Hartman v. Moore
547 U.S. 250, 2006 U.S. LEXIS 3450, 164 L. Ed. 2d 441 (2006)
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Rule of Law:
A plaintiff in a First Amendment retaliatory prosecution claim must plead and prove that the underlying criminal charge was not supported by probable cause.
Facts:
- William G. Moore, Jr. was the CEO of Recognition Equipment Inc. (REI), a company that manufactured multiline optical character readers.
- Moore and REI opposed the U.S. Postal Service's policy promoting nine-digit zip codes, which favored competing single-line scanner technology.
- Moore actively lobbied Members of Congress and testified before committees, criticizing the Postal Service's policy and advocating for his company's technology.
- Moore's campaign was successful, and in July 1985, the Postal Service reversed its policy and adopted multiline technology.
- Shortly after this policy change, the Postal Service awarded a large contract for multiline equipment to one of REI's competitors.
- Subsequently, Postal Service inspectors initiated two criminal investigations involving Moore and REI.
- Based on these investigations, an Assistant U.S. Attorney secured a grand jury indictment against Moore and REI on criminal charges.
- During the criminal trial, the presiding judge granted a motion for acquittal, finding a 'complete lack of direct evidence' connecting Moore and REI to any wrongdoing.
Procedural Posture:
- After his acquittal, William G. Moore, Jr. filed a Bivens action against federal postal inspectors in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas, which was later transferred to the District of Columbia.
- The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the suit.
- On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reinstated Moore's retaliatory-prosecution claim against the inspectors.
- On remand, the inspectors moved for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds, arguing that the existence of probable cause for the prosecution defeated Moore's claim.
- The District Court denied the inspectors' motion for summary judgment.
- The inspectors (petitioners) filed an interlocutory appeal to the D.C. Circuit, which affirmed the District Court's decision, holding that a plaintiff in a retaliatory-prosecution case is not required to plead and prove a lack of probable cause.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split on this issue.
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Issue:
Does a plaintiff's First Amendment retaliatory prosecution claim require pleading and proving that the underlying criminal charge was not supported by probable cause?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Souter
Yes. A plaintiff in a retaliatory-prosecution action must plead and prove the absence of probable cause for the underlying criminal charges. The causal connection in such cases is complex because the defendant is a non-prosecuting official (like an investigator) who allegedly induced a prosecutor to act. To overcome the presumption of prosecutorial regularity, a plaintiff must show more than just the investigator's retaliatory animus. The absence of probable cause serves to bridge the causal gap, providing strong circumstantial evidence that the investigator's retaliatory motive was the but-for cause of the prosecutor's decision to bring charges. Conversely, the presence of probable cause suggests the prosecution would have occurred regardless of any retaliatory motive, breaking the causal chain between the investigator's animus and the plaintiff's injury. This requirement defines a key element of the tort and is necessary to show that an official's retaliatory animus successfully induced a prosecution that would not have otherwise occurred.
Dissenting - Justice Ginsburg
No. A plaintiff in a retaliatory prosecution claim should not be required to plead and prove the absence of probable cause. The majority's holding improperly shields officials who retaliate against protected speech, so long as they can establish even 'weak probable cause.' This rule forecloses relief in cases where strong evidence of retaliatory motive exists but the prosecution was not entirely baseless. The proper framework, consistent with Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, is to require the plaintiff to show that retaliatory animus was a motivating factor, after which the burden should shift to the defendant officials to prove that the prosecution would have been pursued anyway, regardless of their retaliatory motive and importuning.
Analysis:
This decision significantly raises the bar for plaintiffs bringing retaliatory prosecution claims under § 1983 and Bivens. By incorporating the 'no probable cause' element from the common law tort of malicious prosecution, the Court created a uniform standard that resolves a prior circuit split. The ruling prioritizes the protection of prosecutorial discretion and shields law enforcement officers from lawsuits, but it makes it substantially more difficult for individuals to seek redress for First Amendment violations in this context. Future plaintiffs must now not only prove a defendant's retaliatory motive but also overcome the high hurdle of demonstrating that the criminal charges initiated against them were legally baseless.
