Hay v. Medical Center Hosp. of Vermont
145 Vt. 533, 496 A.2d 939, 1985 Vt. LEXIS 335 (1985)
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Rule of Law:
A minor child has a recognized cause of action for the loss of parental consortium when a parent is tortiously injured and rendered permanently comatose.
Facts:
- On July 7, 1980, Mary Hay was injured while at the Medical Center Hospital of Vermont.
- As a result of these injuries, Mary Hay became permanently comatose.
- Regina Abruntilla, as guardian for Mary Hay, filed a complaint alleging that Mary Hay's injuries were proximately caused by the negligence of the defendant hospital and nurses.
- Walter Hay, husband of Mary Hay, filed a complaint for loss of spousal consortium.
- Walter Hay, as father and next friend of David Hay, minor son of Mary Hay, filed a complaint seeking damages for his son's loss of parental consortium, including deprivation of physical, moral, and intellectual training, and loss of affection, society, love, protection, and companionship.
Procedural Posture:
- Regina Abruntilla, in her capacity as guardian for Mary Hay, filed a complaint in trial court against Medical Center Hospital of Vermont and nurses, alleging Mary Hay’s injuries were caused by their negligence.
- Walter Hay, Mary Hay's husband, filed a complaint for loss of spousal consortium and his motion for joinder of his suit with Mary Hay's cause of action was granted by the trial court.
- Walter Hay, as father and next friend of David Hay, minor son of Mary Hay, filed a complaint for David's loss of parental consortium and concurrently filed a motion to be joined as a party plaintiff in the original suit.
- The trial court denied David Hay’s motion for joinder, ruling that a minor has no recognizable cause of action for damages for loss of parental consortium from a living parent rendered totally disabled through negligence.
- The trial court converted its denial of David Hay’s motion for joinder into a final order under V.R.C.P. 54(b).
- David Hay filed a timely appeal from that final order to the Vermont Supreme Court.
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Issue:
Does a minor child have a cause of action for the loss of parental consortium when the parent is alive but has been rendered permanently comatose due to the tortious negligence of another?
Opinions:
Majority - Underwood, J.
Yes, a minor child does have a cause of action for the loss of parental consortium when a parent is alive but permanently comatose due to tortious injury. The Court holds that it has the authority to adapt common law principles to meet changing societal needs, just as it judicially created and developed the doctrine of spousal consortium. It is inconsistent with Vermont's wrongful death statutes to allow recovery for loss of parental training and companionship when a parent is killed but not when a parent is rendered permanently comatose, as the impact on the child is comparable. While adults can seek new relationships, children are often helpless to replace the lost companionship of a parent. The Court clarifies that prior Vermont cases (Whitney, Baldwin) did not deny such a cause of action and overrules previous characterizations inconsistent with consortium claims being derivative actions. Addressing defendants' objections, the Court finds that the injury to the child is not too remote because loss of consortium is a derivative action. It acknowledges the potential for increased litigation but prioritizes justice and restricts the holding to minor children. To mitigate multiple lawsuits, the Court mandates joinder of the child's claim with the injured parent's whenever feasible. Regarding damages, while speculative and uncertain, they are no more difficult to ascertain than in other intangible loss cases, and monetary awards, though imperfect, are the legal system's only method to ease such a loss and ensure funds are for the child's benefit. The Court rejects the argument for judicial deference to the legislature, asserting its role to adapt common law, citing numerous precedents where it expanded outmoded concepts. Finally, the Court dismisses concerns about increased insurance premiums as a standard, secondary argument outweighed by the benefit to the child and society.
Dissenting - Larrow, J. (Ret.)
No, David Hay should not be able to recover for loss of his mother's consortium under these circumstances. Justice Larrow dissents, arguing that Mary Hay, being permanently comatose, should be considered legally 'dead' under 18 V.S.A. § 5218. Therefore, the action should be treated as one for wrongful death, subject to the statutory provisions of 14 V.S.A. § 1492(b). This statute limits damages to 'pecuniary injuries' for an adult decedent, with an exception for loss of love and companionship only in cases where the decedent is a minor child. The dissent argues that the Court cannot simply ignore or amend an existing statute and its express scope of permitted recovery under the guise of adopting a 'more liberal' rule. Justice Larrow expresses doubt about the wisdom of adopting a minority legal doctrine with uncertain future support and believes the general creation of a 'new cause of action' is not required for this decision, nor is it appropriate for the Court to legislate in this manner. Justice Peck joins in this dissenting opinion.
Analysis:
This case significantly expands common law tort liability in Vermont by recognizing a new cause of action for minor children's loss of parental consortium, even when the parent is alive but incapacitated. The decision underscores the judiciary's power and willingness to evolve common law to address modern societal harms and ensure compensation for intangible losses, even in areas arguably within the legislature's purview. It highlights the importance of consistency in compensation for similar injuries (death vs. permanent coma) and positions the child's welfare as paramount. This ruling potentially influences future cases involving severe parental injury, ensuring a mechanism for minor children to recover for their unique damages.
