Hedgepeth v. Whitman Walker Clinic
990 A.2d 455 (D.C. 2010) (2010)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
A plaintiff may recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress, even if not in a "zone of physical danger," if the defendant has a special relationship with or undertaking to the plaintiff that necessarily implicates the plaintiff's emotional well-being, and the defendant's negligence is especially likely to, and does, cause serious emotional distress.
Facts:
- Terry Hedgepeth visited the Whitman Walker Clinic (WWC) to request an HIV test after learning his girlfriend was HIV-positive.
- WWC took a blood sample and sent it to a lab, which administered a test that came back "non-reactive," indicating Hedgepeth was not HIV-positive.
- Due to a human error at WWC, a "Client Lab Results" form was prepared that mistakenly showed Hedgepeth had tested positive for HIV.
- Dr. Mary Fanning, a doctor at WWC, reviewed the inaccurate form and negligently informed Hedgepeth that he was HIV-positive.
- For the next five years, Hedgepeth believed he was HIV-positive.
- As a result of this mistaken belief, Hedgepeth suffered from severe clinical depression, had suicidal thoughts, was admitted to psychiatric wards, lost his job, and experienced deterioration in his personal relationships.
- Five years after the misdiagnosis, Hedgepeth visited the Abundant Life Clinic, where a new HIV test revealed he was not HIV-positive.
Procedural Posture:
- Terry Hedgepeth sued Whitman Walker Clinic and Dr. Mary Fanning in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, the trial court of first instance.
- The defendants (appellees) filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing Hedgepeth's claim was barred because he was not in a 'zone of physical danger.'
- The Superior Court granted summary judgment for the defendants.
- Hedgepeth (appellant) appealed to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, the intermediate and highest appellate court for D.C. matters.
- A three-judge division of the Court of Appeals affirmed the Superior Court's ruling.
- The full District of Columbia Court of Appeals granted Hedgepeth's petition for a rehearing en banc to reconsider the 'zone of physical danger' rule.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does the "zone of physical danger" test for negligent infliction of emotional distress bar recovery for a plaintiff who suffers serious emotional harm from a defendant's negligence in the context of a special relationship, such as that between a doctor and patient, where the negligence does not place the plaintiff at risk of physical injury?
Opinions:
Majority - Ruiz, Associate Judge
No. The "zone of physical danger" test does not bar recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress where a defendant's negligence occurs within a special relationship or undertaking that necessarily implicates the plaintiff's emotional well-being. The court reasons that the historic rationale for the zone of physical danger test—to prevent limitless liability to an infinite number of unknown plaintiffs—is not applicable when a pre-existing relationship already limits the defendant's duty to a specific, identifiable person. In such cases, the defendant's undertaking itself defines the scope of liability. Applying the zone of danger test rigidly leads to untoward results, such as immunizing a funeral home from liability for mishandling a corpse, as in Washington v. John T. Rhines Co., while allowing a claim for finding a worm in food, as in Sowell v. Hyatt Corp. The court therefore adopts a supplemental rule, consistent with the draft Restatement (Third) of Torts, allowing recovery where a special relationship makes serious emotional distress an especially likely result of negligence. A doctor-patient relationship, particularly when dealing with a life-altering diagnosis like HIV, is precisely the type of relationship where the patient's emotional well-being is necessarily implicated, and a negligent misdiagnosis is especially likely to cause serious emotional harm.
Analysis:
This landmark decision significantly alters tort law in the District of Columbia by creating an alternative path for recovery in negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) claims. By supplementing the restrictive "zone of physical danger" test with a "special relationship" or "undertaking" exception, the court moves D.C. law toward a more modern approach that focuses on the nature of the defendant's duty rather than a formulaic physical-risk analysis. This ruling brings D.C. in line with a growing number of jurisdictions and the Restatement (Third) of Torts. The precedent will enable future claims by direct victims of negligence in contexts like therapist-patient relationships, funeral services, and other professional undertakings where emotional harm is a foreseeable and likely result of a breach of duty, even without any threat of physical impact.
