Hawaii v. DeCastro
913 P.2d 558 (1996)
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Rule of Law:
Reliance on a 911 operator's perceived permission to leave a traffic stop does not constitute a valid mistake of law defense, as an operator is not an official authority charged with interpreting the law. Furthermore, the choice of evils defense is not available to a defendant who flees from police if their fear of harm is objectively unreasonable and safer, non-criminal alternatives exist.
Facts:
- Robert DeCastro, believing Officer Derek Rodrigues had driven recklessly while pursuing another motorist, pulled his van over behind the officer's stopped patrol car to record his license plate number.
- Officer Rodrigues approached DeCastro's van, and according to DeCastro, became confrontational, held a baton, used profanity, and challenged DeCastro and his passenger to a fight.
- After the verbal exchange, Officer Rodrigues took DeCastro's license, registration, and insurance card and instructed him to "wait" while he returned to his patrol car.
- While waiting, DeCastro called 911 on his cellular phone to report that he was being harassed by the officer.
- Following his conversation with the 911 operator and before Officer Rodrigues returned, DeCastro drove his van away from the scene.
- Officer Rodrigues pursued DeCastro for approximately two miles with his siren and flashing lights activated.
- The chase, which involved two other police officers, ended only after a police sergeant's vehicle pulled in front of DeCastro's van, blocking his path.
Procedural Posture:
- Robert DeCastro was tried in the District Court of the First Circuit, a trial court.
- The District Court found DeCastro guilty of Resisting an Order to Stop a Motor Vehicle.
- DeCastro appealed his conviction to the Intermediate Court of Appeals of Hawaiʻi.
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Issue:
Does a driver's reliance on a 911 operator's perceived permission, or a subjective fear of a police officer, provide a valid mistake of law or choice of evils defense to a charge of resisting an order to stop a motor vehicle?
Opinions:
Majority - Burns, Chief Judge
No, neither the mistake of law nor the choice of evils defense excuses the defendant's conduct. A 911 operator is not a public officer charged with the interpretation or enforcement of the law defining the offense, so reliance on their statements does not satisfy the mistake of law defense under HRS § 702-220. The operator's advice cannot be considered an 'official statement of the law.' The choice of evils defense under HRS § 703-302 also fails because DeCastro's belief that he faced imminent harm was not objectively reasonable. The incident occurred in daylight on a public freeway with a passenger present, and safer, non-criminal alternatives were available, such as locking the van doors and continuing to speak with the 911 operator. The harm created by fleeing police and initiating a chase was greater than the harm DeCastro sought to avoid.
Concurring - Acoba, Judge
No, the defenses do not apply, but the majority's reasoning on the choice of evils defense is flawed. The mistake of law defense fails because a 911 operator's statement is not an 'administrative grant of permission' under the statute. The choice of evils defense fails because the trial court could reasonably find DeCastro did not believe he was in 'imminent harm,' especially since he testified that he 'chuckled' at the officer's alleged threat. However, the majority improperly relies on the common law test from State v. Kealoha, which adds requirements (like the absence of a 'third alternative') that are not present in the express language of the controlling statute, HRS § 703-302.
Analysis:
This case narrowly defines the scope of the mistake of law and choice of evils defenses in Hawaii. It establishes that for the mistake of law defense, the defendant must rely on an 'official' interpretation from a specifically authorized body, not extemporaneous advice from a subordinate employee like a 911 operator. For the choice of evils defense, the decision underscores the high bar for reasonableness, holding that initiating a dangerous police chase is not a justifiable response to a perceived threat when safer, non-criminal options are available. The concurrence raises an important statutory interpretation issue, questioning whether courts can supplement a statutory defense with additional common-law requirements.
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