No, he does not automatically lose his property rights. To truly 'abandon' something, you have to intend to give it up forever. While escaping makes it seem like he intended to abandon his things, that's just an assumption. Because the prison just stored his property with his name on it and Hawkins asked for it back as soon as he returned, he proved he didn't actually intend to abandon it forever. He successfully challenged the assumption that he was giving it up.

Yes, he absolutely lost his property rights. When you escape prison, you have no plan to come back. The very act of escaping proves you are abandoning everything you leave behind. The prison rightfully took ownership of the property and could do whatever it wanted with it.

Yes, his property was abandoned the moment he escaped. The decision should be based on what happened at the time of the escape. He left his stuff and clearly intended not to return, which is the definition of abandonment. The court shouldn't be making up a new rule about 'challenging an assumption' after the fact.

No, just assuming someone gave up their stuff based only on their actions isn't always right, and Hawkins showed he still wanted his stuff by asking for it back before anyone else took it. The Court said the case needed a closer look, pointing out that giving something up has to be on purpose, and whoever says property was abandoned has to prove it. Here, the prison kept Hawkins' stuff safe instead of letting others take it like in a different case the lower court looked at. By asking for his stuff when he came back, Hawkins showed he didn't mean to abandon it.

Hawkins gave up his property when he escaped prison without planning to come back on his own. Escaping shows he didn't want to keep any stuff he left. By abandoning his things, Hawkins lost all rights to them, and the prison fairly became the owner. It doesn't make sense to think he meant to get his stuff back after being caught when he didn't want to return. The case should be dismissed.

The Court wrongly changed Montana's law about abandoning property by saying you can undo it later with a 'rebuttable presumption.' Hawkins abandoned his belongings under the current law as soon as he escaped, which shows his intent to give them up. The first court was right to use the reasoning from a similar case that matches Montana law. The dismissal should stand.

No, just assuming someone gave up their stuff based only on their actions isn't always right. We conclude that Hawkins showed he still wanted his stuff by asking for it back before anyone else took it. We say the case needs a closer look, pointing out that giving something up has to be on purpose, and whoever says property was abandoned has to prove it. Here, the prison kept Hawkins' stuff safe instead of letting others take it, like in a different case the lower court looked at. By asking for his stuff when he came back, Hawkins showed he didn't mean to abandon it.

I dissent. Yes, Hawkins gave up his property when he escaped prison without planning to come back on his own. Escaping shows he didn't want to keep any stuff he left behind. By abandoning his things, Hawkins lost all rights to them, and the prison fairly became the owner. It doesn't make sense to think he meant to get his stuff back after being caught when he didn't want to return. This case should be dismissed.

I also dissent. Yes. The Court wrongly changed Montana's law about abandoning property by saying you can undo it later with a 'rebuttable presumption.' Hawkins abandoned his belongings under the current law as soon as he escaped, which shows his intent to give them up. The first court was right to use the reasoning from a similar case that matches Montana law. The dismissal should stand.

—the question of whether an inmate who escaped the Montana State Prison had abandoned his personal property which he left at the prison when he absconded.

Abandonment is defined as "[t] he relinquishment of a right; the giving up of something to which one is entitled."

Thus, we determined that Hawkins' complaint was wrongly dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12 (b)(6), MR Civ. P.

In Roman law, res derelicta (or res derelictae) refers to goods which have been voluntarily and intentionally abandoned by their owners, whilst ownership rights (or title to property) could be acquired by occupatio, which is taking actual possession or control of what never had an owner (res nullius) or has ceased to have one (res derelicta).

Further in support of this keepings presumption, the burden is actually on the finder to prove that the owner abandoned the property in question before the finder can be awarded ownership as the first finder of now unowned property

When an owner abandons property, the property is returned to the pool of unowned things open to acquisition by anyone and the now-prior owner has no special status vis-d-vis the property

Notably, the abandoner can reclaim possession of the abandoned property if he does so before any other person appropriates it

No. An inmate's escape from prison creates only a rebuttable presumption of intent to abandon property, not an absolute abandonment as a matter of law. To constitute abandonment, there must be an intent to relinquish the property, which is the paramount object of inquiry. While an escape infers an intent to abandon, this is a rebuttable presumption. In this case, the prison officials did not demonstrate an intent to acquire title to the property; instead, they secured it, labeled it with Hawkins' name, and placed it in storage. When Hawkins was returned to custody and requested his property back, he did so before anyone else had acquired ownership, thereby effectively rebutting the presumption that he intended to abandon it and regaining his status as the owner.

