Hearndon v. Graham
2000 WL 1288688, 767 So. 2d 1179 (2000)
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Rule of Law:
The delayed discovery doctrine postpones the accrual of a cause of action for childhood sexual abuse when the plaintiff alleges that traumatic amnesia, caused by the abuse, prevented them from knowing of the tortious act.
Facts:
- Kenneth Graham was the stepfather of Paula Jean Hearndon.
- Beginning in 1968 when Hearndon was 8, Graham allegedly began sexually abusing her.
- The alleged sexual abuse continued until 1975, when Hearndon was 15 years old.
- In 1975, Graham also allegedly murdered Hearndon's mother.
- Hearndon alleged that due to the trauma, she suffered from amnesia and suppressed all memory of the abuse.
- Around 1988, as an adult, Hearndon's memory of the alleged abuse returned.
Procedural Posture:
- In 1991, Paula Jean Hearndon sued Kenneth Graham in a Florida trial court for injuries from alleged childhood sexual abuse.
- The trial court granted Graham's motion to dismiss the complaint with prejudice, ruling the claim was barred by the four-year statute of limitations.
- Hearndon, as appellant, appealed the dismissal to the Florida First District Court of Appeal.
- The First District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's dismissal but certified a question of great public importance to the Supreme Court of Florida for review.
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Issue:
Does the delayed discovery doctrine postpone the accrual of a cause of action in a tort action based on childhood sexual abuse where the plaintiff alleges she suffered from traumatic amnesia caused by the abuse?
Opinions:
Majority - Per Curiam
Yes, the delayed discovery doctrine postpones the accrual of the cause of action. The doctrine provides that a cause of action does not accrue, and the statute of limitations does not begin to run, until the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of the tortious act. The court distinguished between 'accrual,' which is when the cause of action comes into being, and 'tolling,' which is the interruption of a running limitations period. While the legislature has exclusively defined the grounds for tolling, it has not limited the common law's ability to determine when a cause of action accrues. In cases of repressed memory from childhood sexual abuse, the plaintiff is blamelessly ignorant of their injury and cannot be expected to bring a claim. Therefore, the cause of action accrues only upon the discovery of the abuse and the injury, aligning with the majority of other jurisdictions and principles of fairness.
Dissenting - Wells, C.J.
No, the cause of action should be barred by the statute of limitations. The majority's decision fails to properly reconcile with the court's precedent in 'Wiley v. Roof,' which held that a 1992 legislative amendment allowing for delayed discovery in such cases did not apply retroactively to revive already barred claims. Prior Florida law did not recognize a delayed discovery exception for repressed memory of sexual abuse. The legislature's decision to enact a specific statute in 1992 demonstrates that no such common law rule existed before. Therefore, Hearndon's cause of action was already barred by the time she filed her complaint, and the trial court's dismissal was correct.
Analysis:
This decision is significant for judicially adopting the delayed discovery doctrine for repressed memory cases of childhood sexual abuse in Florida, independent of later legislative action. By clarifying the distinction between 'accrual' (when the clock starts) and 'tolling' (when the clock pauses), the court preserved the judiciary's role in defining when a cause of action begins, even where the legislature has enumerated exclusive tolling provisions. This holding opened the courthouse doors to abuse survivors whose claims would otherwise be time-barred, shifting the legal battle from a threshold dismissal to a fact-intensive inquiry at trial regarding the nature of the plaintiff's memory and the timing of their discovery.
