Henderson v. State
1998 WL 372649, 977 S.W.2d 605, 1998 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 84 (1998)
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Rule of Law:
An appellate court will not grant a rehearing or supplement the record with evidence of a trial judge's personal beliefs when the appellate court's original decision was properly based on an objective legal standard, such as the reasonable beliefs of law enforcement authorities.
Facts:
- Lisa Diane Henderson, the appellant, was a suspect in a case involving a missing child.
- At the request of her court-appointed attorney, Henderson drew maps indicating the location of the child-victim's body.
- Henderson gave these maps to her attorney for the purpose of her legal defense.
- The state sought to compel Henderson's attorney to produce the maps.
- The trial judge held an in camera (private) proceeding regarding the production of the maps.
- During this private proceeding, the trial judge stated his personal conviction that the child was already deceased and that there was no ongoing crime.
- Following the in camera proceeding, the trial judge ordered Henderson's attorney to deliver the maps to the state.
- Authorities subsequently used the maps to locate the child-victim's body.
Procedural Posture:
- The trial court ordered appellant's attorney to produce maps drawn by the appellant.
- Appellant was convicted in the trial court.
- Appellant appealed her conviction to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, the state's highest criminal court.
- The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment in a prior decision.
- The court denied appellant's initial motion for rehearing on March 4, 1998.
- Appellant subsequently filed a motion to withdraw the mandate, a motion to supplement the record with a newly discovered transcript, and a second motion for rehearing.
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Issue:
Does newly discovered evidence showing a trial judge's personal belief that a crime was not ongoing warrant a rehearing of an appellate decision when that decision was based on law enforcement's reasonable belief that the crime might still be in progress?
Opinions:
Concurring - Price, J.
No. A rehearing is not warranted because the appellate court's original decision did not rely on the trial judge's personal beliefs. The original decision was based on the objective beliefs of law enforcement authorities, who had reason to believe the child might still be alive and were entitled to pursue even a remote possibility of rescue. The trial judge's personal convictions, expressed in camera, are therefore irrelevant to the legal correctness of his ultimate ruling to compel production of the maps. Furthermore, the appellant's motion is a second motion for rehearing on previously rejected points, which is prohibited by the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Dissenting - Overstreet, J.
Yes. The court should grant rehearing and consider the new evidence because the trial judge's explicit finding directly contradicts the basis of this Court's original opinion. The trial judge, acting as the fact-finder on the suppression issue, stated unequivocally, 'I’m convinced that the child is deceased.' This undermines the appellate conclusion that 'authorities had reason to believe that the baby might still be alive.' The Court has the power to recall its mandate to consider newly discovered, relevant evidence and should do so here to dispose of the case based on a complete record.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the principle that appellate review focuses on the objective legal correctness of a trial court's ruling, not the subjective reasoning or personal beliefs of the trial judge. It establishes that if a ruling can be upheld on a valid legal ground (here, the reasonable beliefs of law enforcement), the judge's contrary private statements are irrelevant on appeal. The case also underscores the high value placed on the finality of judgments, as the court strictly applies procedural rules to bar successive motions for rehearing, even in the face of potentially impactful new evidence.
