Yes. The newspaper showed 'actual malice' because it deliberately avoided the truth. It's not just that they were sloppy; they had every reason to think their source might be lying. Instead of checking with the one person who really knew what happened or listening to the tapes, they went ahead and printed the story. That's like putting your hands over your ears when someone is trying to tell you you're wrong. That's not just a mistake; it's a 'reckless disregard for the truth.'

Yes, the higher court messed up because it was supposed to look at all the evidence again for itself to see if it clearly showed the newspaper lied on purpose or didn't care about the truth. The court can't just trust what the jury thought about some facts. Proving the newspaper was mad at Connaughton or didn't investigate the story enough isn't the same as proving they actually knew it was probably false. But if the newspaper purposely avoided the truth, that's different. Looking at everything, there is strong evidence here that the newspaper did act with actual malice.

I agree with the main opinion and don't think it goes against what Justice Scalia says in his own opinion.

I agree with the final decision, but not how the Court looked at the first question about the higher court's job. The Court only looked at the facts the jury actually used, not all the facts they could have used in Connaughton's favor. I would have done what the appeals court did and assumed the jury believed everything they reasonably could have that supported Connaughton, then decided if that clearly proved the newspaper acted badly on purpose.

In cases like this, the appeals court has to accept the jury's decisions about the basic facts of who did what and whether witnesses were telling the truth. But it gets to make up its own mind about whether the newspaper actually knew the story was probably false or didn't care. The main opinion fits with this view.

I agree with the overall decision, but want to make two points. First, some important issues about what was in the newspaper story didn't get looked at, like if it was true or just reporting what someone said. Second, what the article actually said matters for deciding if the newspaper knew it was false or didn't care. The Court's opinion shouldn't be read to say the article's content doesn't matter at all in figuring that out.

Such reckless disregard means the defendant entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the publication, ie, that the defendant had "a `high degree of awareness'"of its" `probable falsity

Although credibility determinations are reviewed under the clearly-erroneous standard... the reviewing court must `examine for [itself] the statements in issue and the circumstances under which they were made to see... whether they are of a character which the principles of the First Amendment... protect

A "failure to investigate before publishing, even when a reasonably prudent person would have done so, is not sufficient to establish reckless disregard."

"The question whether the evidence in the record in a defamation case is sufficient to support a finding of actual malice is a question of law."

A] public figure plaintiff must prove more than an extreme departure from professional standards "to demonstrate actual malice

The actual malice standard is not satisfied merely through a showing of ill will or "malice" in the ordinary sense of the term.

"Although failure to investigate will not alone support a finding of actual malice, the purposeful avoidance of the truth is in a different category."

In a case such as this involving the reporting of a third party's allegations, "recklessness may be found where there are obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of the informant or the accuracy of his reports."

"The standard is a subjective one—there must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant actually had `a high degree of awareness of... probable falsity.'"

As the trial court noted, the question whether evidence is sufficient to support a finding of actual malice is a question of law.

Yes. A newspaper's purposeful avoidance of the truth is sufficient evidence to support a finding of 'actual malice.' The constitutional 'actual malice' standard requires a public figure plaintiff to prove that a defamatory statement was made with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth. While a simple failure to investigate is insufficient to establish reckless disregard, the purposeful avoidance of the truth falls into a different category. Here, the Journal News had obvious reasons to doubt Alice Thompson's credibility, yet it deliberately chose not to interview the one witness, Patsy Stephens, who was most likely to confirm or discredit the story. Furthermore, it failed to listen to readily available tape recordings that could have shed light on the truth. This conduct, when viewed in its entirety, supports the inference that the newspaper made a deliberate decision not to acquire knowledge of facts that might confirm the probable falsity of its story, which constitutes reckless disregard.

Yes. The Court's opinion is consistent with the view that historical facts and credibility determinations are reviewable only under the clearly-erroneous standard. However, the 'reckless disregard' component of the 'actual malice' standard is a question of law, not a question of historical fact. Therefore, an appellate court must review that determination independently, which the Court properly does here.

Yes. While agreeing with the majority's conclusion, it is important to stress two points. First, the newspaper unwisely abandoned the 'neutral reportage' defense, which might have been applicable since the article accurately reported Thompson's statements as allegations and included Connaughton's denial. Second, the form and content of the story are highly relevant to the malice inquiry. Although the story's format as a report of allegations (unlike the factual assertions in *Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts*) weighs against a finding of malice, the extrinsic evidence of the newspaper's purposeful avoidance of the truth was so overwhelming that it still supported the jury's verdict.

Yes. While agreeing with the judgment, the majority's analytical approach is flawed. The proper method for an appellate court's independent review under *Bose* is to assume the jury resolved all reasonably disputed factual questions in favor of the plaintiff. The appellate court should then independently determine whether those facts, as found by the jury, establish actual malice by clear and convincing evidence. The majority errs by focusing only on the few factual findings it believes the jury *must* have made, rather than all findings it *could have* reasonably made in the plaintiff's favor.

Yes. The majority opinion is not inconsistent with the analysis set out in Justice Scalia's concurrence.

Yes, the Court of Appeals erred because it did not conduct an independent review of the entire record to determine whether the evidence established actual malice with convincing clarity. The Court of Appeals improperly relied on subsidiary facts implicitly established by the jury's verdict instead of drawing its own inferences from the evidence. The actual malice standard is not satisfied merely through a showing of ill will or 'malice' in the ordinary sense of the term, nor is a failure to investigate before publishing sufficient to establish reckless disregard. However, purposeful avoidance of the truth is in a different category, and recklessness may be found where there are obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of an informant or the accuracy of his reports. Based on an independent review of the entire record, the evidence does support a finding of actual malice in this case.

I join the opinion of the Court, for in my view it is not inconsistent with the analysis set out in Justice Scalia's separate concurrence.

I agree with the Court's disposition of this case and its resolution of the second legal issue on whether 'highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from ordinary standards of investigation and reporting' is alone enough to establish the malice necessary to assess liability in public figure libel cases. However, I disagree with the Court's approach to resolving the first question on the independent appellate review required by Bose. The Court finds it sufficient to decide the present case by accepting only the adequately supported favorable facts the jury did find, not all the favorable facts the jury could reasonably have found. I would have adopted the Sixth Circuit's analysis in its entirety, making an independent assessment of whether malice was clearly and convincingly proved on the assumption that the jury made all the supportive findings it reasonably could have made.

In cases like this, the historical facts are reviewable only under the clearly-erroneous standard mandated by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52. Credibility determinations and the issue of knowledge of falsity fall in this category. But the reckless disregard component of the actual malice standard is not a question of historical fact and is to be reviewed independently by the appellate court. The Court's opinion is consistent with these views.

I agree with the majority's analysis and result, but write separately to stress two points. First, the case reaches us in an odd posture that stands in the way of giving full consideration to aspects of the article's content that may be of constitutional significance, such as truth and neutral reportage. Second, I wish to emphasize that the form and content of the story are relevant not only to falsity and neutral reportage, but also to actual malice. The majority opinion should not be read to hold that article content is irrelevant to actual malice.

Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton

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