Hassell v. Bird
420 P.3d 776, 234 Cal. Rptr. 3d 867, 5 Cal. 5th 522 (2018)
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Rule of Law:
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act immunizes an interactive computer service from a court order compelling it to remove defamatory third-party content when the service was not a party to the underlying lawsuit, as such an order treats the service as the publisher of that content.
Facts:
- In June 2012, Ava Bird hired the Hassell Law Group, owned by Dawn Hassell, for a personal injury matter.
- The Hassell Law Group withdrew from representing Bird in September 2012 due to communication difficulties.
- In January 2013, a user named 'Birdzeye B.' posted a negative, one-star review of the Hassell Law Group on Yelp's website, which Hassell believed was authored by Bird.
- Hassell emailed Bird, asserting the review was slanderous and requested its removal, but Bird refused.
- In February 2013, another negative one-star review of the firm was posted on Yelp by a user named 'J.D.,' which Hassell also attributed to Bird.
- In April 2013, 'Birdzeye B.' posted an update to her review, stating that Hassell had filed a lawsuit against her over the review and was trying to bully her into removing it.
- As a result of the negative reviews, the Hassell Law Group's overall Yelp rating dropped and the firm experienced a significant decrease in user engagement on the platform.
Procedural Posture:
- Dawn Hassell and The Hassell Law Group (plaintiffs) sued Ava Bird (defendant) in San Francisco Superior Court (trial court) for defamation and other torts.
- After Bird failed to appear, the trial court entered a default judgment against her, awarding damages and issuing an injunction.
- The injunction ordered Bird to remove the defamatory reviews and also separately ordered non-party Yelp.com to remove the reviews.
- Yelp was served with a copy of the judgment and filed a motion to set aside and vacate the judgment, which the trial court denied.
- Yelp, as appellant, appealed the trial court's denial to the California Court of Appeal.
- The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's order, holding that the injunction against Yelp did not violate Section 230 or due process.
- The California Supreme Court granted Yelp's petition for review.
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Issue:
Does Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act immunize an interactive computer service from a state court removal order that requires it to remove third-party content that was adjudicated to be defamatory in a lawsuit to which the service was not a party?
Opinions:
Majority - Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.
Yes, Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act immunizes an interactive computer service from such an order. An injunction that compels a service like Yelp to remove third-party content treats it as the 'publisher or speaker' of that content, which is expressly prohibited by § 230(c)(1). Allowing plaintiffs to obtain a removal order against a non-party service provider would constitute an 'end-run' around the broad immunity Congress intended to confer. This immunity applies to a service provider's exercise of traditional editorial functions, including the decision to publish, withdraw, or alter content. The litigation strategy of suing only the content's author does not change the fact that the subsequent order against the platform improperly holds it accountable for its publication of third-party content, thereby contravening the statutory shield designed to foster online speech and avoid entangling intermediaries in litigation.
Concurring - Kruger, J.
Yes, the injunction is invalid, but for the more fundamental reason that it violates due process. A court's power is generally limited to the parties in a case, and an injunction cannot be entered against a non-party like Yelp without providing it a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Yelp was a stranger to the litigation until the order was issued, and it is a violation of basic procedural fairness to compel it to act without its own day in court. While the plurality's Section 230 analysis is correct under these specific facts, the case should be resolved on the narrower, antecedent ground of due process.
Dissenting - Liu, J.
No, Section 230 does not immunize Yelp from this removal order. The statute is designed to shield platforms from being sued for tort liability, not to insulate them from a remedial court order directed at content already adjudicated to be defamatory in a suit against the author. No cause of action was brought against Yelp and no liability was imposed on it for its role as a publisher; the injunction is a remedy for Bird's tortious conduct. The concerns animating Section 230—protecting services from the burden of investigating potentially defamatory speech—are absent when a court has already determined the speech is unlawful. Yelp's active role in disseminating Bird's speech makes it a proper subject of an order designed to make the judgment against Bird effectual.
Dissenting - Cuéllar, J.
No, Section 230 is not a 'trump card' that allows an interactive computer service to evade responsibility for complying with a state court order. The statute does not preempt California's long-standing authority to enforce injunctions against non-parties who aid and abet an enjoined party's violation of a court order. The plurality's broad interpretation misconstrues the statute and endangers victims of online torts by rendering court remedies ineffective. This case should be remanded for a determination of whether Yelp's conduct—such as featuring the defamatory review and advocating on Bird's behalf—constituted aiding and abetting Bird's violation of the injunction.
Analysis:
This decision significantly expands the protective scope of Section 230, establishing that its immunity shields non-party platforms from injunctions compelling the removal of content, even after that content has been judicially found to be defamatory. It effectively closes a potential procedural loophole where a plaintiff could sue only the content creator to obtain a removal order against a platform. The ruling solidifies the legal status of online platforms as passive conduits rather than active enforcers of court judgments concerning third-party speech, making it far more difficult for individuals to compel the removal of defamatory material from the internet through legal action directed at the platform.
