Helen McKey Administratrix of the Estate of Agnes Littlejohn v. Kenneth Fairbairn
345 F.2d 739 (1965)
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Rule of Law:
Absent an express covenant to repair, a landlord who parts with entire possession and control of premises is generally not liable for injuries to a tenant resulting from disrepair. Furthermore, a plaintiff may be found contributorily negligent as a matter of law if they fall on a known hazardous condition after failing to exercise proper care.
Facts:
- On January 17, 1958, Levi McKey rented a dwelling house from Kenneth Fairbairn, agent for Euphemia L. Haynes, on a month-to-month basis.
- Agnes Littlejohn, McKey’s mother-in-law, occupied a bedroom and other space on the second floor.
- On February 20, 1958, after a snow storm, a moist spot about 'twice the size of a pie' was observed on a wall in Mrs. Littlejohn’s bedroom, but there was no moisture on the floor.
- The moist wall condition was reported to Fairbairn and Haynes, and within a week, their representative inspected the premises, found dampness on the wall but no roof leak, and agreed to eliminate the cause.
- On the night of February 26, 1958, an all-night rain fell, causing the roof to develop a leak and the floor of Mrs. Littlejohn’s bedroom to become wet.
- On the morning of February 27, 1958, Mrs. Littlejohn discovered the wet floor and mopped it twice.
- After leaving the room for a short time, Mrs. Littlejohn returned to awaken her grandson and retrieve her coat, where she slipped on the wet floor and fell, sustaining injuries.
- The written contract between McKey and Fairbairn did not obligate the landlord to make repairs, but allowed the landlord access for "making any repairs Landlord considers necessary or desirable."
Procedural Posture:
- On April 24, 1959, Agnes Littlejohn brought suit in District Court to recover damages from Euphemia L. Haynes (owner) and Kenneth Fairbairn (agent).
- On May 27, 1960, Agnes Littlejohn died, and Helen McKey, her administratrix, was substituted as plaintiff.
- During the progress of the trial, counsel for Helen McKey moved to amend the pretrial order to permit introduction of sections of the District of Columbia Housing Regulations.
- The District Judge denied the motion to amend and directed a verdict for the defendants.
- Helen McKey, administratrix, appealed the directed verdict to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
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Issue:
Is a landlord liable for a tenant's injuries caused by a known disrepair if the lease does not obligate the landlord to make repairs, and can a tenant's knowledge of the disrepair constitute contributory negligence as a matter of law?
Opinions:
Majority - Wilbur K. Miller
No, a landlord is not liable for a tenant's injuries caused by a known disrepair if the lease does not obligate the landlord to make repairs, and a tenant's knowledge of the disrepair can constitute contributory negligence as a matter of law. The court held that the landlord was not liable because the lease did not impose a duty to repair on the landlord; instead, the tenant was responsible for repairs, as the landlord had parted with entire possession of the house. The landlord was only notified of a moist spot on a wall, not a roof leak, and there was no evidence they had actual or constructive notice of the subsequent leak and wet floor, nor did they promise to repair that specific condition. Citing Bowles v. Mahoney and Security Savings & Commercial Bank v. Sullivan, the court affirmed the common law principle that tenants generally assume liability for premises upkeep in such leases. Furthermore, the court found Mrs. Littlejohn contributorily negligent as a matter of law, stating that she was well aware of the wet floor, having mopped it twice shortly before her fall, and failed to exercise proper care. The court reasoned that one can walk on a known wet floor without falling if the condition is known and proper care is exercised, citing Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Feeney and Winthrop v. 1600 16th Street Corp.. Finally, the trial judge was within his "justifiably large discretion" to refuse to allow the plaintiff to introduce housing regulations not specified in the pre-trial order, as established in Gould v. DeBeve.
Dissenting - Fahy
Yes, the trial court erred in directing a verdict for the defendants because the housing regulations should have been considered, and the question of contributory negligence should have been decided by the District Court, not as a matter of law. Judge Fahy argued that the trial judge should have exercised the latitude granted by Rule 16, Fed.R.Civ.P., to modify the pre-trial order to prevent "manifest injustice" by allowing the introduction of pertinent housing regulations, especially given that Whetzel v. Jess Fisher Management Co. established such regulations are part of a landlord's obligations. He suggested that any potential prejudice to the defendants could have been addressed with a continuance. The dissent contended that precluding applicable law from consideration because it was not in the pre-trial order is more likely to cause manifest injustice than the preclusion of evidentiary matter. The dissent also disagreed with the majority’s decision to affirm on the ground of the decedent’s own negligence, noting that the trial court did not rely on this for the directed verdict, and the question of contributory negligence should be initially considered and answered in the District Court, implying it should have been a jury question.
Analysis:
This case reinforces established common law principles regarding landlord liability, particularly that absent a specific contractual duty, landlords are generally not responsible for repairs or injuries resulting from disrepair in premises where the tenant has full possession. It also underscores the significant discretion trial courts have in managing pre-trial orders and the introduction of new legal theories or evidence during trial. Crucially, the ruling serves as a strong precedent for finding contributory negligence as a matter of law when a plaintiff has explicit prior knowledge of a hazardous condition but fails to exercise reasonable care, shifting responsibility to the injured party.
