Henry v. Jones
202 So. 3d 129, 2016 Fla. App. LEXIS 15243 (2016)
Rule of Law:
A trial court's decision to grant a new trial based on the manifest weight of the evidence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard and will be affirmed if supported by the record, even if other stated grounds for the new trial are found to be an abuse of discretion. To establish an impermissible quotient verdict, clear and convincing evidence must show jurors agreed in advance to be bound by an averaged numerical result.
Facts:
- George Henry and Margaret Jones are siblings.
- In late 2006, after falling and breaking her hip, their mother moved in with Margaret Jones and her family.
- Margaret Jones acted as her mother's caregiver until the mother's death in August 2009.
- The mother had, over time (August 2006, January 2007, and May 2007), transferred $100,000 from a GNMA fund into a checking account jointly held by herself and Margaret Jones.
- Margaret Jones wrote 108 checks totaling $119,580.08 from the joint account, which George Henry alleged were improper diversions for her own use by exercising undue influence over their mother.
- Dr. Randy Otto, a forensic psychologist, reviewed the mother's medical records and opined that she suffered from dementia of the Alzheimer's type, and her decision-making capacity was significantly impaired by late 2008, possibly by March 2007, making her vulnerable to undue influence; Dr. Otto never met the mother.
- A social worker, Dorothea Swee-Sykes, conducted one home visit in March 2007, where she observed the mother asleep, briefly awake, and then asleep again, with no further interaction.
- Neither George Henry nor any of his witnesses presented evidence of specific actions taken by Margaret Jones that constituted undue influence; George Henry stated his belief that Margaret controlled their mother due to her living with Margaret and having Alzheimer's.
Procedural Posture:
- George Henry sued Margaret Jones in the Circuit Court for Sarasota County (trial court/court of first instance) for damages, alleging tortious interference with his expectancy of inheritance in their late mother's estate.
- A jury in the Circuit Court for Sarasota County rendered a verdict for $100,000 in favor of George Henry.
- Margaret Jones filed a motion for a new trial in the Circuit Court.
- The Circuit Court for Sarasota County (trial court) granted Margaret Jones' motion for a new trial, finding the verdict was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence and constituted an improper quotient verdict.
- George Henry appealed the trial court's order granting a new trial to the District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District; George Henry is the appellant and Margaret Jones is the appellee.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a trial court abuse its discretion by granting a new trial where the jury's verdict is found to be contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, even if the court's separate finding of an improper quotient verdict is not supported by the record?
Opinions:
Majority - Casanueva, Judge
No, a trial court does not abuse its discretion by granting a new trial where the verdict is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, even if another stated reason for the new trial, such as an improper quotient verdict, is unsupported by the record. The court reviewed the trial court's decision to grant a new trial under an abuse of discretion standard, noting that a stronger showing of error is needed to reverse an order granting a new trial than denying one, and such orders must be supported by the record. First, the trial court abused its discretion in finding an impermissible quotient verdict. The jury's question referencing the $100,000 GNMA fund and 25% distribution was insufficient. It did not evidence the use of a forbidden averaging process nor an agreement in advance to be bound by such a result. To overturn on quotient verdict grounds, the moving party must establish by clear and convincing evidence that jurors agreed, prior to calculation, to be bound by the figure as their final verdict, and no such evidence (like juror depositions) was presented (citing Greens to You, Inc. v. Gavelek and Cromarty v. Ford Motor Co.). Second, the record did support the trial court's conclusion that the verdict was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. To prove tortious interference with an inheritance expectancy, a plaintiff must show intentional interference through tortious conduct, such as undue influence. Undue influence requires "over persuasion, duress, force, coercion, or artful or fraudulent contrivances to such an extent that there is a destruction of free agency and willpower of the testator" (citing Estate of Kester v. Rocco). Neither Mr. Henry nor his witnesses testified to any specific actions by Mrs. Jones constituting such undue influence. While the jury's question implied the Ginnie Mae funds should not have been removed, Mrs. Jones testified the mother made those decisions and there was no evidence to the contrary. Furthermore, some transfers occurred before Dr. Otto opined the mother's capacity was significantly impaired. Therefore, the evidence presented was insufficient to meet the standard for undue influence. The court affirmed the order granting a new trial solely on the basis that the verdict was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.
Analysis:
This case underscores the high evidentiary standard for proving undue influence in tortious interference with an inheritance expectancy claims, requiring specific evidence of coercive or fraudulent actions rather than mere proximity or vulnerability. It also clarifies the stringent proof required to establish an improper quotient verdict, demanding clear and convincing evidence of a pre-deliberation agreement among jurors to be bound by an averaged numerical figure. The decision reinforces that an order granting a new trial will be affirmed if any valid ground is supported by the record, even if other stated grounds are found to be an abuse of discretion, demonstrating appellate deference to trial court fact-finding regarding the manifest weight of the evidence.
