Harvey v. State
111 Md. App. 401, 681 A. 2d 628, 1996 Md. App. LEXIS 118 (1996)
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Rule of Law:
The doctrine of transferred intent applies to consummated criminal homicides where an unintended victim is killed, but it does not apply to inchoate crimes, such as assault with intent to murder, when the unintended victim is injured but not killed.
Facts:
- A fight occurred between two groups of men on an apartment complex parking lot, involving Latrice Michelle Harvey's brother and a man named Antoine.
- Harvey (known as 'Kitty Cat') and a male companion arrived at the scene of the confrontation.
- An unidentified person passed a gun to Harvey, who then passed it to her male companion.
- Harvey pointed to one man and instructed her companion, 'Shoot him,' and said she 'wanted him dead.'
- The companion fired approximately five shots but missed the intended target.
- Harvey then pointed to a second intended target, and at her direction, her companion fired about four more shots.
- The shots missed the second target, but one of the errant bullets struck an innocent bystander, Tiffany Evans, in the leg.
Procedural Posture:
- Latrice Michelle Harvey was charged in a Maryland state trial court in Prince George's County.
- Following a trial, a jury convicted Harvey of assault with intent to murder and reckless endangerment.
- Harvey appealed her convictions to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.
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Issue:
Does the doctrine of transferred intent apply to the inchoate crime of assault with intent to murder when an unintended victim is injured but not killed?
Opinions:
Majority - Moylan, J.
No, the doctrine of transferred intent does not apply to the inchoate crime of assault with intent to murder when the unintended victim is only injured and not killed. The court explained that the doctrine was developed out of necessity for consummated homicide cases to prevent a defendant from escaping murder liability when their bad aim results in an unintended death. This 'necessity principle' is absent in cases of inchoate homicide because other criminal charges, such as common law battery or reckless endangerment, are available to punish the defendant for the harm caused to the unintended victim. Extending the doctrine beyond consummated homicides would lead to logical inconsistencies and create a 'carnival' of legal fictions, as there would be no principled reason not to transfer other specific intents, such as intent to rob or rape. Therefore, the jury instruction on transferred intent was erroneous because it improperly relieved the State of its burden to prove Harvey had a specific intent to kill the actual victim, Tiffany Evans.
Analysis:
This decision establishes a bright-line rule in Maryland limiting the application of the transferred intent doctrine exclusively to consummated homicides. By refusing to extend the doctrine to inchoate crimes where the victim survives, the court reinforces the principle that specific intent crimes require proof of a defendant's actual mens rea toward the actual victim. This forces prosecutors in non-fatal, 'bad-aim' shooting cases to rely on other theories, such as the 'concurrent intent' or 'kill zone' doctrines, to secure convictions for serious offenses like attempted murder against unintended victims, rather than using the legal fiction of transferred intent. The ruling prevents the doctrine from being over-extended and maintains a clearer distinction between the legal treatment of consummated versus inchoate offenses.
