Hector v. State
2 Mo. 135 (1829)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
Whether a confession is sufficiently free and voluntary to be admissible as evidence is a question of law to be decided by the court, not the jury, and any confession extorted by pain or duress must be excluded.
Facts:
- About half past ten at night, after a burglary was discovered, certain persons caught a slave named Hector and began flogging him to compel a confession about the burglary and stolen money.
- The flogging continued all night, causing Hector to scream, and he stated he would find the money if they would release him.
- Around daybreak, McKinney was awakened by loud screaming, and upon inquiry, learned that Hector was being flogged to compel discovery.
- When Hector heard McKinney’s voice, he called for assistance; McKinney approached Hector and advised him to confess if he took the money, then asked if he had taken it.
- Hector replied that he took the money and would show McKinney where it was, but he did not want the persons who had been flogging him to accompany them.
- Hector stated the money was at Mr. Menard’s, his master’s house, and offered to go there alone with McKinney.
- The other persons insisted on accompanying them, so Hector, McKinney, and the others went to Mr. Menard’s house but did not find any money.
- Believing Hector had deceived him, McKinney then gave Hector several lashes with a cowskin and left him.
Procedural Posture:
- The prisoner was indicted for burglary.
- During the trial, the prisoner's counsel moved the trial court to exclude McKinney's testimony, arguing Hector's confession was not freely and voluntarily made but extorted by pain.
- The trial court overruled the prisoner's motion to exclude McKinney's testimony.
- The prisoner's counsel also prayed the trial court to exclude all extorted confessions from the jury's consideration, which the trial court refused.
- The trial court instructed the jury that they should exclude any confession made under the influence of torture, pain, hope, or fear, but that confessions they believed were freely and voluntarily given should be taken as good evidence against the prisoner.
- The prisoner's counsel objected to the trial court's instruction to the jury.
- The prisoner appealed the judgment to the state's highest court.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Did the trial court err by admitting a confession potentially obtained through torture and by instructing the jury to determine the voluntariness of the confession rather than ruling on its admissibility as a matter of law?
Opinions:
Majority - M'Girk, C.J.
Yes, the trial court erred in refusing to exclude McKinney’s testimony regarding Hector's confession and in instructing the jury to determine its voluntariness. The court determined that Hector’s confession, made after a night of flogging and in the hope of relief from pain, was likely involuntary. The court emphasized that the determination of whether a confession is sufficiently free and voluntary to be competent testimony is a matter of law to be decided by the Court, not by the jury. Therefore, the trial court should have excluded the confession from the jury’s consideration entirely, particularly as no money was found where Hector claimed it would be, suggesting the confession was made to gain a respite from pain. The court found no error in the discharge of a sick juror.
Analysis:
This case is significant for clarifying the respective roles of the judge and jury in determining the admissibility of confessions. It establishes that judges, not juries, are responsible for deciding as a matter of law whether a confession was voluntary and thus admissible. By requiring judicial pre-screening of confession voluntariness, the ruling safeguards against the use of unreliable evidence obtained through coercion, thereby protecting a defendant's due process rights and preventing juries from being prejudiced by potentially forced admissions. This principle is foundational to modern criminal procedure concerning self-incrimination.