Yes. An inmate's escape from prison does constitute abandonment of their property as a matter of law. The act of escaping is 'unequivocally inconsistent with any intention to retain ownership of property left at the penitentiary.' Hawkins had no intention of returning to the prison when he escaped, and by this act, he relinquished all right, title, and interest in the property. The prison properly became the owner of the abandoned property, free to dispose of it as it wished.

Yes. An inmate's escape from prison does constitute abandonment of their property as a matter of law. Under established Montana law, abandonment occurs when an act of relinquishment is accompanied by the intention to abandon. Hawkins' act of escape and his inferred intent to never return occurred simultaneously, completing the abandonment at that moment. The majority improperly changes state law by creating a new 'rebuttable presumption' standard, which extends the timeline for determining abandonment and was not argued by the parties. The court should have affirmed the lower court's ruling based on existing precedent.

No, the presumption of abandonment based solely on the owner's acts is rebuttable, and Hawkins effectively rebutted it by requesting the return of his property prior to its acquisition by anyone else. The Court reversed the dismissal and remanded the case, emphasizing that abandonment requires voluntary and intentional acts, and the burden is on the party alleging abandonment to prove it. Unlike in Herron v. Whiteside, relied upon by the District Court, the prison here took Hawkins' property into protective custody rather than allowing others to appropriate it. Hawkins' request for his property upon return rebutted any presumption of intent to abandon it.

Hawkins abandoned his property by escaping prison with no intention of returning voluntarily. The act of escape is unequivocally inconsistent with any intent to retain ownership of property left behind. By abandoning the property, Hawkins relinquished all rights to it, and the prison properly became its owner. Inferring intent to reclaim the property upon involuntary capture is illogical. The complaint fails to state a claim and should be dismissed.

The Court has improperly changed Montana abandonment law by introducing a 'rebuttable presumption' that extends the point for determining abandonment beyond the confluence of act and intent. Hawkins abandoned his property under existing law when he escaped, an act inferring intent to terminate ownership. The District Court properly relied on Herron v. Whiteside, which is consistent with Montana law. The dismissal should be affirmed.

No, the presumption of abandonment based solely on the owner's acts is rebuttable, and Hawkins effectively rebutted it by requesting the return of his property prior to its acquisition by anyone else. We reversed the dismissal and remanded the case, emphasizing that abandonment requires voluntary and intentional acts, and the burden is on the party alleging abandonment to prove it. Unlike in Herron v. Whiteside, relied upon by the District Court, the prison here took Hawkins' property into protective custody rather than allowing others to appropriate it. Hawkins' request for his property upon return rebutted any presumption of intent to abandon it.

Yes. Hawkins abandoned his property by escaping prison with no intention of returning voluntarily. The act of escape is unequivocally inconsistent with any intent to retain ownership of property left behind. By abandoning the property, Hawkins relinquished all rights to it, and the prison properly became its owner. Inferring intent to reclaim the property upon involuntary capture is illogical. The complaint fails to state a claim and should be dismissed.

Yes, an inmate's escape from prison constitutes abandonment as a matter of law. The Court has improperly changed Montana abandonment law by introducing a 'rebuttable presumption' that extends the point for determining abandonment beyond the confluence of act and intent. Hawkins abandoned his property under existing law when he escaped, an act inferring intent to terminate ownership. The District Court properly relied on Herron v. Whiteside, which is consistent with Montana law. The dismissal should be affirmed.

Hawkins v. Mahoney

Case Podcast

Rule of Law:

The Legal Principle

Facts:

Procedural Posture:

How It Got Here

Issue:

Legal Question at Stake

Opinions:

Majority, Concurrences & Dissents

Analysis:

Why This Case Matters

Gunnerbot