the district court granted defendants' motions in limine to exclude evidence of certain race-based remarks and testimony from other employees about alleged discrimination.
- Following a trial, the jury returned a verdict for the defendants on all claims.
- The district court entered a judgment closing the case.
- Henry, as appellant, appealed the judgment to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, with Wyeth et al. as appellees.
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Issue:
Does a plaintiff in a Title VII retaliation claim need to prove that the specific individuals who carried out an adverse employment action had personal knowledge of the plaintiff's protected activity to establish the causal connection element?
Opinions:
Majority - Leval, Circuit Judge
No. To establish causation in a retaliation claim, a plaintiff does not need to show that the particular individuals who carried out an adverse action knew of the protected activity. The district court erred by instructing the jury that Henry had to prove the individual managers who placed him on a Performance Improvement Plan (PIP) knew about his EEOC complaint. Citing 'Gordon v. New York City Bd. of Educ.', the court affirmed that general corporate knowledge of the protected activity is sufficient. A causal connection can be established if an agent, even one ignorant of the plaintiff's protected activity, acts pursuant to encouragement by a superior who has knowledge. Because Henry presented evidence that could allow a jury to find that his supervisors acted under the influence of others in the company who knew of his complaints (such as HR representative Joanne Rose), the erroneous jury instruction was not harmless. Therefore, the judgment on the retaliation claims is vacated and remanded for a new trial. The judgment on the discrimination claims is affirmed, as any errors related to those claims were harmless.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the 'general corporate knowledge' standard for causation in Title VII retaliation claims within the Second Circuit, making it more difficult for employers to use an 'ignorant' decision-maker as a shield against liability. By clarifying that mere 'encouragement' from a knowledgeable superior—not just a direct order—is sufficient to establish a causal link, the court lowers the evidentiary burden for plaintiffs alleging a 'cat's paw' theory of liability. The opinion's extensive dicta also strongly discourages district courts from using the confusing term 'pretext' in jury instructions, guiding them to focus instead on the ultimate question of whether discrimination was a motivating factor.
