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Harvey v. Dow

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
962 A.2d 322 (2008)
ELI5:

Rule of Law:

A promisor's conduct, such as acquiescing to and participating in the construction of a substantial improvement on their land by a promisee, can imply a specific and enforceable promise to convey that land under the doctrine of promissory estoppel, even if the initial verbal promises were general and indefinite.


Facts:

  • Jeffrey B. Dow Sr. and Kathryn L. Dow owned 125 acres of land and had a long-standing general understanding that their daughter, Teresa L. Harvey, would one day receive some of this land.
  • With her parents' permission, Harvey first placed a mobile home and later built a garage on their property.
  • In 2003, Harvey decided to build a permanent house on the property with her own funds, ultimately costing her about $200,000.
  • Jeffrey Sr. agreed to the specific location for the house and obtained the necessary building permit in his own name because Harvey lacked sufficient road frontage.
  • Jeffrey Sr. actively participated in the construction of the house, performing a substantial amount of work on the foundation and carpentry.
  • After the house was completed, a family dispute arose, and the Dows refused to provide Harvey with a deed to the property where her house was located.

Procedural Posture:

  • Teresa L. Harvey filed a complaint against Jeffrey B. Dow Sr. and Kathryn L. Dow in the Maine Superior Court, seeking a court order to convey real property or award damages.
  • The Dows filed a counterclaim asking the court to declare that Harvey had no rights to their property.
  • After a bench trial, the Superior Court entered judgment for the Dows on Harvey's claims and on their counterclaim.
  • Harvey filed post-trial motions for further findings and to amend the judgment, arguing the court failed to properly analyze her promissory estoppel claim.
  • The Superior Court denied the motions, finding that the Dows' statements were not sufficiently definite to constitute an enforceable promise.
  • Harvey (appellant) appealed the Superior Court's judgment to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, with the Dows as appellees.

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Issue:

Does a promisor's conduct, such as actively helping the promisee build a substantial and permanent house on the promisor's land, constitute an enforceable promise to convey that specific parcel of land under the doctrine of promissory estoppel, even when prior oral promises to convey land were general and indefinite?


Opinions:

Majority - Mead, J.

Yes. A promise sufficient for promissory estoppel need not be express but may be implied from a party’s conduct. While the Dows' initial verbal statements about giving land to their daughter were too general to be enforceable, their subsequent actions created an implied promise specific to the plot of land where the house was built. Jeffrey Sr.'s conduct—approving the site, obtaining a building permit, and personally performing substantial construction work on the $200,000 house—was a 'manifestation of intention to act in a specified way' that justified Harvey's reliance. The trial court erred by failing to consider the Dows' actions in conjunction with their general promises. Citing the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90 and the principles from Tozier v. Tozier, the court concluded that where a donee makes substantial improvements to land in foreseeable reliance on a promise (even an implied one), injustice can only be avoided by enforcing that promise.



Analysis:

This decision significantly clarifies the 'promise' element of promissory estoppel, particularly in intra-family real estate disputes. It establishes that a vague, unenforceable promise to convey land can be rendered specific and binding through the promisor's subsequent conduct that encourages and facilitates the promisee's substantial reliance. This precedent shifts the focus from the precise words of the initial promise to the entire course of conduct, making it easier for plaintiffs to enforce promises in situations where substantial, non-removable improvements are made with the promisor's active support. The case serves as a caution that one cannot encourage another to make a significant investment in land based on a promise and then revoke that promise by claiming it was never specific enough.

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