Hawkins v. Houser
91 N.C. App. 266, 371 S.E.2d 297, 1988 N.C. App. LEXIS 818 (1988)
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Rule of Law:
A person who voluntarily undertakes to render aid to another in peril has a duty to act with ordinary care, and a breach of this duty, such as by negligently misdirecting rescuers, can give rise to a claim for negligence.
Facts:
- Defendants, the Housers, owned a 220-acre tract of land containing a mobile home park and an unenclosed, unposted farm pond.
- Residents of the park, including decedents Pless (age 12) and Hawkins (age 26), often visited and fished in the pond.
- On January 29, 1985, the pond was frozen over, and Pless rode his bicycle onto the ice, despite prior warnings from the defendants and a contemporaneous warning from Hawkins.
- Pless fell through the ice, and Hawkins went onto the ice on a bicycle in an attempt to rescue him, also falling through.
- Both Pless and Hawkins held onto Hawkins' bicycle to stay afloat in the icy water for approximately 40 minutes, calling for help.
- Other park residents heard the calls and had defendant Sue Houser telephone the rescue squad.
- With her husband's concurrence, Sue Houser told the rescue squad to use a specific unimproved dirt road which the defendants had previously blocked with felled trees.
Procedural Posture:
- Plaintiffs, representatives of the estates of decedents Pless and Hawkins, filed wrongful death actions against the defendants, the Housers, in the Superior Court (trial court).
- The complaints initially alleged negligence in maintaining the pond and that the pond constituted an attractive nuisance.
- After discovery, the defendants moved for summary judgment.
- The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, dismissing both actions.
- Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal to the North Carolina Court of Appeals, an intermediate appellate court.
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Issue:
Does a landowner who voluntarily undertakes to summon aid for a person in peril on their property have a duty to exercise ordinary care, such that negligently providing rescuers with directions to a known-blocked road may constitute a breach of that duty sufficient to overcome summary judgment?
Opinions:
Majority - Phillips, Judge
Yes. While a landowner is generally not negligent for maintaining an unenclosed body of water on rural property, a person who voluntarily undertakes to render aid assumes a duty to act with ordinary care. The court held that the defendants' claim regarding the maintenance of the pond was properly dismissed because maintaining an unposted, unfenced pond in a rural setting is not, by itself, negligence. The attractive nuisance doctrine did not apply as Pless was a 12-year-old capable of appreciating the danger. However, the court found a genuine issue of material fact regarding the defendants' affirmative act of summoning aid. By volunteering to call the rescue squad, the defendants assumed a duty to use ordinary care. Directing the rescuers to a known, barricaded road when an unimpeded road was available is evidence that the defendants failed to use ordinary care. This potential negligence, which was discovered after the initial complaint was filed, warrants reversing the summary judgment and allowing the plaintiffs to amend their complaint, as the amendment would relate back to the original filing.
Analysis:
This case illustrates the important 'voluntary undertaking' or 'Good Samaritan' doctrine in tort law. While there is generally no duty to rescue, once a person volunteers to render aid, they must do so with reasonable care and not worsen the victim's position. The decision distinguishes between liability based on a static condition of the land (a premises liability claim, which failed here) and liability based on an affirmative act of negligence (a general negligence claim, which survived). It also reinforces the liberal pleading standards under modern civil procedure, allowing plaintiffs to amend their complaint to add a new theory of liability discovered during litigation when it arises from the same core set of operative facts.
