Hearn v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.
2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15540, 279 F.Supp.2d 1096, 62 Fed. R. Serv. 1283 (2003)
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Rule of Law:
Product liability claims against cigarette manufacturers are not barred as a matter of law by the 'common knowledge' doctrine or Comment i of the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A. The question of when smoking's risks became 'common knowledge' is a factual issue for a jury, and manufactured cigarettes with additives may not qualify as 'good tobacco' exempt from liability.
Facts:
- In 1950, at the age of sixteen, Winona Hearn began smoking cigarettes manufactured by Defendants, allegedly induced by their extensive advertising campaigns.
- Plaintiffs allege that Hearn was unaware of the detrimental health risks and addictive nature of smoking when she began the habit.
- Plaintiffs claim that Defendants manipulated the addictive properties of their cigarettes by using ammonia and other additives.
- By 1969, when federal law required warning labels on cigarette packs, Hearn was severely addicted and unable to quit.
- In April 2000, Hearn was diagnosed with lung cancer.
- Hearn died from lung cancer in November 2000.
Procedural Posture:
- Robert Hearn and Lori Ann Peterson (Plaintiffs) filed a 12-count complaint against R.J. Reynolds and other tobacco companies (Defendants) in Maricopa County Superior Court, a state trial court.
- Defendants removed the action to the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, a federal court of first instance.
- Defendants filed a joint Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
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Issue:
Do product liability claims against tobacco manufacturers fail as a matter of law under the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A's 'common knowledge' doctrine, which defines a product as unreasonably dangerous based on the ordinary consumer's expectations?
Opinions:
Majority - Judge Silver
No. Product liability claims against tobacco manufacturers do not fail as a matter of law under the 'common knowledge' doctrine because determining what an ordinary consumer knew about the full risks of smoking at a specific time in the past is a question of fact, not law. The court first rejected Defendants' argument that Comment i of the Restatement § 402A, which states 'good tobacco is not unreasonably dangerous,' provides a blanket immunity. The court reasoned that 'good tobacco' does not necessarily encompass modern, manufactured cigarettes that allegedly contain additives to enhance addiction. Second, the court declined to take judicial notice of when the health risks and addictive nature of smoking became 'common knowledge,' especially for the period between 1950 and 1969. The court found this to be a disputed factual issue inappropriate for resolution on a motion to dismiss. While the court dismissed several of the plaintiffs' other claims on separate grounds (e.g., failure to plead fraud with particularity, failure to provide timely notice for warranty claims), it allowed the core product liability claims based on negligence and strict liability to proceed to discovery.
Analysis:
This decision is significant for allowing core products liability claims against tobacco companies to survive a motion to dismiss, pushing back against the historically effective 'common knowledge' defense. By treating the extent of public awareness of smoking's dangers as a question of fact for the jury, the court lowered the barrier for plaintiffs to proceed to the discovery phase. The distinction between 'good tobacco' and manufactured cigarettes with additives created a viable legal theory for design defect claims based on the alleged manipulation of nicotine and other chemicals. This ruling forces defendants to litigate the historical facts of public knowledge and their own product design rather than relying on a broad, dispositive legal defense at the pleading stage.
