Heck v. Robey
1995 Ind. LEXIS 196, 1995 WL 756249, 659 N.E.2d 498 (1995)
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Rule of Law:
The fireman's rule, traditionally limiting landowners' duty to firefighters, does not serve as an absolute bar to recovery for professional rescuers injured by a defendant's positive wrongful acts during a rescue operation, as the Indiana Comparative Fault Act subsumes 'incurred risk' into comparative fault rather than maintaining it as a complete defense.
Facts:
- James L. Robey was a licensed paramedic and emergency medical technician employed by Warrick Emergency Medical Service.
- On January 16, 1990, Robey and his partner, Tracy Kavanaugh, responded to a '911' call to extricate Lawrence Heck from a ditched company vehicle at the Squaw Creek Mine.
- Heck, a nearly 200-pound employee of Squaw Creek Mine (jointly owned by Peabody Coal), had driven a company vehicle into a large, steep ditch while on the job, allegedly while intoxicated.
- Firefighters were summoned and removed the vehicle door with hydraulic tools to aid in Heck's rescue.
- Robey and Kavanaugh then removed Heck, placed him on a spine board, and carried him out of the ditch.
- During the rescue, Heck allegedly flailed and kicked in a combative manner, requiring Kavanaugh to hold Heck's arms and forcing Robey to do most of the pulling while on his knees.
- Robey sustained back injuries for which he later brought a negligence action.
Procedural Posture:
- James L. Robey and his spouse, Carol S. Robey, brought a negligence action against Lawrence Heck and Peabody Coal in the trial court.
- Heck and Peabody Coal moved for summary judgment in the trial court, arguing that the fireman's rule barred Robey's recovery.
- The trial court denied the motions for summary judgment, concluding that genuine issues of material fact existed and that the fireman's rule did not extend to paramedics.
- Heck and Peabody Coal (appellants) filed an interlocutory appeal, which the Court of Appeals (intermediate appellate court) accepted jurisdiction over.
- The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, holding that the fireman's rule applied to paramedics and barred Robey's claim.
- Robey (petitioner/appellant for transfer) then petitioned the Indiana Supreme Court (highest court) to transfer the case.
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Issue:
Does the fireman's rule, which traditionally limited a landowner's duty to firefighters, completely bar a paramedic's recovery for injuries sustained during a rescue operation due to the rescued individual's combative behavior, given that Indiana's Comparative Fault Act addresses 'incurred risk'?
Opinions:
Majority - Selby, Justice
No, the fireman's rule does not, as a matter of law, completely bar a paramedic's recovery for injuries sustained due to a patient's combative acts during a rescue operation, because 'incurred risk' is no longer an absolute defense under Indiana's Comparative Fault Act. The Court first noted that the traditional fireman's rule, established in Woodruff v. Bowen, was founded on premises liability, limiting a landowner's duty to firefighters to abstaining from 'positive wrongful acts.' However, the Court of Appeals had expanded this rule, treating it as a complete bar to recovery for public safety officers based on 'incurred risk' and public policy. The Supreme Court rejected this expansion. While acknowledging that the rescue doctrine, which creates a duty for a negligent actor towards a rescuer, typically applies to voluntary, spontaneous acts and not professional rescuers responding to a '911' call, the Court distinguished Heck's initial negligence from his post-rescue commencement conduct. The Court found that Heck's alleged combative behavior during the rescue attempt created a genuine issue of material fact regarding 'positive wrongful acts,' which could establish a duty for Heck towards Robey. Crucially, the Court held that the Indiana Comparative Fault Act (IC § 34-4-33-2) eliminated 'incurred risk' as a complete defense, subsuming it under the concept of 'fault' for comparative apportionment. Therefore, a plaintiff's incurred risk can reduce or eliminate recovery based on the degree of fault but does not automatically bar a claim unless there was an express, enforceable consent to relieve the defendant of duty. The Court concluded that any rule purporting to create an absolute defense based on incurred risk is contrary to the comparative fault scheme, and thus, the fireman's rule cannot serve as an absolute bar based on implied assumption of risk by a professional rescuer.
Analysis:
This case significantly redefines the scope of the fireman's rule in Indiana, preventing its use as an absolute bar to recovery for professional rescuers based solely on their occupation and the inherent risks. By integrating 'incurred risk' into the comparative fault framework, the decision empowers professional responders to seek redress for injuries caused by a defendant's negligent or positively wrongful acts during a rescue, particularly those occurring after the initial emergency. This shift places a greater emphasis on individual accountability for post-incident conduct and ensures that the risks of a rescue are proportionally allocated rather than being borne entirely by the professional rescuer, influencing future cases involving professional negligence claims against beneficiaries of rescue efforts.
