Hegyes v. Unjian Enterprises, Inc.
286 Cal. Rptr. 85 (1991)
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Rule of Law:
A tortfeasor whose negligence injures a woman does not owe a legal duty of care to a child conceived by that woman years after the tortious act, absent a special relationship, such as physician-patient or product manufacturer, that directly implicates pregnancy and conception.
Facts:
- On July 4, 1985, Lynn O’Hare Hegyes was involved in an automobile accident with a vehicle operated by an employee of Unjian Enterprises, Inc.
- As a result of injuries from the accident, O'Hare was fitted with a lumbo-peritoneal shunt.
- In 1987, two years after the accident, O'Hare became pregnant with the plaintiff, Cassondra Hegyes.
- During the pregnancy, the growing fetus compressed O'Hare's shunt, creating a health risk for O'Hare.
- To protect O'Hare from further injury, doctors delivered Cassondra Hegyes via Cesarean section on October 31, 1987, fifty-one days prematurely.
- Cassondra Hegyes was born with personal injuries allegedly resulting from her premature birth.
Procedural Posture:
- Lynn O’Hare Hegyes sued the defendant for her own injuries resulting from the 1985 accident and subsequently settled that action.
- Cassondra Hegyes filed a complaint for negligence against Unjian Enterprises, Inc. in the Los Angeles County Superior Court, a trial court of first instance.
- Defendant filed a demurrer to the complaint, arguing it failed to state a valid cause of action because defendant owed no legal duty to the plaintiff.
- The trial court sustained the defendant's demurrer without leave to amend.
- The trial court entered a judgment of dismissal in favor of the defendant.
- Plaintiff Cassondra Hegyes (appellant) appealed the judgment of dismissal to the Court of Appeal.
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Issue:
Does a negligent motorist owe a legal duty of care to the subsequently conceived child of a woman who is injured in an automobile accident?
Opinions:
Majority - Woods, J.
No. A negligent motorist does not owe a legal duty of care to the subsequently conceived child of a woman injured in an automobile accident. The existence of a legal duty is a prerequisite to any negligence claim, and California courts have only recognized a duty for preconception torts where a 'special relationship' exists, such as in cases of medical malpractice or product liability. In those instances, the defendant's conduct is inextricably related to the future pregnancy. Extending a duty to a motorist in this context would create limitless liability with staggering social and judicial consequences. Foreseeability alone is insufficient to create a duty; policy considerations, as outlined in Rowland v. Christian, must limit the scope of liability. Here, the connection between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's injury is too remote, and the plaintiff, being unconceived at the time of the accident, was not a person to whom a duty was owed under the Vehicle Code.
Dissenting - Johnson, J.
Yes. A negligent motorist does owe a duty of care to the subsequently conceived child of an injured woman. The California Supreme Court established this general rule in Turpin v. Sortini, which held that a child is entitled to recover for a tort committed upon her mother before conception. This precedent is not limited to medical professionals but applies to all tortfeasors. It is illogical to allow recovery for an unknown, already-conceived fetus injured in an accident while denying it to a later-conceived child who suffers injuries stemming from the same tortious act against the mother's reproductive capacity. Furthermore, an independent analysis using the Rowland v. Christian factors supports finding a duty, as the harm is foreseeable, the injury certain, and public policy strongly favors preventing harm from negligent driving without creating an undue burden on motorists.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies and limits the scope of preconception tort liability in California, establishing that an ordinary negligence claim, such as one arising from a car accident, does not create a duty to a subsequently conceived child. The decision draws a sharp distinction between general tortfeasors and those with a 'special relationship' to the mother, like physicians or product manufacturers, whose conduct is directly linked to conception and birth. By prioritizing policy concerns about limitless liability over a pure foreseeability analysis, the ruling creates a strong barrier against extending tort duties to a potentially infinite class of future plaintiffs, thereby solidifying a more restrictive approach to novel duty-of-care questions.
