Helmedach v. Commissioner of Correction
2016 Conn. App. LEXIS 361, 148 A.3d 1105, 168 Conn. App. 439 (2016)
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Rule of Law:
A defense attorney's duty to promptly communicate formal plea offers is a fundamental component of the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. Intentionally delaying the communication of a favorable plea offer until after the client testifies, even for what counsel perceives as a valid strategic or paternalistic reason, constitutes deficient performance and is not a protected trial strategy.
Facts:
- On September 1, 2004, Jennifer Helmedach and her boyfriend, David Bell, were staying at the apartment of Sarah Tarini.
- The next day, after being told they had to leave, Helmedach called her pregnant friend, Faye Bennett, who picked her up and they returned to Tarini's apartment.
- A downstairs neighbor saw Helmedach and Bennett enter the apartment, heard thumping noises, and later saw a nervous Helmedach driving away in Bennett's vehicle, hitting the building as she left.
- Tarini returned to the apartment to find Bennett's body, who had been stabbed multiple times and strangled, in a garbage bag on the bed.
- During Helmedach's criminal trial, on the morning she was scheduled to testify, the prosecutor called her attorney, Richard Reeve, and offered a 10-year plea agreement.
- Reeve, concerned that news of the offer would fluster Helmedach and negatively impact her testimony, asked the prosecutor to keep the offer open until after she testified, to which the prosecutor agreed.
- Reeve's law partner advised him to communicate the offer immediately, but Reeve chose not to.
- After Helmedach testified for two and a half days, Reeve informed her of the offer, which she wished to accept, but the prosecutor then stated the offer was withdrawn.
Procedural Posture:
- Jennifer Helmedach was charged with felony murder, robbery, and conspiracy.
- A jury in the criminal trial court found Helmedach guilty on all charges.
- The trial court sentenced Helmedach to a term of thirty-five years of incarceration.
- Helmedach's judgment of conviction was affirmed on direct appeal.
- Helmedach filed an amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the habeas court (a trial-level court), alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
- After a trial, the habeas court granted the petition, finding counsel's performance deficient.
- The respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, was granted certification to appeal the habeas court's judgment to the intermediate appellate court.
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Issue:
Does a defense attorney provide ineffective assistance of counsel by intentionally delaying the communication of a formal, favorable plea offer to a client until after the client has testified at trial, even if the attorney believes the delay is necessary for the client's emotional well-being and has reason to believe the offer will remain open?
Opinions:
Majority - Prescott, J.
Yes. A defense attorney provides ineffective assistance of counsel by intentionally delaying the communication of a favorable plea offer. The decision to accept a plea is a fundamental right belonging exclusively to the defendant, and counsel cannot usurp this right through paternalistic decision-making. The duty to 'promptly' communicate plea offers, as established in Missouri v. Frye and professional conduct rules, means to do so immediately or without undue delay. Reeve's two-and-a-half-day delay was not prompt, and the prosecutor's agreement to keep the offer open did not negate Reeve's constitutional duty to his client. This decision was not a protected trial strategy because it interfered with the petitioner's fundamental rights; even if it were considered a strategy, it was unreasonable given that a prior plea offer had been withdrawn and Reeve's own partner advised against the delay.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces and clarifies the 'promptly' standard from Missouri v. Frye, effectively equating it with 'immediately' or 'without undue delay' in the context of communicating plea offers. It significantly narrows the scope of what constitutes permissible trial strategy, establishing that an attorney's paternalistic concerns for a client's emotional state cannot justify infringing upon the client's fundamental right to decide whether to accept a plea. The ruling creates a bright-line rule that prioritizes the client's autonomy, making any intentional delay in communicating a formal offer highly vulnerable to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, regardless of the attorney's motives or a prosecutor's assurances.
