Hellums v. Raber
853 N.E.2d 143, 2006 Ind. App. LEXIS 1719, 2006 WL 2457410 (2006)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
One who substantially assists or encourages another's negligent conduct may be held liable for harm resulting to a third person, even if their own direct actions did not cause the injury, provided their actions were negligent and foreseeably led to the encouraged negligent act.
Facts:
- On November 15, 2003, Alan Raber, William Nugent, and Ernest Raber were hunting deer.
- Charles D. Heliums was hunting deer with a separate party on the same property.
- Alan had seen another truck and assumed other people were hunting nearby.
- Alan's party spotted a deer, and all members, including Alan, shot at it, with Alan firing four rapid shots.
- Five to ten seconds later, a second deer appeared, running in approximately the same direction as the first.
- Ernest Raber fired multiple shots at the second deer, and one of his bullets struck Heliums.
- Heliums was not hit by a bullet from Alan Raber's gun.
- Heliums and his father, who were about 175-200 yards east of Alan's party and wearing orange hats, waved hats and shouted to get Alan's party's attention, but were unsuccessful before the second deer was shot.
Procedural Posture:
- On September 22, 2004, Heliums filed a lawsuit against Alan Raber, Ernest Raber, and William Nugent in the trial court (court of first instance), alleging negligence.
- On November 17, 2005, Alan Raber moved for summary judgment in the trial court, asserting that Heliums was not hit by a bullet from his gun, and thus he had not proximately caused Heliums's injuries.
- On December 12, 2005, the trial court granted Alan Raber's motion for summary judgment.
- Heliums (appellant) appealed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Alan Raber (appellee) to the Court of Appeals of Indiana (intermediate appellate court).
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a genuine issue of material fact exist as to whether a hunter's allegedly negligent shooting proximately caused injuries to another hunter, even if a bullet from the first hunter's gun did not strike the injured party, when the first hunter's actions may have substantially encouraged a co-hunter's negligent shooting?
Opinions:
Majority - Crone, Judge
Yes, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Alan's actions proximately caused Heliums's injuries. The court adopts Section 876(b) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which states that one is subject to liability for harm to a third person from another's tortious conduct if they know the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and give substantial assistance or encouragement. The court reasoned that Alan's shooting, if negligent, could have encouraged Ernest to shoot negligently as well, thereby creating a question of proximate cause for the jury. This approach acknowledges that an injury may have more than one proximate cause and that proximate cause is generally a question of fact. For liability to attach under this theory, Heliums must show that Alan's own actions were negligent, that it was reasonably foreseeable Alan's actions would encourage Ernest to act negligently, and that such encouragement was a proximate cause of Heliums’s injuries.
Dissenting - Bailey, Judge
No, a genuine issue of material fact does not exist regarding proximate causation because Heliums failed to demonstrate that his injury would not have occurred 'but for' Alan's conduct. Judge Bailey dissents from the majority's adoption of Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 876 because, in this case, it negates the fundamental requirement of proximate causation in negligence law. Since it is undisputed that the bullet that struck Heliums did not come from Alan's gun, the dissenting judge argues that the 'but for' test, a minimum requirement for causation-in-fact, is not met. Without this direct causal link, Heliums is not entitled to further develop his case factually against Alan.
Analysis:
This case is significant for extending the application of Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 876 to negligence cases in Indiana, specifically concerning 'substantial assistance or encouragement' liability. It broadens the scope of proximate causation beyond direct physical contact, allowing a party to be held liable for another's injury even if their action was not the immediate physical cause, provided their negligent conduct encouraged or assisted the direct tortfeasor. This decision reinforces that proximate cause is generally a question of fact, making summary judgment less appropriate in cases where indirect causation can be argued, and emphasizes the foreseeability of the encouraged action.
