Havert v. Caldwell
452 N.E.2d 154, 1983 Ind. LEXIS 919 (1983)
Rule of Law:
An initial negligent act is not the proximate cause of an injury, and liability is cut off, if an independent and unforeseeable intervening act directly causes the injury, particularly when the initial act merely created a condition and the ultimate injury was not a natural and probable foreseeable consequence.
Facts:
- On September 5, 1977, Officer Jon Havert and his partner pulled a police car over near the east side curb of Taylor Street in Fort Wayne to investigate a reported prowler.
- Nedrey Hook abruptly stopped his car behind Havert's police car.
- Claude Caldwell's car then struck the rear of Nedrey Hook's car.
- Jon Havert, Nedrey Hook, and Thelma Hook walked between the Hooks' and Caldwell's cars to survey the damage.
- Loretta Warren drove her car into the rear of Caldwell's car, pushing it forward into the Hooks' car, which then hit the police car.
- Mr. and Mrs. Hook and Officer Havert all suffered serious personal injuries caused by the impact of Warren's car.
- The accidents occurred in the curbside lane of the eastbound lane of Taylor Street, which was 21 feet wide, and where parking was legally permitted at the time.
Procedural Posture:
- Nedrey and Thelma Hook, along with Jon and Diane Havert, filed a complaint against Claude Caldwell and Loretta Warren in the Allen Superior Court.
- The case was transferred via a change of venue to Noble Circuit Court.
- Claude Caldwell moved for partial summary judgment, and the trial court granted his motion, premised on the theory that the Hooks and Havert were contributorily negligent.
- Hooks and Haverts (appellants) appealed the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment to the Indiana Court of Appeals.
- The Indiana Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.
- The Indiana Court of Appeals denied Caldwell's (appellee) Petition for Rehearing by written opinion.
- Caldwell then petitioned the Indiana Supreme Court for transfer under Ind.R.App.P. 11(B).
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Issue:
Does an unforeseeable intervening act of a third party, such as a drunken driver colliding with a legally positioned vehicle, break the chain of causation, thereby precluding a finding of proximate cause as a matter of law for the original negligent act?
Opinions:
Majority - GIVAN, Chief Justice
Yes, an unforeseeable intervening act breaks the chain of causation, precluding a finding of proximate cause as a matter of law for the original negligent act. The Court rejected the trial court's initial rationale that Hooks and Havert were contributorily negligent, distinguishing precedents like Phillips v. Croy and Hedgecock v. Orlosky by noting that in those cases, the injured plaintiffs were standing between vehicles in an active driving lane, whereas in this case, the plaintiffs were between vehicles in a legally permitted parking lane. The Court instead affirmed the grant of summary judgment for Caldwell on his alternative theory that his negligence was not the proximate cause of the injuries. Proximate cause requires that an injury be a natural and probable consequence that should have been reasonably foreseen or anticipated. An intervening cause cuts off liability if it was not reasonably foreseeable. The Court concluded that Caldwell could not reasonably have foreseen that a 'drunken driver, Warren, would come driving through the same lane of traffic in which parking was permitted and collide with his vehicle already situated in that lane in the same manner as any legally parked car would have been.' Citing Slinkard v. Babb, the Court held that Warren's act constituted an intervening force that broke the chain of causation between Caldwell's initial conduct and the plaintiffs' injuries due to its unforeseeability.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the application of proximate cause and intervening causes in Indiana negligence law, particularly within the context of multi-vehicle accidents. It emphasizes that foreseeability is paramount in determining whether an intervening act breaks the chain of causation, thereby absolving an initial tortfeasor of liability. The Court's distinction between vehicles stopped in a driving lane versus a legally permitted parking lane establishes a higher threshold for foreseeability of subsequent collisions in designated parking areas. This precedent will be crucial for courts in assessing the scope of liability when subsequent, independent negligent acts contribute to injuries following an initial act that merely created a 'condition.'
