Hearn v. Meyer

Majority - Leisure, District Judge

No, copyright law does not extend protection to reproductions of public domain illustrations with only minor, unintentional variations, nor to an author's historical textual works containing facts, common structures, or quotations. An author does not have standing as a beneficial owner if their interest is merely a remote, contingent reversionary right. Regarding the reproductions of illustrations, the court held that Hearn's reproductions did not meet the originality requirement for copyright protection. While Hearn expended great effort and time, the variations from the public domain originals were insignificant, unintentional, and did not express his own artistic viewpoint. The court emphasized that mere physical skill and labor, without substantial creative contribution or a distinguishable variation, are insufficient for originality. It distinguished previous cases where copyright was granted for reproductions because those involved a change of medium (e.g., oil painting to mezzotint engraving) or creative interpretation (e.g., scale reduction of a sculpture), which Hearn's direct reproduction of existing reproductions lacked. The court also rejected the argument for copyright protection based on public benefit, stating that granting copyright for minuscule variations would monopolize public domain works and hinder artistic progress. On the issue of standing for the “W.W. Denslow” book, the court found Hearn lacked standing as a beneficial owner. Section 501(b) of the Copyright Act grants standing to legal or beneficial owners, with beneficial ownership typically implying a present financial interest, such as royalties, in exchange for legal title. Hearn's interest was a remote, contingent possibility of negotiating royalties or copyright reversion only if specific future conditions (second printing, or first printing sold out and no reprint) were met. The court ruled that such a remote reverter did not constitute a 'present interest in the work' or 'present financial interest in exploitation of his work,' and that adopting such a broad interpretation would grant standing to virtually every author, contrary to Congressional intent. Concerning the textual works, the court granted summary judgment to defendants, finding no infringement. The court determined that many of Hearn's alleged infringed passages were not copyrightable because they were: 1) verbatim quotations from other works; 2) statements of pure fact; or 3) statements of fact that could only be expressed in a limited number of ways (merger doctrine), often due to common source material. For the remaining passages, the court found a lack of substantial similarity in the protectible aspects or deemed similarities de minimis. Regarding the 'plot,' structure, and organization of “The Pictured World,” the court stated that copyright protection does not extend to historical interpretations, theories, or facts. The 'plot' of Hearn's work, derived from historical artists' lives, was not copyrightable under the principle that history is common property. The work's overall structure (thematic grouping of artists, chronological presentation) was deemed a 'standard literary device' and not distinctive enough for copyright. Furthermore, the court found no substantial similarity between the structures of Hearn's and defendants' works, noting their differing organizational principles (thematic vs. by-artist). Finally, Hearn's claim based on the 'compilation' theory for selecting and arranging facts was rejected because his works were historical and artistic interpretations, not compilations of raw data that required originality in selection or arrangement like directories.