Haycock v. Hughes Aircraft Co.
22 Cal.App.4th 1473, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 248, 94 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 1580 (1994)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
The statutory presumption that employment is at-will under California Labor Code § 2922 is a presumption affecting the burden of proof, not merely the burden of producing evidence. Therefore, the existence of this presumption is, by itself, sufficient to create a question of fact for the jury as to whether an implied contract not to terminate without good cause exists, even if the employer presents no other evidence of an at-will relationship.
Facts:
- Don H. Haycock was employed by Hughes Aircraft Company for over 25 years, during which he consistently received favorable performance reviews and merit salary increases.
- Haycock's supervisor, Jack Rafelson, began making unauthorized and false negative entries in Haycock's personnel file while also removing favorable documents without Haycock's knowledge.
- Following a satisfactory performance appraisal in December 1986, Haycock's managers, including Rafelson, changed his rating from a '3' (satisfactory) to a '4' (marginal) to justify denying him a salary increase, which violated company policy requiring employee notification.
- Haycock discovered the altered documents, including an appraisal marked 'rejected' and a memorandum calling him 'not an asset,' in his personnel file.
- Haycock complained to successively higher levels of management and human resources, requesting that his file be corrected and removed from Rafelson's control.
- While the company made some corrections, it failed to fully resolve his complaints, removed an additional favorable review from his file, and ultimately returned the file to Rafelson's custody.
- Haycock also discovered a draft layoff request in Rafelson's desk that falsely cited 'poor performance' as grounds for a 'for cause' termination, which would circumvent seniority protections and damage his reemployment prospects.
- After being told there were no other positions available and that he would have to continue working under Rafelson, Haycock retired, viewing the situation as a constructive discharge.
Procedural Posture:
- Don H. Haycock sued Hughes Aircraft Company in a California trial court for constructive discharge, termination in violation of public policy, and defamation.
- The trial judge granted a judgment of nonsuit in favor of Hughes Aircraft on the public policy and defamation claims.
- During the jury trial on the constructive discharge claim, the judge ruled as a matter of law that an implied employment contract existed, removing that question from the jury's consideration.
- The jury returned a verdict in favor of Haycock.
- The trial court denied Hughes Aircraft's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
- Hughes Aircraft (appellant) appealed the judgment to the California Court of Appeal, and Haycock (respondent/cross-appellant) cross-appealed the nonsuit on his other claims.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Is the question of whether an implied-in-fact contract exists to terminate an employee only for good cause a question of fact for the jury that cannot be decided by a judge as a matter of law, given the statutory presumption of at-will employment?
Opinions:
Majority - Turner, P. J.
Yes, the question of whether an implied-in-fact contract exists to terminate an employee only for good cause is a question of fact for the jury. The trial court erred by ruling as a matter of law that such a contract existed. California Labor Code § 2922 establishes a presumption of at-will employment, which the court determined is a presumption affecting the burden of proof, not merely the burden of producing evidence. This is significant because a presumption affecting the burden of proof does not disappear when the opposing party introduces contrary evidence (e.g., longevity of service, positive reviews, company policies suggesting job security). Instead, the presumption remains and creates a factual conflict that must be resolved by the trier of fact. The plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of persuading the jury that the presumption of at-will employment is overcome by evidence of an implied contract. Because the presumption itself has evidentiary value in this context, it was reversible error for the judge to take this question away from the jury.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces that the existence of an implied contract is almost always a question of fact for the jury in wrongful termination cases. By classifying the at-will presumption as one affecting the burden of proof, the court established a significant procedural hurdle for employees, ensuring that employers can typically get to a jury by simply relying on the statutory presumption. This makes it more difficult for plaintiffs to win such cases on summary judgment or a directed verdict. The ruling clarifies that the statutory at-will presumption is not a weak, easily-rebutted assumption, but a robust legal principle that carries its own weight through trial, forcing the employee to affirmatively persuade the jury that a different agreement existed.
